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DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK? A VIEW FROM
THE UNITED NATIONS
Gian Luca Burci*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question "do sanctions work?" can be interpreted not only as a
political or legal assessment about their effects on a State, but also as an
analysis of whether sanctions are designed, managed and enforced in a
manner which makes them viable for an extended period of time for those
who are required to implement them. Recent practice denies the once
popular argument that United Nations' sanctions could be a quick tool
giving an immediate devastating blow to the economy of the target State.
Instead, and especially when they aim at achieving deep policy changes,
sanctions are slow to be fully put in place, slow to work, and slow to
clearly show their effects, even when they are imposed against extremely
vulnerable states such as Haiti. The question whether sanctions work has
also to be seen in light of the lack of a widely shared understanding within
the Security Council about the purpose and acceptable scope and duration
of sanctions, which is reflected in the vague goals and formulation of most
current sanctions regimes. While scholarly debates concentrate on the
constitutional legitimacy of Security Council actions under the Charter, or
on their appropriateness and impact in specific cases, attention should also
be paid to some procedural aspects of the imposition, implementation,
management, and enforcement of sanctions. I will thus look at sanctions
from the perspective of the implementing States rather than their target. In
the absence of a consensus as to substantial reforms in the manner of using
economic sanctions, possible adjustments to make sanctions regimes more
"effective" should for the moment be configured within the existing legal
framework.
* Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
The views expressed are only those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
United Nations.
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II. DESIGN, FORMULATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SANCTIONS
Sanctions are conceived and resolutions drafted in a hurried
political atmosphere, even though they sometimes remain "in the pipeline"
for a while, theoretically ensuring the time for a better conceptual and
legal quality of the final product. The extreme politicization of the whole
exercise does not militate in favour of good and clear drafting; moreover,
the Security Council has shown a considerable linguistic and conceptual
conservatism, relying over and over on the language of previous
resolutions even though their terms have proved to be imprecise. Thus,
the term "transshipment" used in paragraph 6 of resolution 757 (1992)
instituting sanctions against Yugoslavia, actually refers to both
transshipment and transit, and recurs in this partial sense in resolutions 787
(1992) and 820 (1993). Needless to say, this generated considerable
confusion. Again in resolution 757 (1992), paragraph 5 on financial
restriction, repeats verbatim the language of paragraph 4 of resolution 661
(1990) on Iraq, even though the latter had generated considerable
uncertainties in many States as to whether it contained an obligation to
freeze Iraqi assets abroad. The issue was clarified in paragraph 21 of
resolution 820 (1993), almost one year later, and only after substantial
pressure by the United States. In the case of Iraq, it was clarified in
resolution 670 (1990), adopted in October 1990.
The atmosphere in which sanctions are designed also does not
militate in favour of a good coordination between measures contained in
the same resolution or in different resolutions. Financial sanctions have
proven to be particularly problematic, both in scope and, in relation to
trade restrictions. The question whether a commercial transaction
authorized by the competent Sanctions Committee, or falling outside the
scope of the sanctions, automatically legitimates the unfreezing of funds or
financial transactions otherwise prohibited, has been a vexing one in the
Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia Sanctions Committees. The ambiguity of the
resolutions, and the lack of agreement within the Committees, weakens the
credibility of the various regimes and opens dangerous loopholes. This is
particularly evident in the case of Libya where resolutions 748 (1992) and
883 (1993) impose only a limited trade embargo but much wider financial
sanctions, including a clear obligation to freeze Libyan assets.
These are probably inevitable shortcomings in view of the way in
which the Council operates. However, when a certain provision has
proved particularly problematic or contains obvious oversights, a few
pragmatic corrective steps could be taken. All existing Sanctions
Committees are requested by their establishing resolutions to recommend
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to the Security Council possible improvements of the sanctions. The
Committees have largely neglected this function, but they might rather
easily exercise it, as explained below. On the basis of these
recommendations, the Council could proceed to authentic interpretations of
its previous decisions. Precedents of this nature already exist, for
example, the clarification contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 787
(1992), that the expression "Yugoslav vessels" had to be interpreted for
the purposes of the sanctions as including vessels flying the flag of a third
State but owned by Yugoslav interests. Also, in paragraph 9 of resolution
670 (1990), the Council confirmed that the financial restrictions against
Iraq imposed by resolution 661 (1990) included the freeze of Iraqi assets.
Such interpretations could be inserted in a resolution or given in the form
of statements made by the President of the Council on behalf of its
members.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of sanctions by States is obviously the
backbone of the whole system. Sanctions resolutions, adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter, are immediately and unconditionally
mandatory for all Member States, but their largely non-self-executing
nature makes their incorporation into the legal system of each State
necessary. The approach used by the Charter, as consistently upheld by
the Sanctions Committees, emphasizes the sovereign duty and right of each
State to give its own interpretation to the vague and often open-ended
terms of the resolutions. This, of course, together with the wide variety of
national legal mechanisms regulating trade control measures, does not
favour uniformity of application in the absence of an institutional
coordinating or assisting mechanism. Recent practice has underlined this
rather unorganized state of affairs. For example, the Council has included
in most current sanctions regimes a provision prohibiting claims by the
target State in connection with the non-implementation of contracts or
other transactions as a consequence of the sanctions (for example,
paragraph 29 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 9 of resolution 757
(1992)). A typical example are performance bonds or similar bank
guarantees. The language used does not clarify whether such guarantees,
which are separate undertakings independent from the main contract, are
simply suspended until the lifting of the sanctions, or have become null
and void. Courts in several European countries have reached opposite
conclusions in this respect. These differences could be exploited by the
target State, which could engage in forum shopping in certain countries to
1996] 579
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obtain a judicial decision confirming indirectly the persistent validity of a
bank guarantee to its benefit.
Once again, this lack of uniformity is an inevitable result of the
Charter system and, indeed, of the attachment of States to the widest
possible preservation of their sovereign prerogatives. However, the
existing framework offers the possibility of feasible, if limited, corrective
steps which should be considered by the main supporters of the sanctions.
Any attempt to foster a greater uniformity in sanctions
implementation should be based on the reporting procedures established by
sanctions resolutions. Within the existing regimes, states are required to
report to the Council their implementation measures, normally in the
resolution initially imposing sanctions. Only one report is required; so far
there has been no provision for regular periodic reports. States are to
report within a short time-frame, normally a month, which is probably
meant to convey a sense of urgency and determination, but which does not
necessarily ensure accurate reporting. The reports have no fixed format
and vary widely, from vague statements of compliance with the sanctions
to detailed overviews of the relevant legislation. The Sanctions
Committees, with the initial partial exception of the Committee on Iraq
which sent a questionnaire to all states in early 1991, do not examine the
reports and do not entrust this task to the Secretariat, thus preventing the
establishment of an institutional memory and failing to exercise a
systematic scrutiny which could detect loopholes and deter possible
violations.
In order to build a more effective system, states should instead be
required by the Security Council to report on their domestic measures at
least once a year to the Sanctions Committee. They should be requested to
use a pre-established format to be indicated by the Committees, which
should focus on measures taken, legal problems encountered, patterns of
violations detected, and inter-state cooperation established. These reports
should then be considered by the Committees or one of their working
groups, in the course of formal meetings, on the basis of a preliminary
analysis carried out by the Secretariat. In exceptional cases, the reporting
states could be invited to provide clarifications during a meeting. On the
basis of their findings, the Committees could issue general comments
which, without mentioning individual States, would clarify the
interpretation of key provisions of the sanctions resolutions or highlight
common implementation problems. The Committees would also, if
appropriate, recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the
authentic interpretations mentioned above. This approach, which is close
to that employed by the Human Rights Committee, should not impose an
unacceptable burden on the Committees, as the number of countries
[Vol. 2:577580
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entertaining meaningful economic relations with the target State would
probably be limited. At the same time, it would go a long way towards
making more rational and uniform the implementation of sanctions, and
strengthening the credibility of the institutional machinery of the United
Nations as a source of assistance and support.
Another practical proposal would be the elaboration of a model
law for the implementation of multilateral sanctions or, if this is too
far-reaching at this time, of a set of minimum implementation requirements
to be issued in the form of a legal guide. The Security Council and its
subsidiary organs would not be suitable bodies for such an exercise. A
natural candidate for the task would rather be the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a subsidiary body
of the General Assembly, whose goal is precisely the uniformity of trade
law and which is a genuinely technical body with substantial expertise.
This would, incidentally, ensure a more active participation of the general
Assembly in the general management of sanctions.
IV. MANAGEMENT
The Security Council customarily establishes a partially centralized
management of the sanctions, centered in the Sanctions Committees. The
Committees are subsidiary bodies of the Council, and their membership is
the same as that of the Council at any given time; they take all decisions
by consensus and always meet in closed sessions. Their documentation is
of restricted circulation, thus their decisions are normally not released to
the United Nations membership at large. The Committees have been the
object of much criticism during the last few years, due to their secrecy,
politicization, lack of consistent criteria and penchant for heavy
micro-management. The Sanctions Committees are indeed political (and
politicized) organs, which discharge their mandate under the influence of
their most powerful members and their bilateral policies toward the target
State. As a result, they are not particularly well-suited for promoting and
ensuring a consistent and rational management of the functions falling
within their mandates.
I will limit myself to a few observations on issues that have a
particular impact on the "effectiveness" of existing sanctions. A first
observation is that there is a substantial discrepancy between the mandate
of the Committees on paper and in practice. A reading of the various
resolutions clearly shows that some of the functions provided therein, such
as those mentioned above concerning recommendations to the Council for
the improvement of the sanctions, are practically not carried out. The
actual activities of the Committees can be grouped in three categories:
Burci
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investigation of possible violations; regulation of exceptions to the
sanctions (normally those concerning "humanitarian" situations); and
advice, normally on a case-by-case basis, on the scope of certain
provisions.
The latter category has no explicit basis in any sanctions
resolution. This would not be a matter of great concern per se; reliance on
a reasonable interpretation of the implied powers of the Committees, as
well as the acquiescence of the Council and the whole United Nations
membership, constitute a sufficient legal basis for the legitimacy of this
function. However, on the one hand, the Committees have occasionally
given general interpretations of the terms of the resolutions, for example,
with regards to the conditions for allowing Yugoslav athletes to participate
in sporting events. On the other hand, in several important cases, the
Committees have gone beyond a purely advisory role and have couched
their decisions in terms granting or denying approval for certain actions or
transactions. In the latter case, this function is of a rather regulatory
nature, but it sometimes concerns issues for which the resolutions do not
foresee any regulatory role for the Committee. Even though, to my
knowledge, no State has claimed that the Committees act ultra vires in this
respect, it would still be important for the long-term viability of sanctions
that the actual functions of the Committees be spelled out in clearer and
more specific terms in the enabling resolutions.
The approval of "humanitarian" and other transactions has raised
much criticism for the slowness of the Committees' procedure; its apparent
lack of sensitivity for the exceptional gravity of certain humanitarian
situations; its tendency to micro-manage in a way that has impaired
legitimate trade flows; and its refusal to indicate in a general and consistent
way what kind of situations and products will be considered under the
humanitarian exceptions. The latter approach obviously makes the
approval pattern of the Committees somehow erratic. The performance of
the Committee on Yugoslavia has admittedly improved, also as a result of
the strong criticism just mentioned, but much remains to be done. The
elaboration of general approval criteria, in particular, has proved
particularly difficult.
Even though there are clear limits to a "rationalization" of the
approach used by the Committees, an improvement of a general nature
which would go a long way in making their role and functions more
acceptable, relates to their accountability and transparency. Under the
latter respect, the Council has recently taken some welcome, if limited,
steps, providing for example for the issuing of press releases by the
Committees and the distribution of the list of approvals of humanitarian
transactions to permanent missions that so request. However, the Council
[Vol. 2:577
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and the Committees should seriously consider publishing at least a
summary of their most important decisions, as well as figures and statistics
concerning their work. The proposal made above concerning general
interpretive comments should be seen in this context. Moreover, since in a
paper-based organization such as the United Nations, reporting is the main
instrument to ensure accountability, the reporting requirements for the
Committees should be clarified and strengthened. It is unacceptable that
the Committees almost never report to the Security Council, and the latter
does not report to the General Assembly on their activities. This state of
affairs worsens the already existing imbalance within the Organization
between the two major policy-making organs. A serious display of
commitment and self-restraint in this direction by the Council would make
the management of the sanctions more transparent, acceptable, and viable
in the long term.
V. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT
Also in this case, the United Nations system is based on the
sovereignty of each of its Members; which have the duty to adopt the
necessary measures for the supervision and enforcement of the sanctions
within their jurisdiction. There is a lack of institutional machinery for
cooperation and coordination in this regard. The Sanctions Committees
are supposed to be the main institutional watchdogs, relying on
information provided to them or reported in the media in order to discover
and publicize violations. However, the reliance on the sovereign good
faith of States acts as a limit to the effectiveness of this function. The
Committees have to follow a rather slow and cumbersome diplomatic
procedure, which often stops in front of the denial by a state of any
wrongdoing. As a result, in the case of Yugoslavia, the violations
reported to the Security Council have been a trickle, in strident contrast
with the large number reported in the media. This weakens the credibility
of the sanctions, and consequently the level of actual commitment by many
States.
The inherent weakness of the United Nations' role in monitoring
and enforcement, and the evident need to go beyond absolute reliance on
individual compliance by States, explains the proliferation of forms of
naval enforcement authorized by the Security Council.' It is worth
recalling the interesting discussions about the Charter basis for the naval
quarantine established against Iraq; such discussions have not generated a
real consensus among scholars, but, in the meantime, the formula used in
1. For example, in resolution 665 (1990) for Iraq; resolution 787 (1992) for Yugoslavia;
and resolution 875 (1993) for Haiti.
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the Gulf has developed into a legally more coherent instrument. The
Multinational Interception Force operating in the Gulf under United States
command had no clear connection with, or reporting obligation to, the
United Nations; the forces operating in the Adriatic were, instead, under
the aegis of regional organizations (NATO and WEU), acting within
Chapter VIII of the Charter and reporting regularly to the Sanctions
Committees. This is a welcome development, as it makes enforcement
activities more transparent and complementary to the monitoring role of
the Committees.
However, "hard" enforcement by itself can be an unpopular and
non-viable option in the long term, among other reasons for its high costs,
the concerns raised by a foreign military presence, and open questions
about liability for expenses and damages caused by the interception of
innocent ships. The Council, or regional organizations supporting a
particular sanctions regime, should thus consider the establishment of
forms of "soft" monitoring and enforcement, focusing more on assistance
to implementing States than on coercive measures. Whereas this is totally
lacking in the case of Iraq, a very developed and interesting example
regards the sanctions against Yugoslavia. The European Union and the
OSCE deployed a number of Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) in
countries neighbouring Yugoslavia, on the basis of bilateral agreements
with the latter. These Missions were staffed with customs officers who
assisted the local customs in complying with the sanctions, detecting
violation, and managing the traffic in goods authorized by the Sanctions
Committee. They reported to, and were coordinated by, a communication
centre (SAMCOMM) based in the European Community Commission in
Brussels, which liased with the Committee, regional organizations, and
humanitarian agencies. The high level of expertise, and the sophisticated
equipment supplied, allowed SAMs and SAMCOMM to exchange
information in real time and to assess with a high degree of accuracy the
absolute impact of sanctions. The installation of computer links, and the
secondment of liaison officers to the Sanctions Committee, ensured the
possibility of a full participation by the United Nations side. The presence
of customs officers from virtually all Western countries provided local
authorities with invaluable technical assistance, and constituted a strong
deterrent against a weak implementation of the sanctions. Thanks to the
presence of the SAMs, but with the exception of Albania and Macedonia,
the number of violations has been extremely low, thus maximizing the
impact of the sanctions on Yugoslavia. Finally, the establishment of a
reliable monitoring mechanism on the Danube has been vital for
minimizing the disruption of legitimate traffic and economic hardship for
riparian States.
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Interestingly enough, this exercise has taken place entirely outside
the legal framework established by the Security Council, which limits itself
to encouraging regional efforts and cooperation. Moreover, the Sanctions
Committee has shown reluctance in following the recommendations and
technical advice from the SAMs and SAMCOMM, and even more, in
delegating some of the micro-management to them. It has taken more than
a year to convince the Committee to relax the restrictions on traffic on the
Danube, and to entrust the SAMs with the monitoring of non--strategic
goods passing through Serbian waters. Once again, the political "instinct"
to preserve as much authority as possible, and not to commit oneself to a
particular course of action, clashes with considerations of rational
management of sanctions or the need to minimize the inconveniences to
third, particularly front-line, States. Still, the presence of the SAMs and
the technical input of SAMCOMM has inevitably shaped and somehow
rationalized the work of the Committee, as compared to that of the
Committee on Iraq. The form of regional involvement just described
constitutes a very important precedent, and should be considered again for
future sanctions regimes. Certainly, the imposition of sanctions within the
European context, which brought forth the deep involvement of NATO,
EU and OSCE, may not recur easily. However, the EU or OSCE, whose
members have been quite frequently the direct initiators of sanctions
regimes in recent times, could offer the same kind of assistance to States
outside Europe, as a form of technical cooperation in the enforcement of
collective security measures. Its soft features, which would avoid Chapter
VII actions, together with the financial and political leverage of the
offering states, would make this formula potentially appealing and
promising for the success of sanctions programmes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
United Nations sanctions have been described as a blunt and rough
instrument, producing much collateral damage and showing few results in
the short term. It is important that the overall design and management of
the sanctions not be equally "blunt", that it could decrease their negative
impact for blind States as well as companies and international
organizations, obliged to give them effect. It would be highly desirable if
the international community could agree on a more rational and strategic
use of this instrument. However, since this result is quite unlikely in the
short term, the Security Council could and should consider a number of
rather pragmatic and feasible improvements within the existing regimes,
which would substantially enhance both the implementation and the image
19961 585
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of United Nations sanctions. I have tried through this contribution to
highlight a few of them.
WHEN ARE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE?
SELECTED THEOREMS AND COROLLARIES
W. Michael Reisman*
Economic sanctions may take many forms and may be applied
unilaterally or multilaterally, but like all uses of the economic instrument,
they involve the purposive threat or actual granting or withholding of
economic indulgences, opportunities, and benefits by one actor or group of
actors in order to induce another actor or group of actors to change or
adjust an internal or external policy. The external policy that has been
targeted may be the withdrawal of the target from territory it has seized or
illegally occupied, as, for example, South Africa's long occupation of
Namibia; a change in an internal policy, for example patterns of human
rights violations in China; or even the replacement of the elite in the target
State, for example Peron in Argentina after the Second World War or
Saddam in Iraq at the moment.
Economic sanctions are used often in international politics, not
necessarily explicitly, indeed sometimes with demurrers or denials by the
sanctionfeasor, who may insist that the consequences, which are, of
course, regrettable, are the ineluctable result of some other lawful action.'
An agriculture-exporting State's perishable products aboard a ship in
harbor may slowly compost, as the importing State's customs inspectors,
with unprecedented care, examine each hold, "by the book," all this
occurring at a moment when the two States are engaged in a critical
negotiation. But, denials or not, the target always gets the message.
Economic sanctions are not quite "equal opportunity" instruments,
but their use is certainly not limited to the greatest States against the
smallest States. Any disparity in power in general or as a result of an even
transitory situation, can provide the basis for the design and application of
* Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. Andrew Willard
made helpful comments on a draft of the paper.
1. In this respect, I would depart from the approach taken by HUFBAUER ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2nd ed. 1991), which is the indispensable work in this
field and must be consulted for any inquiry. The authors only examine explicit cases of economic
sanctions. I believe that it is a much more common occurrence than they allow and that it is
particularly important to consider, inter alia, covert uses of the economic instrument, such as
shifts of hard currency reserves to strengthen or weaken the currency of the target State before an
election. See generally REISMAN & BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION (1992).
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an economic sanction program. During the stormy election of the
Secretary-General of the OAS less than two years ago, some Caribbean
States angrily accused Costa Rica of using "banana diplomacy" to
persuade certain States to support the candidate it had put forward. Costa
Rica is hardly a superpower. Conversely, immunity from economic
sanctions is a matter of degree. Even large and powerful States such as
the United States may be targeted effectively. The People's Republic of
China has mounted an extraordinarily effective economic sanctions
program against the United States through which it has secured virtually all
the adjustments in America's China policy that it seeks. One of the most
fascinating aspects of this particular economic sanction program is that the
target, the United States, seems possessed of the idea that it is the
economic sanctioner while States like China are the targets!
Are economic sanctions effective? If that means when used
without the military strategy, can and do they induce desired adjustments
in the external or internal policies of the target, the answer is yes. In
1919, Woodrow Wilson, one of the great enthusiasts of economic
sanctions said:
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender.
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there
will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost
a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon
the nation which, in my judgment, no modem nation could resist. 2
Wilson was speaking as a propagandist for the League and did not need, in
that role and context, to specify the conditions for the success of the
instrument. But his basic point still holds: economic sanctions can be
highly effective. The pertinent question is under what circumstances and
conditions are uses of the economic instrument likely to be effective? The
answers to that question should indicate what adjustments should be made
in the planning and implementation of economic sanction programs in
order to increase their effectiveness.
Let us set some parameters to facilitate our inquiry this morning.
I will discuss the use of economic instruments alone or in
conjunction with the other non-military strategic instruments, the
diplomatic and the propagandic, but not in conjunction with the military
instrument. Thus, I will exclude uses of the economic instrument as an
integral part of an overt military strategy, either as a precursor to invasion,
designed to "soften up" the enemy, or in the course of a long war, as a co-
ordinate form of "economic warfare."
2. SAUL K. PADOVER, WILSON'S IDEALS 108 (1942).
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I will not consider cosmetic uses of the economic instrument, in
which a manifest and highly public program is set in place with no
expectation that it will achieve its manifest objective. When the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States imposed a grain
embargo. Unless there was, in Jacob Viner's memorable phrase, a
concurrent moratorium in Washington on the deliberate exercise of
intelligence, we may assume that the designers of this program had no
illusion about its effectiveness any more than they expected the United
States' boycott of the Moscow Olympics to lead to a prompt Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
I am not suggesting that prospectively ineffective uses of the
economic instrument are without political consequence. They may still
reinforce public commitment to the norm that has been violated and
generate a sense of civic virtue in the government and public of the
sanctioning State, without incurring unacceptable domestic political costs.
In every instance in which a norm is violated, the most urgent social task
is not punishing the violators, but re-establishing in the minds of the
community, the continuing validity of the norm. Hence symbolic or
cosmetic economic sanction programs may have important functions and
may be deemed to have been effective in terms of those functions, despite
the fact that they did not secure adjustments in the policies of the target
State.
Nor will I deal with symbolic economic sanction programs that
will be manifestly ineffective, but, by confirming the unlawfulness of the
target's behavior and its continuing intransigence, will prepare the public
in the sanctioning State for more assertive action. It is interesting to note
that the same threshold finding under Article 39 of the United Nations
Charter is required for economic and military action. Hence once the
Council has decided on economic sanctions, for which there may be less
political objection, the continuing resistance of the target itself becomes an
increasingly more compelling argument for more severe action.
Because the question on which we will focus is when or under
what conditions is the purposive use of the economic instrument to grant or
withhold benefits in order to secure changes of internal or external policies
of a target likely to be effective, let us stipulate what it meant by
"effectiveness." The economic sanctions programs will be deemed to have
been effective to the extent that, to some degree, a desired adjustment
whether or not publicly announced or acknowledged was made in the
policies of the target and a causal link may be discerned between the
sanction program and that policy adjustment.
This type of assessment of success is far from easy, for a number
of reasons. For one thing, the proclaimed or manifest goal of the program
1996] 589
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may not be the actual goal. Thus, a failure of the manifest goal may
conceal substantial effectiveness in the achievement of latent goals. In the
case of the Iraqi sanctions, for example, Saddam Hussein has not been
removed from power, but his external effectiveness has been neutralized.
Assessments of success are also difficult because of the complex
problem of social causality. Many factors are in play in every situation.
Logicians admonish us to be wary of the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter
hoc, i.e., the fact that an event follows another event does not per se mean
that it was caused by the other event. A sanction program may appear to
have been successful when in fact a key part of the result may be due to
deferred concessions secretly promised by the sanctioner.
The assessment of effectiveness is also made difficult by the fact
that political actors will put their own "spin" on the outcome of events.
For example, in the recent trade negotiations between the United States
and Japan, each used variants of economic instruments: The United States
threatened to impose heavy, effectively punitive duties on selected
Japanese goods, Japan threatened to take the matter to a World Trade
Organization panel. Predictably, the matter was settled before, either of
these actions was actually consummated. I am not certain as to which of
the parties prevailed in the transaction (though I have certain suspicions).
In any case, what is relevant here is that each party may point to its use of
the economic instrument as a critical factor in the outcome, while
minimizing the effective of its adversary's use of the instrument.
I now propose to formulate a number of theorems and corollaries
about the circumstances or conditions under which economic sanction
programs are likely to be effective.
One: Economic sanctions are more likely to be effective when the
change in policy sought from the target is, in Roger Fisher's terms, an
essentially "yessible proposition," i.e., the party to whom it is addressed
can accept it without suffering a critical value loss. Thus, sanctions aimed
at removing a dictator, who has effective control of the political order of
the target State, are unlikely to be effective. Similarly, sanctions aimed at
changes that would involve serious loss of face in the cultural context of
the target are unlikely to be effective.
There are several corollaries to the theorem of "yessibility." First,
the degree of yessibility of the policy adjustment sought will, in direct
proportion, increase or decrease the quantum of destructive force
necessary for the effectiveness of the sanction program. Put bluntly, the
less yessible the policy adjustment you seek from the target State, the more
coercion you must be prepared to invest in your sanction program.
A second corollary holds that yessibility will be increased by an
accommodative formulation of the policy adjustment that is sought, i.e. a
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formulation that takes account of the needs or circumstances of the target
elite. In particular, change that can be accomplished in ways that permit
the target to save face are more yessible. In some circumstances, a
package deal, in which the sanctioner appears to be making a concession
to the target in return for the target's concession to the sanctioner may also
increase yessibility. In this respect, economic sanction programs are more
likely to be seen as part of a larger negotiation process, in which the
economic instrument's role is not prominent and the result is likely to be
attributed to negotiation rather than to the application of sanctions.
A third corollary, which is put forward much more tentatively,
holds that adjustments in external policies will be more yessible than
adjustments in internal policies, insofar as internal policies are likely to
undermine the effectiveness of the political elite.
Two: Sanctions aimed at securing changes of policy are more
likely to be effective when the political elite in the target State is itself
composed of rational profit-maximizing economic actors or the internal
political structure of the target is such that the political elite, though not
economically oriented, must take account of the interests of other rational
economic actors. Thus, sanctions will be less effective in securing
changes of behavior in repressive dictatorships that control internally
through an apparatus of terror and more effective against liberal
democracies. As a result, the success of sanction programs against
dictatorships will soon begin to be measured in terms of the destruction of
the target economy, rather than in terms of a change of internal or external
behavior. In this respect, these sanctions will quickly acquire the character
of economic warfare in a larger military program.
This is a particularly intriguing theorem, for of course it is the
liberal democracies that have, to date, made the most manifest use of
economic sanctions and frequently, but not exclusively used them against
authoritarian governments. But authoritarian governments can also play
the game and the purpose of this theorem is to alert us to the possibility
that they might be able to wield economic sanctions more effectively than
their democratic counterparts. Consider the interesting situation in United
States-China relations: the threat and/or application of United States
sanctions against China in the post-Tianamen period has been ineffective in
changing China's human rights policies and practices. In contrast, the
threat and/or application of Chinese sanctions against the United States, in
terms of reducing economic opportunities in China for United States
business while increasing them for our economic competitors, has been
quite effective. Indeed, the current United States Administration has
largely surrendered our hitherto major economic sanction technique for
securing Chinese compliance with international standards of human rights
1996]
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by decoupling the granting of Most Favored Nation status from human
rights performance exactly as demanded by the Chinese government!
In terms of this theorem, the sanction target against which an
American program is likely to be most effective is a State like apartheid
South Africa, in which a distinct commercial elite stands to suffer
significant deprivations as a result of the sanctions and is in a position to
influence the political elite. For the same reasons, the United States is
likely to be a prime target for effective economic sanctions programs
mounted by other States with whom we have important economic ties.
The least auspicious sanction target is a State like Castro's Cuba, where
there is no independent wealth elite and the political elite and its security
apparatus are not oriented to or likely to be affected by wealth
deprivations.
The critical factor in this theorem is the degree of political
relevance of the internal wealth elite. A corollary to this theorem holds
that the sanction program will fail, despite the political relevance of a
wealth elite that is suffering the brunt of the sanctions, when the sanction
program itself generates a new politically relevant wealth elite that actually
benefits from the sanctions. Thus, in General Cedras' Haiti, the existing
wealth elite suffered from the sanctions, but its influence on the military
dictatorship was more than counter-balanced by a new elite which was
enriching itself by trade in contraband and other transactions which had
become profitable, thanks to the sanction program itself.
Three: Sanction programs will be less effective when the target's
elite has or can acquire supportive contacts within the sanctioning State.
Thus, China can retain law firms, public relations firms, business lobbies,
and consulting firms composed of former high officials who continue to
have great influence on policy in the United States, while the United States
is unable to acquire comparable instruments of influence in China.
Four: Sanctions will be less effective when the political economy
of the target is sufficiently varied to adapt itself to the exigencies of the
circumstances. Thus, an economy based on a single commodity, such as
sugar is less able to diversify and respond effectively to a broad sanction
program. In contrast, a diversified economy, like that of Panama, is likely
to be able to mount many defensive or adaptive measures to blunt the force
of sanctions.
A corollary to this theorem would hold that the degree of
authoritarianism of the regime of the target State will affect its
mono-cultural economic vulnerability. The more authoritarian the regime,
the more it can compensate for its economic vulnerability.
Five: In circumstances in which there is a high degree of
interdependence between the sanctioner and the target, such that many of
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the deprivatory effects of the sanction program will be felt by economic
factors within the sanctioner, the sanction program is less likely to be
effective, in proportion to the political relevance of the domestic factors
likely to be hurt by the sanctions, for there will be pressure within the
sanctioning State to reduce the scope and intensity of the program to an
essentially symbolic level. In these circumstances, one may find, under
the rubric of an economic sanctions program, what is essentially a
propagandic program, one of whose critical targets is that part of the
targetting State's constituency who are demanding action and who are,
thus, reassured that "everything" possible is being done when in fact
virtually nothing is being done. This does not mean that the resulting
symbolic sanction program has no political meaning, as I explained earlier.
United States' responses to China may be an example of this theorem.
Six: In situations of bipolarity, an economic sanction imposed by
one superpower against a smaller State is unlikely to be effective because
the smaller State has the capacity to turn to the other superpower to
supplement what has been deprived. Thus, during the Cold War, Stalin's
economic sanction program against Tito's Yugoslavia failed because Tito
was able to turn to the West, which eagerly and generously embraced him.
Conversely, the United States' sanction program against Cuba at the end of
the Eisenhower Administration and thereafter was largely ineffective,
because (and as long as) Cuba could turn to the Soviet Union.
A corollary to this theorem is that in situations of competitive
multi-polarity, the unilateral imposition of sanctions is less likely to be
effective. The operational implication of this corollary is that in situations
of multipolarity, unilateral sanctions should be channeled through
international organizations so that as many States as possible are obliged to
participate in them. The compromises necessary to win organizational
support may be more than compensated in the effectiveness of the
narrower but multilateral program.
A second corollary to this theorem is that in market situations of
intense competition, economic sanctions mounted unilaterally are unlikely
to be effective insofar as the target State can develop alternative supplies
or markets.
A third corollary holds that short-term programs are more likely to
be effective with respect to goods that cannot be stockpiled and/or are
seasonal, e.g., highly perishable fruit, for the more perishable the items
involved, the less real-time opportunity for the target to find and arrange
an alternative market.
A fourth corollary to this theorem is that in circumstances in which
the sanctioning State enjoys a monopolistic or monopsonistic relation with
the target, its sanction program is likely to be more effective.
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Seven: The more civilians and non-combatants suffer in the target,
the more popular indignation in other States (and even in the sanctioning
State) will be directed against the sanctions. Hence the target will use the
propaganda instrument intensively. Planning for extended sanction
programs that cause wide-spread collateral damage will, accordingly,
require coordinate propagandic programs that justify the continuation of
sanctions to politically relevant strata whose support is necessary for the
sanction program.
Eight: Many of the preceding theorems suggest that the
effectiveness of a sanction program may be enhanced by making it
plurilateral or international. A sanction program conducted through the
United Nations Charter, under Chapter VII, has the benefit of being
obligatory on all other States' parties by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter
as well as having a monitoring mechanism that is not associated directly
with the State primarily interested in having the sanction program.
Other theorems may be generated, but even the limited selection of
theorems we have examined this morning should confirm that economic
sanctions can be a powerful and often destructive instrument. As in all
politics and law, much depends on an understanding of the instrument and
the context and the skill of the hands of those who shape and wield it. But
properly designed and used intelligently in the appropriate contexts,
economic sanction programs can be as effective as Wilson argued. Indeed,
precisely because of their potential destructiveness and comparative
inability to avoid collateral damage, their application should always, as I
have argued elsewhere, meet the fundamental international legal tests for
the lawful use of force. 3
3. Michael Reisman, Assessing the Lawfulness of Non-Military Enforcement: The Case of
Economic Sanctions, PROCEEDINGS OF ASIL, Apr. 8, 1995.
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WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, WILL THE UNITED NATIONS
PLAY IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY OVER THE NEXT FIFTY
YEARS?
Commander Thomas J. Donlon*
After two years of close observation of the United Nations
struggling to answer the challenge of Article 7 of its Charter "to maintain
international peace and security," I have become an optimist on the
question of the United Nations' future, if nonetheless a cautious, realistic
one. Whether the United Nations will have such a role, however, depends
on the collective ability of the international community to learn from the
past fifty years of the organization. Lawyers, particularly those trained in
the common law system of precedents, appreciate as much as historians the
value of looking to past experience to guide future actions. In the
particular case of the United Nations, there is a rich history and
experience, both positive and negative, to aid in taking those measures that
will allow the organization to continue to strive toward the dreams of its
founders.
While the purpose of the entire United Nations is maintenance of
international peace and security, Article 24 of the Charter confers
"primary responsibility" for this on the Security Council. Conventional
wisdom holds that the bipolarity of the permanent members during the
Cold War prevented the Security Council from performing this role.
However, during the years of the Cold War, the United Nations developed
a mechanism to attempt to deal with some international conflicts:
peacekeeping. With the end of the Cold War there was an explosive
growth in the number and size of peacekeeping operations. Between 1945
and 1987, thirteen peacekeeping operations were undertaken. In the next
eight years, nineteen new peacekeeping operations were begun.' In
* United States Coast Guard Adviser, United States Mission to the United Nations. The
opinions stated are those of the author only and do not represent the position of the United States,
the State Department or the Coast Guard.
1. UN Department of Public Information, Background Note on Peacekeeping Operations,
DPI/1634/PKO, Jan. 1995.
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January 1988 there were 9500 United Nations peacekeepers deployed; by
October, 1995 their number was almost 60,000.
Today there is a rising tide of public criticism of the Untied
Nations and peacekeeping, in particular in the United States. For the
United Nations to be a relevant force in the next fifty years, member states
must answer this criticism and demonstrate to the electorates in an
increasingly democratic world the value of actions under the authority of
the United Nations and its Charter. Some of the criticism can be traced to
the unfortunate tendency by practitioners, as well as the media, to merge
all United Nations operations involving military personnel under the rubric
of peacekeeping. Yet this generic term really encompasses a broad range
of activities. Traditional peacekeeping, the model formulated during the
Cold War, involved lightly armed peacekeepers, or even unarmed
observers, who were introduced into a region to monitor a peace
agreement between opposing forces. In later operations this approach was
expanded to include humanitarian assistance, as in Mozambique, and in
some cases even human rights activities, as in El Salvador. But the basic
requirement of this type of operation was the pre-existence of a peace
agreement. While it may seem self-evident, in light of some recent
operations it should be stressed that peacekeeping is impossible if there is
no peace to keep. Traditional peacekeeping operations, whether
established thirty years ago as in Cyprus, or last year as in Angola, differ
substantially from "peacekeeping" in Somalia or Bosnia, where the
deployment of United Nations military forces occurs before there is any
peace agreement.
Much of the recent public criticism is in fact aimed at the latter
type of operation. Sometimes such operations are called peacemaking,
peace enforcement, or humanitarian intervention. Whatever title is used
by specialists, too often the public hears them called, and believes them to
be, peacekeeping. The operations in Somalia and Bosnia were undertaken
for the best of motives. In Somalia, thousands of innocents were starving
to death every week while lawless "warlords" prohibited the distribution of
food and medicines that the international community was bringing into the
country. In Bosnia, starvation was exacerbated by merciless cold and
ethnic "cleansing" punctuated by rape and murder. The United Nations
involvement in Somalia and Bosnia was honorable and well-meaning, in
keeping with the highest aspirations of the Charter. But, in the public's
mind, the operations became synonymous with failed peacekeeping. It
does not matter that Somalia was not the disaster it is sometimes called.
2. The UN reported, as of October 31, 1995, 58,763 deployed in sixteen countries, down
from a maximum of 78,000 in July 1993. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at 14.
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As the final report of the Secretary-General in March 1995 stated, the
United Nations operation in Somalia can claim major accomplishments,
especially when one recalls that in late 1992, 3000 men, women, and
children were dying daily of starvation and this tragedy was ended by the
international relief effort.", Yet here, as in many areas, perception
outweighs reality. United Nations' peacekeepers could not save Somalia
or Bosnia; therefore, peacekeeping is no good.
To overcome this public perception of failure, and the defeatist
attitude that seems to affect not only member states but higher levels of the
Unite Nations' bureaucracy, it is necessary to focus on what the United
Nations has done right and how that can be used in the future. Amidst the
outcry over Somalia and Bosnia, traditional peacekeeping has notched
some significant successes. In January 1995, the United Nations'
operation in Mozambique concluded its work, having successfully
overseen the demobilization of thousands of troops and peaceful
democratic elections. In 1994, it was ONUSAL in El Salvador winding
up successfully; and, in 1993, it was UNTAC in Cambodia.
Based on this record of recent success, which built on earlier ones
in Namibia and the Middle East, one path to the future is clear. There is
and will be a role for traditional United Nations' peacekeeping. The
Security Council recognized this in February 1995 when it created
UNAVEM III to oversee the implementation of the Lusaka Accords in
Angola.' Influenced by recent events, approval of this operation was
delayed to provide time for the parties to demonstrate their commitment to
the new peace agreement. Deployment of peacekeepers was then phased
in over a period of months to maintain the pressure on the parties. Yet the
careful approach adopted by the Security Council does not mean is a small
operation. At the time of its creation, UNAVEM III with 7,350 troops,
was the third largest behind Bosnia and Haiti.
The commitment to the creation of UNAVEM III, in spite of a
history of failed peace agreements in Angola, and two prior United
Nations' operations, demonstrates that traditional peacekeeping will remain
a tool in the future. This should be good news to the inhabitants of
developing countries, particularly in Africa. The success of decolonization
in Africa did not bring safety from war, within or across borders. Without
the presence of a strong regional organization for the protection of peace,
or a great power with a stake in limiting conflict, the United Nations is the
hope of Africa's peoples. With the closing of the United Nations'
3. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/1995/231, Mar. 28,
1995, pg. 15.
4. Security Council Resolution 976 of 8 February 1995.
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operation in Somalia, it is popular in some circles to bewail the United
Nations' abandonment of Africa. In fact, there are more peacekeeping
operations in Africa than in any other region of the world., Fortunately,
even the growing public disenchantment with peacekeeping has not
stopped the Security Council from recognizing the value of traditional
peacekeeping. Not only have new operations been created, but some
ongoing operations facing cutbacks have been continued and even, as in
the case of Liberia, modestly expanded. 6 This should provide a measure of
reassurance not only to the people of developed countries who question the
future of the United Nations, but also those of developing countries who
cry for protection from the horror of war.
Beyond traditional operations designed to keep a peace made by
the parties, recent Security Council practice shows another way the United
Nations can play a role in future years. While the United Nations may not
have proven to be effective in operating a force to establish peace, there
have been recent examples where an independent multilateral force, acting
under the authority of the United Nations has succeeded. In both Haiti and
Rwanda, a permanent member of the Security Council sought and received
authorization to conduct an operation to make peace. In each case, these
operations helped establish the conditions necessary for the introduction of
a follow-on traditional peacekeeping operation.
The Haiti and Rwanda operations trace their legal precedents to
the creation of the multinational coalition against Iraq. Yet, the invasion
of Kuwait was a much different situation. The conflicts in Haiti and
Rwanda, while having definite destabilizing impacts on regional peace and
security, were primarily internal. The real model for these operations was
UNITAF, the initial United States-led operation in Somalia. A small
United Nations' force in Somalia, UNOSOM I, proved unable to cope with
the deteriorating humanitarian situation. When the United States offered to
use its own troops, assisted by multinational forces, the Security Council
authorized member states "to use all necessary means" to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief., Regardless of the final
outcome in Somalia, UNITAF accomplished its goal of ending starvation
and ensuring that humanitarian relief was delivered unimpeded. In the
process, it expanded the precedent of coalition forces responding to
aggression, as in Kuwait, in a new direction.
When illegal forces in Haiti blocked implementation of the
Governors Island Agreement for a peaceful return to democracy, the
5. United Nations DPI Background, supra note 1.
6. Security Council Resolution 1020 of 10 November 1995.
7. Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992.
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Untied States turned again to the UNITAF model. In a resolution on 31
July 1994,8 the Security Council again authorized member states "to use all
necessary means" to create a secure environment for the return of
President Aristide and constitutional democracy. Learning from its
experience in Somalia, the United Nations required certain criteria before
a United Nations' peacekeeping operation would take over responsibility in
Haiti. While the ultimate success of the follow-on United Nations'
operation still hangs in the balance, the initial United States-led operation
did create a secure environment to allow the United Nations to deploy. In
a similar fashion, France sought and received authorization to conduct
"Operation Turquoise" in Southwest Rwanda.9  Again, a permanent
member of the Security Council undertook an operation with its own
troops in a situation that was not appropriate for a traditional peacekeeping
operation.
The success of these operations in establishing a peaceful
environment highlights another role for the United Nations in the future,
providing the legal and moral basis for action under the leadership of a
powerful member state. This should not be seen as a relinquishment of
responsibility by either the Security Council or the United Nations. Acting
through the United Nations requires the Security Council to conduct a
separate analysis of the motives and purposes of the operation before it
occurs, rather than listening to the self-serving explanations for unilateral
actions after the fact. The Council can control, and even modify, the
approach of the member state in a situation like Haiti or Rwanda.
The "all necessary means" approach offers an opportunity for
United Nations' involvement in situations where the prerequisites for a
traditional peacekeeping operation do not exist. Of course, reliance on a
particular member state to provide the motivating force and leadership for
an operation places limits on this approach. Obviously, there are few
states with sufficient political and military power to lead such operations.
These will not have sufficient national interest to be involved in every
conflict, or even most of them. But to say a tool is limited is not to say
that it has no value. In the years to come, the single state or coalition
approach to creating conditions for traditional peacemaking can make an
important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and
security.
8. Security Council Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994.
9. Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994.
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CONCLUSION
Contrary to public perception, the recent history of United
Nations' actions to maintain international peace and security has not been a
catalogue of unmitigated disasters. Rather, in two separate
areas--traditional keeping of peace agreements between opposing forces,
and operations spearheaded by a member state to create an appropriate
environment for peacekeeping--there are the foundations for a real future
for United Nations' action. The ability of the United Nations to build on
this foundation, to learn the proper lessons from recent operations, both
successes and failures, will define the actual role the United Nations will
play. But the opportunity is there.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTI-PERSONNEL
LAND MINES
Stephen Goose*
I. INTRODUCTION
Human Rights Watch was one of the six non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that initiated the International Campaign to Ban
Land Mines in 1992.' The Campaign calls for a comprehensive
international ban on the production, stockpiling, trade and use of
antipersonnel land mines. It also calls for increased international resources
for mine clearance and victim assistance programs.
The ban campaign has had many successes. In the past year, the
number of NGOs endorsing a ban has grown from about 60 to more than
350. There are now organized national campaigns in about thirty nations,
with recent launches in Afghanistan, South Africa, and the Philippines. A
ban has been endorsed by the ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDHA,
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and major influential
media sources such as The New York Times, the Times of London, and the
Economist. In September 1994, President Clinton gave a speech at the
U.N. in which he changed United States' policy by embracing the goal of
the eventual elimination of antipersonnel land mines. That was followed in
December 1994 by the U.N. General Assembly's adoption of a resolution
endorsing that goal. In March 1995, Belgium became the first nation to
enact legislation to ban production, export, and use of mines. Eighteen
nations have declared support for an immediate and comprehensive ban.
Thirty-one nations have announced a moratorium on the export of mines.
In July 1995, both the European Parliament and the Organization of
African Unity passed resolutions calling for a comprehensive ban on
antipersonnel mines. The United States Congress has approved an
amendment to the FY 1996 foreign aid spending bill mandating a one-year
moratorium on use of antipersonnel land mines by United States forces. 2
A ban on anti-personnel mines is required for moral, humanitarian,
economic, practical, and legal reasons. Perhaps first and foremost, a ban
* Program Director, Human Rights Watch Arms Project.
1. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, New York, New York, Nov. 3, 1995.
2. The bill has not yet been sent to the President for signature.
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is needed because of the terrible toll mines take on civilian populations.3
The United States State Department estimates that 26,000 people each year
are killed or maimed by mines. The vast majority of victims are civilians,
not combatants. Moreover, the entire socio-economic fabric of some
nations is disrupted by mines. A fundamental underpinning of the ban
campaign is the conviction that the long-term human and socio-economic
costs of mines outweigh the short-term military utility.
There are about 100 million mines scattered in more than 60
nations around the globe. Perhaps another 100 million are stockpiled in
the arsenals of more than 100 countries. Each year, on average, another
five million antipersonnel mines are produced in some 50 nations. The
United Nations estimates that last year approximately 100,000 mines were
removed in mine clearance programs, while 2.5 million new mines were
laid. These mines claim a new victim every 20 minutes. Even as
international awareness of and efforts to cope with the disaster caused by
land mines grows, the crisis worsens.
II. AN ILLEGAL WEAPON
As the experience of recent decades has shown, the rules contained
in the Land Mines Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW) have proven completely ineffective in safeguarding
civilians from the devastating effects of antipersonnel land mines. In the
ten years after the Protocol came into force (1983-1993), an estimated 65
million new mines were laid, claiming hundreds of thousands of victims.
Few would disagree that the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of land
mines has been increasing.
Human Rights Watch believes that only a total ban on the use,
manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines can
significantly reduce the harm to civilians from mine warfare. Moreover,
Human Rights Watch believes that customary international law already
requires that land mine use be banned in armed conflict. A Human Rights
Watch memorandum, was prepared for governmental delegates preparing
for the Review Conference of the CCW.4
Human Rights Watch believes that the Land Mines Protocol should
be brought into conformity with already existing humanitarian law -
3. For a better understanding of the scope and nature of the land mines crisis, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LAND MINES: A DEADLY LEGACY
(1993) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]; and SHAWN ROBERTS AND JODY WILLIAMS,
AFTER THE GUNS FALL SILENT: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF LAND MINES (1995).
4. For a full discussion of legal issues see Land Mines in International Law: Why is a
Complete Ban Required, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 261-318.
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notably customary prohibitions on the use of means of warfare that cannot
meet the proportionality test (expected military utility must outweigh
anticipated humanitarian toll) and those which are indiscriminate (weapons
which cannot distinguish military objects from civilians and those whose
effects cannot be limited).' These principles are incorporated,
respectively, into Articles 35(1) and (2) and 51(4) of 1977 Additional
Protocol I, which the 1980 Land Mines Protocol was intended to
supplement. Human Rights Watch believes the use of antipersonnel land
mines violates these provisions. Because of the delayed-action effect of
land mines, it is both impossible to discern in a particular instance whether
military utility surpasses humanitarian harm, and possible to recognize-
especially given the horrific injuries they cause and the long-term risk they
pose-that, at least in the aggregate, the military utility of antipersonnel
mines is far outstripped by their devastating humanitarian consequences.
The delayed-action function also means that mines cannot distinguish
military targets from civilians, and that their effects cannot be controlled.
A comprehensive ban on production, stockpiling, trade and use
would also be consistent with the idea expressed in the 1972 Convention
on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, that weapons
which pose intolerable harm should be banned as "repugnant to the
conscience of mankind."
Human Rights Watch also believes that a comprehensive ban
would be the most practical and effective approach to the land mines crisis.
A flat ban-in addition to providing enhanced protections-would be much
easier to follow, monitor, and enforce than a patchwork of restrictions, as
contained in Protocol II. A complete prohibition will help create the
stigmatization of parties who continue to use, manufacture or export
mines. Such stigmatization, much or more than the Protocol itself, will
diminish use, production, and supply. The combination of a
comprehensive ban, international stigmatization, enforcement measures,
and the possibility of sanctions or censure against users, producers, or
exporters makes a complete proscription more viable than further modest
and unenforceable restrictions.
III. VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Conventional
Weapons held in Vienna from the 25 of September through the 13th
October, concluded in a fashion that few would have predicted: nations
5. Monica Schurtman and Kenneth Anderson, then with the Human Rights Watch Arms
Project, drafted an alternative protocol: Draft of a Protocol Banning All Antipersonnel Mines,
May 1994.
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agreed to a new protocol restricting blinding laser weapons, but were
unable to reach consensus on revisions to the existing land mines protocol.
Nations will meet again on the 15'h through 19'h of January, and on the 2 2 d
of April through the 3 ' of May 1996 to try to break the deadlock on land
mines. Eighty-four nations sent delegations to the review conference,
including 44 of the 50 states parties and 40 observer nations. More than
100 representatives from nearly 70 NGOs in 20 nations also participated.
Based on the tentative agreements reached during four preparatory
"government experts" sessions in 1994 and 1995, NGOs were expecting
little of significance to result from Vienna. For the most part, even these
low expectations were not met. While nations were willing in public
speeches to acknowledge the humanitarian disaster brought about by land
mines, when nations engaged in closed door negotiations, military
considerations clearly predominated over humanitarian concerns. In
discussing new restrictions on mines, it appears that delegates paid little to
no attention to the human and socio-economic implications of land mines
usage. Rather, they were preoccupied with the perceived military utility
of mines, and therefore with protecting their own mine inventories and
insuring their own armies were able to use mines in as unfettered a manner
as possible.
Most NGOs in Vienna were calling for a comprehensive ban on
antipersonnel land mines (no production, stockpiling, transfer, and use),
and were supportive of three other steps that were seen as advancing the
cause of a total ban: regular and more frequent review of the CCW (5
years or less), expansion of the scope of the CCW from application only in
international conflicts, to application in all circumstances; and
establishment of strong verification and compliance mechanisms.
IV. BAN
There was no serious discussion of a ban on anti-personnel land
mines in the working group sessions. Despite the fact that a ban proposal
(offered by Sweden) was in the conference president's "rolling text,"
nations declared that it was a non-starter and spent almost no time
whatsoever debating the merits of the proposal. This contrasted with the
public statements of many nations in the plenary sessions and elsewhere.
In connection with the conference, Austria, Denmark, Mozambique, and
New Zealand made strong statements in support of an immediate and
comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines, bringing the total of ban
supporters to eighteen nations. Austria renounced the use of anti-
personnel mines and declared that it had destroyed all of its anti-personnel
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mines.6 France announced that it was henceforth banning production and
export of anti-personnel mines, and beginning destruction stockpiles
France indicated, however, that it reserved the right to continue using
mines. Ukraine declared a moratorium on the export of all anti-personnel
mines, bringing the total of nations with some form of export moratorium
to thirty-one.
V. REVIEW
In one of the few successes in Vienna, it appears that nations will
agree to hold the next review conference within five years time, with
preparatory meetings in 2000 and the conference in 2001. NGOs had
pressed strongly for this, as it will keep governments focused on the land
mines issue, provide the opportunity for more meaningful changes than
those agreed to this time, and also permit the possibility of addressing
other weapons that have negative humanitarian implications.
VI. SCOPE
It appears that partial success will be achieved on the scope issue,
with nations agreeing to expand application to internal as well as
international conflicts. This is an important step forward as land mines
have been used primarily in internal conflicts. However, NGOs and most
nations present in Vienna supported application in all circumstances,
including internal "disturbances." India, China, Pakistan, and Mexico
opposed the broader application.
VII. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE:
A key flaw of the 1980 CCW is the lack of any verification and
compliance provisions. Without these, there is no real accountability and
nations will act with impunity in violation of the law. A very solid
proposal put forth primarily by Western nations, involving fact-finding
missions, was rejected by China, India, Pakistan, and Mexico, on
sovereignty grounds.
VIII. RESTRICTIONS
The vast majority of the delegates' time was spent not on the four
above issues, but on a complicated set of proposed restrictions and
requirements for antipersonnel mines, ostensibly aimed at lessening the
humanitarian toll. Most NGOs did not actively lobby on these issues, as
6. Some question remained about a Claymore-type mine, which Austria does not classify
as a mine.
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they implied an acceptance of the continued use of anti-personnel mines.
Disturbingly, however, in many cases there was backsliding even on these
modest restrictions from positions largely agreed to in the preparatory
meetings. China, Russia, India and Pakistan were the nations cited most
often for preventing consensus on these issues.
The heart of the package of restrictions put forward most notably
by the United States is the requirement that all remotely delivered mines
have both a self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanism. With a few
loophole exceptions, non-remotely delivered mines would have to be in
marked and monitored minefields. Some nations, notably China, have
balked at the self-deactivating requirement which is seen as a near fail safe
device, such as a battery expiring, rendering the mine inert. There is
disagreement also on the technical specifications for self-destruct and self-
deactivation. Going into Vienna, nations were discussing a self-destruct
time limit of 7-90 days, with an acceptable failure rate of 1 in 1,000. The
emerging consensus now seems to be 30 days and 1 in 20, though some
nations have advocated 365 or more days and 1 in 10 failure rate. For
self-deactivation, initial parameters of 30 to 365 days have given way to
120 to 200 days. Moreover, some nations, notably Russia, are insisting on
a 15 year grace period for the new restriction, to take effect.
On another issue of humanitarian concern, it was expected that
agreement would be reached in Vienna that all land mines must be
detectable, and that a uniform standard (at least eight grams of metal in
every mine) would be set. Instead, nations have decided not to have any
detectability requirement for antitank mines, and a few nations, especially
India and China, are balking at the eight gram requirement for
antipersonnel mines.
The fact that nations were unable to reach agreement on even
modest new restrictions on land mines in Vienna is a strong argument in
favor of the comprehensive ban approach. As long as nines are viewed as
legitimate and useful weapons, nations are unlikely to take steps that will
significantly address the global land mines crisis. While the Vienna review
conference was disappointing in many ways, NGOs also had reason for
encouragement. A few years ago, not many people were thinking about
land mines. Because of the work of the Campaign, and others, it is
increasingly in the public discourse. The Review Conference would not
have happened if it were not for the work of the Campaign. The fact that
countries are so concerned about world opinion in how they deal with the
land mines crisis was a factor in their decision to suspend proceedings.
Indeed, it can be argued that while governments made little progress in
Vienna, the Campaign to Ban Land Mines continued to gather strength.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTI-PERSONNEL
LANDMINES
Ariane Sand-Trigo*
Antipersonnel land mines are among the deadliest and most
insidious weapons in the world today: their aim is to maim for life, they
cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of a child and
they recognize no cease-fire or end to war. More than 110 million active
mines are scattered in sixty-four countries and the problem is growing
worse at a dramatic rate. In his last report on mine clearance, the United
Nations Secretary-General indicated that for every mine being removed,
another 20 are being laid; furthermore, he estimated that it would cost
about 33 billion dollars to clear the globe of the currently buried land
mines. Although impressive, these figures do not begin to describe the
human suffering these weapons inflict nor can they give an idea of the
profound disruption they cause to families, societies and economies; thus
seriously undermining their effort and ability to recover from war.
In the execution of its humanitarian mandate, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is confronted on a daily basis with the
horrible consequences of the use of land mines. There are two main areas
of activity of the ICRC with regard to this problem: the direct action in
the field which involves the setting up of hospitals, surgical, and
orthopedic centers; and the implementation and the encouragement of the
development of international humanitarian law that not only establishes
rules for the protection of the victims of armed conflict, but also limits
means and methods of warfare.
In the past ten years, ICRC medical teams have treated over
140,000 war wounded of whom about 30,000 were victims of land mines;
in other words, approximately 25 % of all war injuries are caused by land
mines. Out of these 25 %, 58 % are non-combatants, half of them women
and children. These numbers vary a lot from one country to another; a
sad example is Somalia where, at the height of the conflict, 74% of mine
* Attach6 International Committees of the Red Cross, Delegation to the United Nations.
The author has a Masters Degree in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of
International Studies (Geneva), a Masters Degree in management and marketing from IFM-Paris
(France) and a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from the University of Strasbourg (France).
The author acknowledges Louise Doswald-Beck and the ICRC medical division whose
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victims admitted to the ICRC Hargeisa hospital were women and children.
Doctor Robin Coupland, an ICRC war surgeon, who has studied the
problem closely, estimates that up to 50% of mine victims die within
minutes of the blast and all gathered evidence seem to indicate that for
every person who makes it to the hospital, one dies in the field.
The full extent of this tragedy is hard to assess since the total
number of people maimed or killed will probably never be known. Many
are isolated when the accident occurs, some die alone, and even for those
who are lucky enough to make it to a hospital, medical facilities are
usually overworked and have more important priorities than gathering
information. Only recently have medical and relief organizations such as
Handicap International, Save the Children, Physicians for Human Rights,
to name a few, as well as the ICRC, begun collecting systematic data on
mine blast injuries and deaths.
The first phase of helping a landmine victim is the surgical
treatment which should be performed as soon as possible; unfortunately, in
most cases, the transportation time to the hospitals may be days or even
weeks; only about 20% of the patients admitted to ICRC hospitals because
of a mine injury are admitted within six hours of the accident, while it is
estimated that over 15 % travel for more than three days often without
treatment and by any means available.
The suffering of the victims is further enhanced by the lack of
knowledge and training in war surgery since injuries of this severity and
degree of contamination are rarely seen in civilian practice. Moreover,
such patients also need roughly twice as much blood transfusion as those
injured by fragments or bullets, which places additional burdens on the
medical system in screening blood for HIV, hepatitis or other diseases. If
amputation is needed, and according to ICRC hospitals, it is in more than
35% of mine injuries, the way the surgery is performed is extremely
important since it will ultimately determine whether a victim can be
adequately fitted with a prosthetic limb. In this respect, the ICRC medical
division has organized instructional sessions and seminars in various
countries in order to train and educate surgeons in these specific
techniques, particularly with regard to amputation.
Successful surgical treatment does not begin to deal with the
problems of rehabilitation and, later on, integration back into society. The
rehabilitation of a mine victim who has lost a leg or an arm requires a
prosthetic limb, each such prosthesis must be individually fitted, has a
limited life and must be replaced after some years, if not months, in the
case of children. Another problem is that prostheses are expensive items,
for example, a child injured at the age of ten, with a life expectancy of
another 40 to 50 years, will need 25 appliances during his or her lifetime,
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at approximately $125.00 U.S. dollars for a prosthesis; that amounts to
more than $3,000.00. In countries where the average per capita income is
$15.00 to $20.00 per month, it is not surprising that crutches are often all
people can afford. Furthermore, the manufacture and fitting of these
prostheses requires a specialized workshop and trained technicians that are
often not available in affected countries that lack the resources as well as
the expertise.
Many relief organizations have become involved in rehabilitation
along with the ICRC which, in the last fifteen years, fitted over 60,000
amputees with prostheses. In 1994, twenty-four ICRC orthopedic centers
produced over 12,000 artificial limbs and as of June 1995, fourteen
countries were host to Red Cross orthopedic programs. Unfortunately,
demand still outruns supply.
In addition to the physical trauma, the psychological trauma of the
loss of a limb is considerable, especially in children and young adults.
Unemployment, divorce, poor marriage prospects and social isolation are
just some of the problems which will make rehabilitation all the more
difficult. Although several studies have been conducted on the subject, as
to this day, the full social, economic and financial implications in a
country infested by land mines are unknown.
Unlike chemical or biological weapons, land mines have never
been banned by international consensus; their use has merely been
regulated both by customary international humanitarian law and by the
1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
There are two basic rules of international humanitarian law that
apply directly to anti-personnel land mines and that have been reaffirmed,
for example in the 1977 Protocol I addition to the Geneva Conventions:
(1) Parties to a conflict must always distinguish
between civilians and combatants. Civilians may not be
directly attacked, and indiscriminate attacks and the use of
indiscriminate weapons are prohibited;
(2) It is prohibited to use weapons which cause
unnecessary suffering. Therefore, the use of weapons
whose damaging effects are disproportionate to their
military purpose is prohibited.
These rules have become part of customary international law and
thus apply to all States irrespective of their treaty obligations.
The second source is treaty law, which applies only to States party
to specific treaties. The most relevant text is the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Protocol II of this treaty is
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entitled "Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices."
The main provisions of the Protocol are as follows:
(1) Mines may be directed only at military
objectives, indiscriminate use is prohibited and all feasible
precautions must be taken to protect civilians;
(2) Remotely-delivered mines may not be used
unless their location is accurately recorded or they are
fitted with an effective neutralizing mechanism;
(3) Record must be kept of the location of
pre-planned minefields, and the parties to a conflict are
also to keep records on other minefields laid during
hostilities;
(4) At the end of hostilities, the parties are to try to
agree either among themselves or with other States or
organizations to take the necessary measures to clear
minefields.
Since this treaty was the result of various compromises, it contains
serious flaws and major weaknesses among which: (1) it does not apply to
internal armed conflicts, (2) no clear responsibility is assigned for the
removal of mines, (3) it does not prohibit the use of non-detectable mines,
(4) provisions for remotely delivered mines are not strong enough, (5)
provisions on the use of hand-placed mines are too weak, (6) there is no
effective implementation or monitoring mechanism, (7) as of now, only
fifty-five States have become party to the Convention, and (8) the
Convention should be reviewed more often, at least every five years.
In 1993, the French government took the initiative to ask for a
review Conference of the 1980 Convention. This Conference was held in
Vienna from September 25 to October 13, 1995, and has been preceded by
four expert group meetings in Geneva.
This Conference is a unique opportunity to render this Convention
a dynamic and meaningful means of limiting the suffering and destruction
caused by the use of land mines and we all assumed that today, we would
be able to speak of the results of the Vienna Conference; instead, it has
been suspended until January 1996 as it was unable to reach agreement on
amendments on Protocol II.
However, several important gains were made, in particular the
adoption of Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons and provisional
agreements on certain aspects of Protocol II. These include: (1) the
extension of the scope of the landmine restrictions to cover internal as well
as international armed conflicts, (2) the assignment of responsibility for the
clearance of land mines to those who lay them, (3) an increased protection
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from land mines for ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent
personnel and other humanitarian workers, and (4) a requirement that all
minefields be recorded.
A number of other rules were considered but either ran into
deadlock over technical issues or were weakened by the introduction of
exceptions:
(1) A prohibition on the use of antipersonnel mines
which are not detectable; however, no agreement was
possible on specifying a minimum metallic content for
achieving this; and
(2) A prohibition of the use of long-lived
antipersonnel mines except in fenced, marked and guarded
minefields, nevertheless, the present chairman text allows
the continued use of "dumb mines" without fencing "when
direct enemy military action makes it impossible to
comply."
The concern for the ICRC is that even if these measures were to
be adopted at the next meeting, although representing a big progress, they
will probably prove inefficient and difficult to monitor. Furthermore, the
following aspects have to be taken into consideration. Some States
indicated that they would need grace periods up to fifteen years in order to
fit their mines with a minimum metal content (to render them detectable)
and equip them with a self-destructing or neutralizing system. If mines
continue to be sown at the present rate, up to 75 million could be added in
such a period to the existing 110 million.
Because 100 million dumb mines (not fitted with a self-destructing
or neutralizing device) remain in stockpiles, they will probably continue to
be used regardless of the prohibition, especially in the absence of
implementation and verification mechanisms. Self-destructing mines are
more expensive and uncertainty prevails as to their reliability (experts
estimate the failure rate between 5 and 20%). Mapping mines are always
difficult in the context of a conflict (maps can get lost, often there is no
time to accurately record the emplacement, geographic elements interfere
easily). The short life of self-destructing mines may be compensated
through an increased use and there is the added danger that they will be
perceived as less dangerous than the so called dumb-mines. And finally,
the promotion of self-destructing mines legitimizes their use generally.
For the ICRC, the only effective solution to the humanitarian crisis
anti-personnel mines have created is to stigmatize them and to prohibit
their production, use, transfer and stockpiling. Indeed, further restricting
and even banning only the use of antipersonnel land mines will not be
effective without strict measures regarding production and transfer since it
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is precisely the cheapness and easy availability of these weapons that have
largely contributed to the enormous scale of the problem. Moreover, the
low level of pledges at the July 1995 International Meeting on Mine
Clearance, convened by the United Nations' Secretary-General,
demonstrates that international commitments are insufficient to ensure the
rapid removal of land mines already in place.
So far, sixteen countries along with the United Nations
Secretary-General, the European Parliament, and the Organization for
African Unity have joined the ICRC in its call for a total ban. This
solution is simpler, easier to verify, and far more effective.
The ICRC is of the position that any measure adopted by the
Review Conference, short of a total ban, should be evaluated by two
criteria:
One, will they significantly, and in the shortest
time possible, reduce the level of civilian casualties?
Two, do they move towards the goal endorsed by
the 1994 United Nations General Assembly' of the
"eventual elimination of antipersonnel land mines"
During the three-week session of the Review Conference in
Vienna, 36 people were killed and 243 maimed by land mines in
Cambodia alone and about 1,600 people world-wide suffered the same
fate. These appalling statistics illustrate the urgency of dealing effectively
with the landmine crisis.
Remarks by Bruno Zimmermann, Deputy Head, ICRC
Delegation to the U.N.
I would like to take the floor on several aspects raised by
the questions from the audience thereby to some extent
also repeating the presentation made earlier by my
colleague Ms. Sand Trigo, which I support fully.
Indeed, international humanitarian law is not
homogeneous, and one can see various lines of division:
such as whether a specific rule is customary or
treaty-based, at a given time and for a given party or
group of parties. Successive treaties have dealt more or
less with the same subject-matters, with changing scope,
substantive rules, and states party to them; various treaties
have been codified in different fora and they have been
1. Resolution A/RES/49/75D.
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fitted with different implementation, supervision, and
review mechanisms.
The regulation of land mines belongs to the law governing
the conduct of hostilities, a domain of international
humanitarian law where it is much more difficult, broadly
speaking, not only to devise rules but also to check on
their correct application than in the domain of protection
of, and assistance to, persons in the power of the enemy.
Whatever the difficulty, these two domains, also called
"Hague Law" and "Geneva Law", have somehow been
merged by the adoption of 1977 Protocols I and II
additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Whether in "Geneva Law" or in "Hague Law", it has
often been possible only to progress one step at a time, and
the process has expanded in decades, and even more than a
century, if one thinks of the development since the 1864
Geneva Convention or the 1868 St. Petersburg
Convention. The ICRC knows this and has learned to use
the necessary realism and patience. This is why, .subject to
some sine qua non conditions regarding the outcome of the
work which Ms. Sand Trigo just described to you, the
ICRC considers that the decision to go on with the Review
Conference next year is better and more promising than if
the participants had decided to stop where they stood
mid-October in Vienna.
But again, the ICRC has the feeling, after years of work
and contacts on this subject matter, that any restrictions
that might be adopted short of a total ban would give no
guarantees for the respect of the aforementioned principles
of the prohibition of indiscriminate effects and of the
prohibition of superfluous injury and unnecessary
suffering. Ms. Sand Trigo explained to you why the ICRC
has reached this conclusion and why, therefore, a set of
new restrictions would be seen as a step towards the total
ban, which remains the ICRC's objective.
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Joerg Wimmers*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Review Conference in Vienna' has failed to adopt a revised
Convention due to unbridgeable differences among delegations on a
strengthened Protocol II of the Convention (Land Mine Protocol). Almost
all important provisions of the Protocol were contentious and a number of
delegations showed very limited room to move toward a compromise.
They were particularly, and surprisingly, the technical issues of
detectability, self-destructing, and self-deactivating mechanisms where no
consensus could be reached despite four preparatory meetings of technical
experts. Also, the issues of transfer and verification are far from being
resolved.
From a humanitarian viewpoint the conference was a
disappointment. Discussions were very much focused on military
necessities and economic considerations while the humanitarian dimension
was only highlighted in interventions by the participating relief
organizations. The prospects for the adoption of a meaningful Convention
when the Conference resumes its deliberations in January and April 1996
are limited. It is likely that delegations will reach agreement only at a very
low common denominator, making the revised Land Mine Protocol the
same toothless tool as its predecessor.
As to the substantive work of the Conference on a revised Protocol
II, different positions emerged on the following provisions of the envisaged
Convention.
II. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
There was general agreement among delegations that the material
scope of application of the revised convention should extend to internal
conflicts. Disagreement remained, however, as to the formulation of such
provisions. A large number of delegations supported a clear extension to
* Written by Jorg Wimmers, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations and
delivered by Tore Skedsmo, Senior Demining Advisor, Department of Peace-Keeping
Operations, United Nations.
1. September 25 to October 13, 1995.
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"all circumstances including times of peace," while other wanted to link
the extension to the Geneva Conventions excluding "internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and
other acts of a similar nature."
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES
The concept of the revised Convention as it was laid out in the
Chairman's Rolling Text is based on a general distinction between
self-destructing and non-self-destructing mines. The rational of this
concept is drawn from the belief of particular states from the western
group that self-destructing mines are a realistic solution to the current land
mine problem. It was put forward by delegations that these do not pose a
humanitarian problem for civilian populations as they would destroy
themselves within a short time period with a reasonable rate of reliability.
Based on this principle, the Conference tried to reach agreement
on the following provisions that would restrict the use of land mines:
1. General restrictions for all mines repeating principles
of customary humanitarian law, derived from the 1949
Geneva Conventions.
2. Restrictions on the use of non-self-destructing (dumb)
mines, requesting mine-laying parties to mark, fence,
maintain, monitor, and subsequently clear minefields, with
exemptions in the case of direct enemy contact.
3. Prohibition of remotely delivered mines that are not
self-destructing.
4. Prohibition of mines that are not detectable.
5. Prohibition of booby-traps.
It was in this area of practical provisions where differences of
positions remained that the President of the Conference referred to as
being "unbridgeable."
IV. SELF-DESTRUCTING MECHANISM
The Chairman's Rolling Text included a bracketed provision that
required mines to self-destruct within 7-90 days with a reliability of 99.9%
and a self-deactivating mechanism as a backup feature rendering the mine
inoperable within 30-365 days with the same reliability.
The discussions in the Committee surrounded two basic areas.
The first area was the time frame for self-destruct. Proposals ranged from
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7 days, 14 days, 30 days supported by the majority of delegations up to as
much as 365 days. The second area of discussion was the failure rate. A
number of delegations pointed out that a rate of 1 in 1,000 would be
unrealistic. Accordingly, some delegations supported a failure rate of 90%
and asked for a grace period of 15 years to comply with these provisions.
The discussions at the Conference underlined that the whole
concept is questionable. Self-destructing mines will be excluded from
marking and fencing requirements and can be remotely delivered in
accordance with the envisaged Convention. The concept of
self-destruction is misleading, as it supports a general perception that
self-destructing mines are not dangerous. As this assumption is highly
doubtful, it will be reduced to absurdity if the position prevails that lowers
both the time frame and the failure rate for these mines.
V. DETECTABILITY
Equally broad differences remained concerning the question of
detectability, a provision of utmost importance to mine clearance
operations. The Rolling Text provided for two alternatives: One required
that each mine shall have a metal content equivalent to 8 grams of iron in a
single coherent mass; while the other required mines to be detectable with
commonly available equipment in a more generic way. No agreement was
reached on this provision. Some countries obstructed the inclusion of a
precise specification of a metal content, arguing that all mines are, in fact,
detectable. Other delegations agreed with such specifications but asked for
a grace period, ranging from fifteen years to indefinite. It is needless to
say that these proposals would make a provision on detectability
meaningless.
Numerous state parties want the requirement for detectability to
apply to anti-personnel mines only, arguing with the different objectives of
using anti-tank mines and pointing out that the latter do not pose dangers to
civilians, a view that was opposed by other delegations and, in particular,
by DHA and the ICRC. The question of making a distinction between
anti-personnel and anti-tank mines was brought up for all provisions
regulating the use of mines.
VI. OTHER ISSUES REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES
Some delegations pointed to the increasing importance of remotely
delivered mines in military operations and, as a result, to the need to allow
the use of these mines. The problem is obvious: remotely delivered mines
can neither be marked nor fenced nor accurately recorded. Though some
delegations supported a position to ban these mines on the whole, the
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majority agreed to allow the use of remotely delivered mines that are
self-destructing.
No agreement could be reached regarding a tabled proposal to ban
anti-handling devices on anti-personnel mines, features of particular
danger to mine clearance personnel. Opposing delegations argued that
these devices were necessary to protect mines against removal.
VII. TRANSFERS
Prohibiting the transfer of certain mines was already a very
contentious issue in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and
no agreement could be reached as to whether a corresponding provision
should be included in the Convention. The Conference made only very
limited progress to reduce the differences. Opponents argued that the
question of transfers should not be part of a humanitarian law regulating
the use of certain weapons.
VIII. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
Like transfers, the question of verification was one of the most
controversial issues in the preparatory meetings and at the Review
Conference. The western group supported an extensive system by
establishing a verification commission that would investigate alleged
violations by, for example, fact finding missions. The establishment of a
verification regime was heavily opposed by other delegations, with the
result that the Conference could not even agree on principles regarding this
issue.
IX. CONCLUSION
The United Nations' position on the question of land mines was
clearly stated by the Secretary General on various occasions. A total ban
on land mines is the only effective measure to rid the world of the scourge
of these weapons. He declared at the Vienna Conference: "We must ban
land mines once and for all! We must ban their use! We must ban their
production! We must destroy those that are stockpiled!"
Although an increasing number of Governments have joined the
Secretary General's call for a total ban on land mines, the probable
outcome of the Review Conference will fall short of this aim.
Participating states' positions center too much on the military and
economic aspects of the land mine issue and do not take adequately into
account the humanitarian dimensions of the land mine crisis, which in fact
triggered this Review Conference.
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The world-wide problem of uncleared land mines has continued to
grow in the past year, with the laying of new mines outstripping the efforts
of the United Nations and other bodies to remove them. Mines have
become and will continue to be the weapon of choice in armed conflicts, as
they are cheap, easy to obtain, and effective. We have also seen a change
in the use of these weapons in the past, as land mines were employed in
large numbers and in an indiscriminate manner. We are looking at an
estimated 10,000,000 land mines in Afghanistan, 9-15,000,000 in Angola,
8-10,000,000 in Cambodia, 10,000,000 in Northern Iraq, and 2,000,000
in Mozambique to name only a few countries.
Probably 10,000 people die each year due to mine accidents and
possibly double that number are seriously maimed. But land mines not
only strike the individual with their lethal effects, they devastate whole
nations by impeding the restoration of societal life in the aftermath of
armed conflicts, possibly for decades. Hundreds of thousands of refugees
and internally displaced persons cannot return to their villages because of
land mines; agriculture cannot be revived without clearing the land of
mines; transportation becomes impossible because of mined roads and
tracks; irrigation systems and critical industries become unusable; and
medical systems are overburdened.
The United Nations' involvement in mine clearance activities
began in 1989 when it established its first mine clearance program in
Afghanistan, which is currently employing 3000 deminers. Comprehensive
mine clearance programs were also set up in Cambodia and Mozambique,
and the United Nations is currently in the process of developing its
program in Angola. There is increasing international support for these
operations which culminated in this year's International Meeting on Mine
Clearance in Geneva. But mine clearance activities in the most affected
countries are likely to continue for decades and can continue only if this
support is sustained at the highest possible level.
But, besides these critical efforts to alleviate the suffering of
affected populations, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the number
of newly laid mines exponentially outweighs the number of those that are
cleared. The magnitude of the problem makes it imperative that a political
solution is found to stop the proliferation of these insidious weapons.
There is a growing expectation that the international community takes the
necessary steps to rid the world of the scourge of land mines. The States
Parties to the CCW will have to amplify their efforts significantly if they
want to come up to those expectations. We believe that a total ban on land
mines is the only effective measure to end the indiscriminate killing and
maiming of innocent civilian personnel.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTIPERSONNEL
LAND MINES
Luke T. Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Antipersonnel (A/P) land mines are devastating weapons not only
during, but also after, warfare or armed conflicts. There still exist an
estimated 85 million mines, or one for every 50 people on earth, scattered
in 62 countries that kill and maim some 26,000 innocent civilians each
year. In Cambodia and Angola, for example, there are more than 30,000
and 20,000 amputees, respectively, who are victims of mine incidents.
These mines have impeded the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons to their homes, thus rendering vast areas of land unproductive
despite severe food shortages. The following statistics are sombering:
Mines cost as little as $3 each to produce, up to $1,000 each to remove,
and $5,000 for the treatment and rehabilitation of each survivor. But these
grim statistics do not tell the whole story. According to the United
Nations, although 100,000 mines are removed each year, between 2 and 5
million new mines are laid. Thus, the problem worsens with time.
II. COMPATIBILITY OF A/P LAND MINES WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Common Features of A/P Land mines
1. Once planted, A/P land mines are not selective in their targets;
they cannot distinguish civilians from soldiers.
2. Most of the civilians killed or injured are women and children:
vulnerable groups requiring special protection under international law.
They suffer immense bodily pain and psychological and emotional trauma.
Their loss of limbs can never be recovered. Children are often lured by
toy-like contraptions that explode on impact.
3. Mines are long-lasting unless fitted with deactivation or
self-destruct mechanisms. They continue to hurt innocent civilians long
after the ending of war or armed conflict.
* Special Adviser, Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State;
Chairman, International Committee on Internally Displaced Persons, International Law
Association. The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author's and do not necessarily
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4. While originally detectable because of their metallic content,
mines can now be practically undetectable.
5. Mines are used primarily in internal armed conflicts in developing
countries, rather than in international armed conflicts.
B. The Law
The legal status of A/P land mines may be approached from
customary international law and treaties. Customary international law
forbids the use of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering and are
indiscriminate as between military and civilian objects or personnel. Also
forming part of customary international law is the principle of
proportionality, under which the use of weapons whose damaging effects
are disproportionate to their military purposes is prohibited. These rules
are legally binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to any
treaties regulating the use of such weapons.
There are many treaties renouncing or regulating the use of
specific weapons. The most recent of these is the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in Paris on January
13, 1993. Belonging to this category of treaties is the 1980 Convention on
Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects ("Convention on Conventional Weapons"), with its
Protocol II: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices. On March 24, 1995, the United States
ratified the Convention, whose contents are summarized below:
- Mines may be directed only at military objectives. Indis-
criminate use is prohibited and all feasible precautions must be taken to
protect civilians.
- Remotely-delivered mines may not be used unless their location
is accurately recorded or they are fitted with an effective neutralizing
mechanism.
- Records must be kept of the location of pre-planned minefields,
and the parties to a conflict are also to keep records on other minefields
laid during hostilities.
- At the end of hostilities, the parties are to try to agree either
among themselves or with other States or organizations to take the
necessary measures to clear minefields.
[Vol. 2:621
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C. Applying the Law to A/P Land mines
As measured against the rules of customary and conventional
international law, A/P land mines cannot pass the test of legitimacy.
Indeed, in his address to the United Nations on September 26, 1994,
President Clinton called on all nations to join the United States for the
"eventual elimination" of A/P land mines. As a first step, he proposed the
conclusion of a multilateral "agreement to reduce the number and
availability of those mines."
The United States had in fact worked toward that goal. Thus, in
late 1992, the United States adopted a unilateral, one-year moratorium on
the transfer of A/P land mines to other countries. The moratorium was
extended for three more years in 1993. In December 1993, the General
Assembly adopted unanimously a United States sponsored resolution
calling on all countries to adopt a moratorium on the export of A/P land
mines that pose a grave risk to civilians.
III. STRENGTHENING THE 1980 CONVENTION
Notwithstanding many positive elements in the 1980 Convention
and its Protocol II, their potential for reducing the casualties and damages
to the civilian population remains unfulfilled. In fact, none of the armed
conflicts since 1980 in which there has been serious misuse of land mines
has been governed by the Convention. Ways must be found both to
strengthen the contents of the Convention and to make it more widely
applicable.
Because of space constraints, emphasis will be placed on a few
major gaps or shortcomings, followed by the author's proposals for
improvement.
A. Internal Armed Conflicts
The 1980 Convention at present applies only formally to
international armed conflicts, although most of the armed conflicts today
are of internal nature. Hence, the Convention should be amended to
broaden its scope of application to include internal armed conflicts. The
amendment should draw for its support the Convention's preamble
(paragraph 5), Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the 1977 Additional Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions. Most important, the proposed amendment should be
based on human rights. As defined by the late Sir Humphrey Waldock,
former President of the International Court of Justice, human rights are
"rights which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their
nationality," hence wherever they are. To the extent that their basic
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human rights have been violated, they are entitled to protection and
assistance, whether in international or internal armed conflicts.
It should be stressed that equal rights for all individuals, be they
nationals or aliens, refugees or internally displaced persons, men, women
or children, is implied in all universal and regional human rights
instruments through the use of such expressions as "all human beings,"
"everyone," "no one," or "all." Hence, not a single "right" in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two 1966 Covenants is
specified or implied as belonging only to those during international armed
conflicts, but not during internal armed conflicts.
B. Implementation/Enforcement Mechanism
The lack of implementation or enforcement mechanism in the 1980
Convention and Protocol II may be remedied, at least in part, by an
explicit requirement of payment of compensation to victims of A/P land
mines by those who laid the mines in violation of international law. Such
a requirement serves two useful purposes: to render justice and relief to
victims of mines, and to prevent or deter future violations through the
disincentive of compensation. Since there is no statute of limitation on the
applicability of the compensation principle, it behooves all potential
violators of international humanitarian law to observe such law. Violation
of such law, in other words, does not pay.
As a practical matter, however, the compensation remedy may not
be particularly effective if aimed at insurgent groups in developing
countries like Angola and Cambodia, unless the groups have succeeded in
overthrowing and replacing the former governments.
It should be noted that the compensation principle is an integral
part of customary international law. As early as the mid-17t century,
Grotius formulated the rule that every "fault creates the obligation to make
good the loss." The most common remedy for the breach of an
international obligation is adequate compensation. Along with the
requirements to discontinue a wrongful conduct, to provide restitution and
to guarantee non-repetition, compensation for injuries inflicted upon any
victim in violation of international law constitutes a basic concept of State
responsibility. Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions reflects this rule of customary international law by
providing: "A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces."
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Similar provisions are found in Article 3 of the Hague Convention
IV of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Statute
2277, to which the United States is a party. Both the International Court
of Justice,' and the Security Council' reaffirm the compensation principle.
C. Obligation to Record and Report the Location of Mines
Article 7(1)(a) of Protocol II of the 1980 Convention imposes an
obligation on the parties to an international armed conflict to record the
location of all "pre-planned minefields" laid by them. However, there is
no definition of what is meant by "pre-planned." Article 7(2) merely
requires the parties to "endeavor to ensure the recording of other
minefields, mines and booby-traps which they laid or placed in position."
The word "endeavor" is too weak or imprecise for enforcement purposes.
It should be noted that the obligation to record and report the
location of sea mines by the parties that laid them exists under customary
international law. Thus, in the Corfu Channel Case,3 the International
Court of Justice placed Albania's liability to Great Britain for failing to
notify British ships about mines in the Albanian waters of the Corfu
Channel, which exploded and damaged the ships, on "certain general and
well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of
humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the freedom of
maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States." In view of the analogy between land and sea mines in their
destructive impact on personnel and material, legal principles applicable to
one type of mines should, in general, be applicable to the other.
While the United States did not participate in or accept the
conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,4 the
decision of the Court remains relevant. In that case, Nicaragua alleged
that a total of twelve vessels or fishing boats were destroyed or damaged
by mines in Nicaraguan internal waters or territorial sea, and that fourteen
people were wounded and two killed. These were reportedly small mines
laid on the sea-bed and triggered either by contact, acoustically,
magnetically or by water pressure. They caused noisy explosions, but
were unlikely to sink a ship. The Court decided, by a vote of fourteen
1. See, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 149.
2. Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991.
3. IC. Reports 1949, pp. 4, 22.
4. Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
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(including that of Judge Schwebel) to one, "that the United States of
America, by failing to make known the existence and location of the mines
laid by it. . . has acted in breach of its obligation under customary
international law in this respect. "
In reaching this decision, the Court cited, inter alia, the
Convention relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines of
1907,6 which provides that, even in time of war, "every possible
precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping," and
belligerents are bound to notify the danger zones as soon as military
exigencies permit, by a notice addressed to ship owners, which must also
be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel.7
In response to a request from Libya that Germany assist it in
removing mines laid by General Rommel's Army during World War II,
Germany sent Libya a huge stack of maps detailing the locations of such
mines. In addition, Germany sent several de-mining teams to Libya to
help locate and remove the mines, with all expenses paid by Germany on
an ex qratia basis. The then German Charge d'Affaires to Libya, Dr. G.
Muller-Chorus, termed the obligation to render such assistance as required
under Volkerrecht im Entstehen.
D. Obligation to Remove Mines
Article 9 of Protocol II of the 1980 Convention concerns
international cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines and
booby-traps. Again, the imprecise word, "endeavor," is used with regard
to the reaching of agreement on such cooperation. No clear legal
responsibility is assigned to anyone for mine clearance.
It is submitted that the primary responsibility for mine removal
rests with the parties that laid the mines. This not only conforms with the
concept of State responsibility, but also is practical since the parties which
laid the mines are in the best position to know their location and the armed
units directly involved. Imposing a clear responsibility on these parties to
remove mines would also have a deterrent effect. Such responsibility is
implied in Article 7 obligating the parties immediately after the cessation
of active hostilities to use the mine-location records "to protect civilians
from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps." Such protection
surely includes, at the minimum, mine removal.
5. pp. 147-48.
6. Hague Convention No. VIII.
7. Art. 3 p. 12.
8. Personal interview with Dr. Muller-Chorus in Washington, D.C., June 16 1995.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
As noted earlier, President Clinton has called for the eventual
elimination of antipersonnel land mines by all nations. Characterizing
these mines as "an enduring threat to post-war reconstruction around the
world," Secretary of State Warren Christopher has urged "a multi-faceted
approach to addressing the problems caused by this most deadly debris of
war." Not only the use, but also the production, stockpiling and transfer of
these mines should be prohibited.
The review conferences of the 1980 Convention on Conventional
Weapons scheduled for January and April 1996 should be occasions for
intense preparation for the eventual elimination of A/P land mines.
Pending their elimination, the Convention should be strengthened along the
lines suggested in this paper, and its widest possible adherence by States be
promoted.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTI-PERSONNEL
LAND MINES
Ambassador Michael J. Matheson*
The Convention on Conventional Weapons was adopted in 1980 to
limit the use of conventional weapons that present special risks of causing
unnecessary suffering or indiscriminate effects. The Convention currently
contains three Protocols, each of which regulates the use of a specific type
of weapons. Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons which rely on
non-detectable wounding fragments. Protocol II regulates the use of land
mines and booby-traps. Protocol III deals with the use of incendiary
weapons. The United States ratified the Convention, together with
Protocols I and II, earlier this year.
The Parties to the Convention are in the process of holding the
First Review Conference for the Convention, which just completed a
three-week session in Vienna. It succeeded in resolving one item on its
agenda-namely, the adoption of a new Protocol on Blinding Lasers. This
Protocol will prohibit the use and transfer of lasers "specifically designed
to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision." (The reference to
"unenhanced vision" excludes persons using optical devices, such as those
used to operate armored vehicles and to target tank and artillery fire.)
This was a welcome development.
This was, however, not the main purpose of the Review
Conference. The main objective was the revision of the current Protocol
on Land Mines, which is an essential task in light of the serious
humanitarian crisis created by the indiscriminate use of land mines in
many areas of the world during recent decades. The United States is
committed to taking vigorous action in various fora to deal with this crisis
in all its aspects. The eventual goal should be the elimination of
anti-personnel land mines, including a ban on their use, production,
stockpiling and transfer, recognizing that States can move most effectively
toward this goal as viable alternatives are developed that significantly
reduce the risk to the civilian population.
* Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. State Department. Principal Deputy Legal
Adviser, U.S. State Department, and U.S. Representative to the Review Conference for the
Convention on Conventional Weapons.
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The revision of the land mines Protocol is an important first step
toward this goal. If the restrictions of the Protocol had been observed
during the conflicts of the past two decades, there might have been a
substantial reduction in civilian casualties. Unfortunately, most of the
States involved in these conflicts were not parties to the Convention, and it
did not apply at all to internal armed conflicts, where most of these
casualties occurred. As a result, large numbers of mines were laid without
proper marking and recording, and often were used for the specific
purpose of causing civilian casualties.
However, the current Protocol is not a sufficient answer to the
problem of indiscriminate use of land mines. At the Review Conference,
the United States is pressing for a number of substantial improvements in
its provisions. These include, in particular, the following:
First, we favor an expansion in the scope of the
Protocol to apply in internal armed conflicts, as well as
during peacetime.
Second, we have proposed a requirement that all
remotely-delivered mines be equipped with self-destruct
devices to ensure that they do not remain a danger to
civilians long after the conflict is over. These mines
would also have backup self-deactivation features to ensure
that they do not detonate even if the self-destruct device
fails.
Third, we support a requirement that any
anti-personnel land mines without self-destruct devices and
backup self-deactivation features be used only within
controlled, marked and monitored minefields. These
minefields would be protected by fencing or other
safeguards to ensure the exclusion of civilians. Such
minefields could not be abandoned, other than through
forcible loss of control to enemy military action, unless
they were cleared or turned over to another State that had
committed to maintain the same protections. Self-destruct
devices on anti-personnel mines would have a maximum
lifetime of 30 days from emplacement, and
self-deactivation features would have a maximum lifetime
of 120 days.
Fourth, we favor a requirement that all mines be
detectable using commonly available technology. This
would greatly simplify the burdens and risks of demining.
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Fifth, we have proposed a requirement that the
party laying mines assume responsibility for them,
including a duty to clear them or maintain them in
controlled fields to protect civilians at the cessation of
active hostilities.
Sixth, we support the addition of an effective
compliance mechanism, including the possibility of
fact-finding inspections where credible reports of
violations have been made. If violations are found to have
occurred, there would be a possibility of reference to the
United Nations Security Council for action, as well as
individual criminal liability for persons who willfully or
wantonly put the civilian population in danger.
Finally, we have proposed the addition of a
mechanism for more frequent consideration of the land
mines Protocol and for exchange of views on all aspects of
the land mines issue.
The three-week session of the Review Conference that was just
concluded made considerable progress on most of these issues. In
particular, the Conference seems near agreement on expanding the scope
of the Convention to internal conflicts, and on fundamental improvements
in the requirements for marking, monitoring, recording and clearing of
minefields, as well as the protection of international forces and missions
from land mine hazards. However, a handful of States were not able to
accept the requirements for detectability, self-destruct mechanisms and
self-deactivation features that the great majority of the Conference thought
essential to the humanitarian improvement of the Protocol. It was also not
possible to reach agreement on a meaningful compliance procedure to deal
with violations.
The Parties therefore decided to take a recess and to resume work
next year: for a week in January in Geneva to focus on the technical
issues that could not be resolved; and for two weeks in April and May in
Geneva to conclude the revision of the Protocol. In the meantime, we and
other like-minded governments are working hard to convince the
dissenting States to modify their positions so that the Conference can be
successfully concluded by next spring.
There should be no reason why these technical problems cannot be
resolved in a manner consistent with both humanitarian and military
requirements. On the detectability question, it is very important to have a
clear specification of the metallic signature required for land mines, so that
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they can be reliably detected and cleared. Otherwise, clearance teams will
continue to take heavy casualties and it will be dangerous or impossible for
civilians to return to their homes and fields. We have proposed a
minimum standard of the equivalent of 8 grams of metallic content, which
almost all States participating at the Review Conference were prepared to
accept. The problem is that two countries-India and China-have large
stockpiles of anti-personnel mines that fall well below this standard and
were therefore unwilling to accept the proposed requirement.
The United States is familiar with this problem because we have
over four million mines that also fail to meet the standard, but we are
prepared either to forego their use or to adapt them to bring them up to the
necessary metal content. In fact, it is relatively simple to make such mines
detectable-all that is required is the attachment of a simple device
containing the necessary metal mass, which can be done easily and cheaply
by applying a small piece of metallic tape or attaching a small metal disk
with tape, adhesive, or wire. We hope to convince China and India that
the minor inconvenience of taking these steps is well worth the
humanitarian benefit.
The issue of equipping mines with self-destruct and
self-deactivation features may be more difficult and complicated. Here,
Russia, China, and Pakistan have declined to accept the requirements that
were acceptable to the rest of the Conference participants, either because
they have stocks of non-compliant mines or because they may wish to
acquire mines that would not comply. Russia, in particular, appears to
have a large stock of anti-personnel mines-including the famous butterfly
mine used in large quantities in Afghanistan-that cannot be readily brought
into compliance because they will not destroy or deactivate themselves in a
reasonable period of time with reasonable reliability. We hope to convince
these governments to forego the use of these mines or, where possible, to
use them within marked and monitored minefields so that the effect on the
civilian population is minimized.
As I have noted, the goal of this Administration is the eventual
elimination of anti-personnel land mines. The fact is, however, that this
goal is not attainable today, both because the great majority of the major
military powers are absolutely unwilling to accept such a total prohibition,
and because our own military still requires such mines for certain military
missions where there are currently no effective substitutes. Nonetheless,
we can and we must act now to impose much stricter controls on landmine
use that can, if complied with, substantially reduce the risk to the civilian
population.
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THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
SELF-DETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM THE
EXPERIENCE OF NATIVE AMERICANS
Allison M. Dussias*
I. INTRODUCTION
In seeking to vindicate their right to self-determination, indigenous
peoples seek not only recognition and protection of land rights and political
rights, but also recognition and protection of cultural and religious rights.
These cultural and religious rights have been described as including such
rights as the right to practice and perpetuate cultural traditions and to
control cultural property; the right to practice religious traditions and
ceremonies and to have access to sacred sites; the right to repatriation of
human remains and objects of religious and cultural significance; and the
right to use and preserve languages, oral traditions, and literature.'
My comments focus on the experience of Native Americans, both
historically and more recently, in seeking recognition and protection of
their cultural and religious rights,2 and what this experience can tell us
* Associate Professor, New England School of Law
1. Under the terms of the "International Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations,
Authorized Version Initialed July 28, 1994," for example, "The Cultural Rights of Nations" are
described as follows:
Para. 11 ... the right to practice their cultural traditions and evolve culture in relation
to lands and territories without interference. This includes the right to maintain,
protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their culture.... as
well as the right to the restitution of cultural, religious and spiritual property taken
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws;
Para. 12.. .the right to manifest, practice and teach spiritual and religious traditions,
customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect and have access in privacy to
religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of ceremonial objects; and
the right to the repatriation of human remains.
Para. 13.. .the right to instill, use, develop and transmit to future generations their
languages, oral traditions, writing systems and literature, and to designate and maintain
their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. It should be noted that it is inherently problematic to speak in terms of the cultural
rights and religious rights of Native Americans as if these were separate categories of rights. In
the traditional Native American world view, there is no clear-cut distinction between what is
cultural and what is religious. JOSEPH EPES BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 1 (1982). Rather, religion and spirituality pervade all aspects of life.
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about the struggle faced by indigenous peoples in seeking to vindicate their
rights to cultural and religious self-determination. I will first discuss the
experience of Native Americans with respect to religious ceremonies and
practices. If time permits, I will also discuss federal legislation aimed at
protecting Native American rights with respect to human remains and
objects of cultural and religious significance.
II. THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Historical Picture
Historically, the federal government's policy toward Native
American religions consisted of two key components: first, the conversion
of the Native Americans to Christianity through government-supported
missionary activities, and secondly, the direct suppression of Native
American ceremonies and traditions, at times by force. This two-fold
policy was maintained despite the constitutional questions which the policy
raised under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the Constitution.'
1. Christianization Efforts
From the earliest days of the United States, the federal government
viewed the conversion of the Native Americans to Christianity as a key
part of government policy, and accordingly provided financial and other
assistance to Christian missionaries.' Christianization was viewed as a
necessary part of the government's efforts to "civilize" the Native
Americans. Government support of Christianization efforts culminated in
the so-called "Peace Policy" of 1869 to 1882, during which the federal
government allotted the Indian agencies to various Christian religious
This holistic world view has led to difficulties for Native Americans seeking protection for
traditional practices, particularly because the U.S. Constitution refers to the right to the free
exercise of religion, but does not refer to cultural rights. See, e.g., New Rider v. Board of
Education, 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973), reh'g denied, 415
U.S. 939 (1974) (court refused to treat as constitutional in nature Indian students' claim that
school hair regulations violated the Free Exercise Clause because long hair had religious
significance). For a fuller description of the Native American world view and religious
traditions, see Allison M. Dussias, Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological
Resources and Native American Rights, 55 MD. L. REV. 84 (1996).
3. The relevant portion of the First Amendment, referred to as the Religion Clauses,
provides as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See generally R. PIERCE BEAVER, CHURCH, STATE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS:
Two AND A HALF CENTURIES OF PARTNERSHIP IN MISSIONS BETWEEN PROTESTANT CHURCHES
AND GOVERNMENT (1966).
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groups for the stated purpose of Christianization, and called upon
Protestant religious groups to nominate government Indian agents.,
Although these practices seem incredible today, in the nineteenth century
federal government officials viewed them as a necessary part of
government policy. Thus in 1869, a report by the U.S. Board of Indian
Commissioners could state quite plainly and openly that the duty of the
government was to educate Native Americans "in the principles of
Christianity ... [and that] [t]he establishment of Christian missions should
be encouraged . . . ." "The religion of our blessed Saviour is believed to
be the most effective agent for the civilization of any people." 6  The
alliance between church and state was not seriously questioned on
constitutional grounds until late in the nineteenth century, when Protestant
groups became alarmed over the amount of government funding which was
provided to Catholic-run schools for Native Americans.7 As a result,
direct government funding of sectarian schools for Native Americans was
ended, but only in response to anti-Catholic prejudice, not out of concern
for the right of the Native Americans to practice their traditional religions.
2. Suppression of Religious Ceremonies
In addition to attempting to destroy traditional religions by
supplanting them with Christianity, the federal government also made
more direct efforts to suppress religious ceremonies and practices, such as
the Ghost Dance and other ceremonial dances.8 The efforts to suppress the
Ghost Dance culminated in the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre, in which
over 100 Sioux men, women and children were killed by government
troops. 9 Although the government's efforts to suppress traditional religious
ceremonies and practices have not always been so violent, these efforts
persisted as late as the 1920s.'0
In short, the government's policy toward Native American
religious rights into the early part of the twentieth century demonstrated a
5. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS:
CHRISTIAN REFORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900 (1976).
6. 1869 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS 10.
7. ROBERT F. KELLER, AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, 1869-82, at 208-09 (1983).
8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. KELLY, THE ASSAULT ON ASSIMILATION: JOHN COLLIER
AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLICY REFORM 321-26 (1983) (describing efforts to suppress
ceremonial dances).
9. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 288-94 (1970).
10. In the 1920s, Indian superintendents were instructed to restrict ceremonial dances and
to be prepared to repress them by punitive measures if they persisted. See KELLY, supra note 8,
at 303-04.
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systematic and at times violent denial of the right to religious
self-determination. Where Native Americans were concerned, the
protections which the Constitution's Religion Clauses purported to provide
simply did not apply.
B. Twentieth Century Efforts to Vindicate Religious Rights
Although Native Americans are no longer subjected to express
government-backed Christianization efforts or direct government
suppression of traditional religious practices and ceremonies, when Native
Americans have turned to the federal courts for protection against
infringements upon their right to the free exercise of religion, they have
faced an uphill battle. In recent years a generally unsympathetic Supreme
Court has even dismissed threats to Native American free exercise rights
as an unavoidable consequence of a democratic political system." In most
of these cases, federal courts have been willing to subordinate the religious
rights of Native Americans to other rights and objectives, such as
government property rights.
Although a comprehensive review of the federal court cases which
have addressed Native American free exercise claims is beyond the scope
of this presentation,'2 I will briefly describe two Supreme Court cases
dealing with Native American free exercise claims and discuss what
lessons they may teach about the obstacles that indigenous peoples face in
seeking to vindicate their religious rights.
1. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association
In 1988, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association,'3 Native American plaintiffs challenged decisions by the U.S.
Forest Service to complete construction of a logging road and to permit
timber harvesting in a portion of a California national forest which was
considered sacred by three tribes, who made regular use of the sacred area
for a number of religious purposes. The plaintiffs maintained that
completion of the Forest Service's plans would desecrate the area, and
violate their free exercise rights."1
11. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892
(1990).
12. The author is currently writing an article which analyzes the twentieth century Native
American free exercise cases in the context of the history of government policy toward Native
American religious rights, and discusses how the twentieth century cases reflect this history and
perpetuate the failure to protect religious freedom.
13. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
14. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442-43.
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At first glance, the case may have seemed to be a strong one for
the plaintiffs. Not only does the Constitution protect the right to free
exercise of religion, which it was undisputed would be severely infringed
by the Forest Service's plans, but also a federal statute, the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA) provided that it was the
government's policy to protect the right of Native Americans to exercise
their traditional religions, including access to sites.' 5 The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that even if the Court were to assume that the
government's proposed actions would virtually destroy the plaintiffs'
ability to practice their religion, 6 the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit
the government's proposed actions.'1 The Court stated that the plaintiffs'
free exercise rights did not limit the government's right "to use what is,
after all, its land."' The Court ignored the congressional policy embodied
in AIRFA on the grounds that the statute did not explicitly provide for a
cause of action.' 9
What are the lessons to be learned from the Lyng case? First,
Lyng demonstrated the general difficulty that indigenous peoples can have
in vindicating their right to practice religions which are different from
mainstream religions. More specifically, Lyng demonstrated the difficulty
of establishing rights with respect to sacred sites, which have a significance
for Native Americans which may often be imperfectly comprehended by
judges who are more familiar with religions in which sacred sites do not
have comparable importance. In Native American religious traditions, the
land itself is sacred, with certain locations having particular significance as
places of revelation and communication with the spirits.2° For judges who
are more accustomed, however, to religions in which ceremonies can be
conducted in any church, synagogue or mosque, it may well be difficult to
comprehend and protect a religion in which specific sites are considered
15. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)). The Act
provides as follows:
It shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonial and traditional rites.
16. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
17. Id. at 441-42. The Court relied on the fact that the effects of the government's actions
on religion were incidental, rather than involving "indirect coercion or penalties on the free
exercise of religion." Id. at 450.
18. Id. at 453.
19. Id. at 454-55.
20. VINE DEIORIA, JR., GOD Is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 67-68 (2d ed. 1992).
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unique, such that a ceremony which is traditionally performed at a certain
site which is being destroyed cannot simply be moved to a different site.
Secondly, Lyng showed the willingness of federal courts to subordinate
Native American religious rights to other interests, such as government
property rights, despite the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion and the statutory protection for Native American religious rights
which appeared to be embodied in AIRFA.
2. Employment Division v. Smith
The second Supreme Court case which I will discuss, Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,"1 involved
two members of the Native American Church who brought a free exercise
claim after they were denied unemployment benefits when they were fired
because of their use of the drug peyote as part of a Native American
Church ceremony. 2  Members of the Native American Church view
peyote as the embodiment of their deity, and ingestion of peyote is the
church's essential ritual.23 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, even
though the dismissal of the plaintiffs had been based on their participation
in a religious ceremony.24 The Court did not even require the government
to establish a compelling interest to justify the infringement on the
plaintiffs' free exercise rights, which the Court had required in previous
free exercise cases. 25
Like the Lyng case, the Smith case demonstrated the difficulty that
Native Americans have continued to have in the twentieth century in
vindicating their right to practice their religions. As Justice Blackmun
noted in a dissenting opinion in Smith, the First Amendment and the
congressional policy reflected in AIRFA have offered to Native Americans
"merely an unfulfilled and hollow promise. "26 The fact that Native
American plaintiffs, armed with the Constitution and AIRFA, have had
such a difficult time vindicating their religious rights in U.S. courts does
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
22. Id. at 873-74. State law classified peyote as a controlled substance, possession of
which was a felony. Id. at 874. The federal government and twenty-three states had exemptions
in their drug laws for religious use of peyote. Id. at 912 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
25. Id. at 881-89.
26. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a more extensive discussion of Smith and
Justice Blackmun's opinion, see Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands of Justice: Justice
Blackmun's Indian Law Opinions, 71 N.D. L. REV. 41, 77-82 (1995).
[Vol. 2:633638
Dussias
not bode well for the prospects of other indigenous peoples in their quests
for religious self-determination.
There is a possibility, however, that Native American free exercise
claimants may fare better in future cases under the terms of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 19937 (RFRA), a federal statute which was
enacted in response to the Smith decision. RFRA designated the
compelling governmental interest test which the Court ignored in Smith as
the appropriate standard for evaluating free exercise claims.2 8 There are
no guarantees, however, that RFRA will provide any greater protection for
Native American religious practices, because it still allows for substantial
burdens on free exercise rights as long as the compelling governmental
interest test is satisfied. It is not difficult to imagine that federal courts
which have previously been unsympathetic to Native American religious
claims will only rarely find that challenged governmental actions fail to
satisfy the test..2 9 RFRA may thus prove to be no more useful than AIRFA
in protecting Native American religious freedom.
Another recent development in the protection of Native American
religious rights was the enactment in 1994 of amendments to AIRFA, 0
which were designed to ensure the lawfulness, under state and federal law,
of the ceremonial use of peyote by tribal members.3' These amendments
did not, however, strengthen the provisions of AIRFA as far as other
Native American religious practices and ceremonies were concerned.
27. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I to 2000bb-4
(1994).
28. Id. Under the terms of the statute, government "may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person--(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
29. In Diaz v. Collins, for example, a federal district court rejected the free exercise
claims of a Native American prison inmate under RFRA on the grounds that the prison
regulations challenged by the plaintiff either passed the compelling governmental interest test or
did not substantially burden religious practices and therefore were not even subject to the test.
Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353, 358-60 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
30. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344,
108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994)).
31. The amendments provided in part that "the use, possession, or transportation of peyote
by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any
State." 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (1994).
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III. THE RIGHT TO THE PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION OF HUMAN
REMAINS AND CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS OBJECTS
Another important right of Native Americans and of indigenous
peoples, in general, is the right to recover possession of, and to protect
and maintain, human remains and objects of cultural and religious
significance. A federal statute, the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act of 199032 (NAGPRA), specifically recognized certain
Native American rights and interests with respect to human remains and
certain objects of cultural and religious significance.
NAGPRA was enacted for two basic reasons. First, Congress
recognized that certain objects, including human remains, had special
religious and cultural significance for Native Americans, and that the
federal government was obligated, as part of its trust responsibility to
tribes, to respect this significance by protecting tribal rights with respect to
such objects and remains. Secondly, extensive past desecration and
plundering of Native American graves and objects of cultural and religious
significance, 3  at times with the active assistance of the federal
government," had demonstrated the need for protection of Native
American remains and objects, including both those which had already
been removed and those which had not yet been excavated. 5
32. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013
(Supp. 1994)).
33. See generally James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of
Imperial Archaeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11 (1992).
34. Id. at 19-20.
35. An earlier statute, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA), 16
U.S.C. § 470aa-70mm (1988 & Supp. 1994)), established a permitting process for the excavation
and removal of "archaeological resources" from "public lands" and "Indian lands." "Indian
lands" is defined as "lands of Indian tribes, or Indian individuals, which are either held in trust
by the United States. . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4). "Public lands" includes such areas as lands
which are part of the national park system. Id. § 470bb(3). "Archaeological resource" includes
"any material remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest" and
are at least 100 years old. Id. § 470bb(1). Permits cannot be issued for excavation on Indian
lands without the consent of "the Indian or Indian tribe owning or having jurisdiction over such
lands." Id. § 470cc(g)(2). The related regulations provide that archaeological resources which
are excavated or removed from Indian lands "remain the property of the Indian or Indian tribe
having rights of ownership over such resources." 43 C.F.R. § 7.13(b). Permits are not required
for excavation and removal by tribes or tribal members of archaeological resources on the tribe's
Indian lands. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(1). In addition, if a permit "may result in harm to, or
destruction of, any religious or cultural site," then "any Indian tribe which may consider the site
as having religious or cultural importance" must first be notified, but tribal consent is not
required if the site is not on Indian land. Id. § 470cc(c). ARPA thus provides for only a limited
tribal role and only limited protection for sacred sites and artifacts.
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NAGPRA provides a number of important protections. First, it
provides for the repatriation of Native American human remains, and
certain other protected objects, referred to collectively as cultural items , 6
from the holdings of federal agencies and federally funded state and local
institutions" under specified circumstances." Secondly, NAGPRA
provides that Native American cultural items can be excavated or removed
from federal or tribal lands only after a permit has been obtained, and the
appropriate tribe has been consulted or, in the case of tribal lands, has
given consent. 9  Thirdly, NAGPRA provides for Native American
ownership or control of cultural items which are excavated or removed
from federal or tribal lands after the date of the statute. 4
Although NAGPRA falls short of providing complete protection
for Native American interests with respect to human and other remains
discovered at locations other than on tribal lands, it does reflect
considerable respect for the significance of human remains and cultural
and religious objects for Native Americans. It also reflects respect for the
tribal right to a role in controlling the excavation and removal of these
items from tribal lands. By providing for repatriation of human remains
and other items, NAGPRA has played a positive role in redressing some of
the harm done by years of desecration and plunder of Native American
graves and artifacts. It can, therefore, provide a potentially useful model
for other indigenous peoples who are seeking to recover and protect
human remains and objects of religious and cultural significance.
36. NAGPRA applies to "cultural items," defined to include human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects, and "cultural patrimony" (objects "having ongoing historical, traditional,
or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture itself . and which,
therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual. "). 25 U.S.C. §
3001(3).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(4) & (8).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 3005.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c). "Tribal lands" includes "all lands within the exterior boundaries
of any Indian reservation." Id. § 3001(15). By its terms, NAGPRA thus covers objects on
reservation lands which are owned by nonmembers of the tribe.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 3002. Depending on the circumstances, either an individual Native
American or a tribe will have ownership or control of a particular cultural item. Id. § 3002(a).
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COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Hans Corell*
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter does not preclude
regional organizations from taking regional actions in the maintenance of
international peace and security. As long as such regional actions are
taken consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter,
regional organizations can play a pivotal role in the peaceful settlement of
regional disputes. Enforcement measures must however be authorized first
by the Security Council.
The Security Council should utilize regional organizations or
arrangements either in response to requests made to states or by the
Security Council itself. Furthermore, the use of regional arrangements can
strengthen the role of the Security Council and help maintain peace and
security effectively.
The Charter of the United Nations does not provide a specific
definition and character for the regional organizations. This flexible
nature of the Charter in dealing with the roles of regional organizations
permits various organizations to work for international peace and security
regardless of their different organizational objectives.
Gradual attraction towards the role of regional organizations in
maintaining international peace and security is in an ascending mode. In
its Resolution 49/57 of December 9, 1994, the General Assembly
approved the Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the
United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, and was convinced that
its adoption would contribute towards strengthening the role and enhancing
the effectiveness of the United Nations and of the regional arrangements or
agencies in this regard.
Regional organizations and arrangements can play an important
role in providing personnel and materials. Confidence of the parties can
be enhanced by allowing the role of well-known regional organizations to
play a part in conflict resolutions. The use of regional organizations is
important not only to the peace-keeping operations, but also for preventive
diplomacy, establishment of military and civil personnel and fact finders
* Under-Secretary General, for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, United Nations.
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when carried out in coordination with the United Nations. Among others,
the following organizations are currently in cooperation with the United
Nations to further peace and security. These include the Organization of
the American States (OAS); Organization of African Unity (OAU);
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); European
Union (EU); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC); and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS).
In August, 1994, the Secretary-General met with the heads of
several regional organizations to strengthen the cooperation between the
United Nations and regional organizations. In his "An Agenda for
Peace", the Secretary-General recommended a greater role for regional
organizations in peace-related activities. The Secretary-General further
emphasized the joint action, not only as a matter of decentralization,
delegation, and cooperation with United Nations, but also as a means of
promoting consensus, and democratization in international affairs.
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REVISITING CHAPTER VIII: THE ROLE OF
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
Ambassador H.E. Nabil Elaraby*
Recently, the world has seen both pragmatic and sudden changes
in international relations. Cooperation between Super Powers, along with
regional organizations, seems to be possible today. Consequently, the
scope of general cooperation and consensus is increasing among member
states of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations should be
changed according to the needs of the changing world.
We should be grateful for the flexible nature of Chapter VIII,
which allows the interplay of United Nations and regional organizations in
maintaining international peace and security. The demise of the Cold War
and the changing nature of conflicts have brought a number of challenges
to the United Nations. Internal, ethnic, and political issues are the source
of disputes today. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations did
not anticipate these intra-state conflicts in 1945.
In light of the changing nature of conflicts, regional organizations
can play an important role in maintaining international peace and security.
Regional organizations should be given enough authority and resources to
play an active role in the pacific settlement of regional disputes.
Meanwhile, the Security Council needs to encourage member states to use
the regional organizations to solve their disputes. However, regional
organizations should not move into the enforcement of actions because the
Security Council could be a better forum for the enforcement.
The role of regional organizations in maintaining international
peace and security is increasing. In some instances, regional organizations
are best suited to solve regional conflicts due to their proximity and ability
to provide faster information than the United Nations. For example,
during the Rwandan massacre, many non-African countries such as India,
Pakistan and the United States left Rwanda, but African countries stayed to
prevent further massacre. But the lack of resources has prevented the
regional organizations from operating a large scale peace-keeping
operation. The United Nations should provide enough resources to carry
out the regional peace-keeping activities.
* Representative of Egypt to the United Nations
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The capability of the United Nations in peace-keeping is
overstretched due to the ever-increasing number of operations. Regional
approaches to settlement of disputes could be realized through an active
cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations. Joint
operations under flexible, innovative mandates could enhance international
peace and security effectively. We must be open to allow experimentation
of joint actions or interplay of the regional organizations and the United
Nations. The cooperation between the United Nations and regional
organizations is in the initial stages and there is a need for further
refinement and development.
THE LURE OF REGIONAL SOLUTIONS: A
REALISTIC OPTION OR ESCAPISM?
Ambassador H.E. Colin Keating*
Depending on the nature and importance of disputes, there is
a need for either bilateral or unilateral use of global and regional
organizations. In spite of the convenience of using regional
organizations in solving regional disputes, the growing importance
and awareness of the global instrument cannot be minimized.
Moreover, regional solutions seem to be less effective than global
ones in solving regional crises.
The role of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations
in maintaining international peace and security has been forgotten
for almost twenty to thirty years. Furthermore, the Charter itself
does not define a clear role for the regional organizations to face the
current issues.
Threats to international peace come from many sources.
Intra-state ethnic, religious, and political issues are threatening the
fabrics of international peace and security. The impact of these
conflicts can be found at both the regional and global level. The
Secretary-General has employed various means of preventive
diplomacy, such as good offices and the involvement of regional
organizations in settlement of these new forms of conflicts.
However, regional organizations do have limitations to
participate in maintaining international peace and security. The
effectiveness of the use of regional actions in the matter of
enforcement is not a widely shared view. In spite of some effective
actions of regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) support in Bosnia, many believe that the
basic norm should be the United Nations.
Outside of enforcement and use of force, other areas of
international involvements prove the effectiveness of the regional
organizations. For instance, the Organization of African Unity's
* Ambassador, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations.
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(OAU) role in both regional and global scheme in dealing with many
disputes in Africa, including Western Sahara and Mozambique, and
the Cooperation between the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the United Nations in Haiti, all indicate the importance
of cooperation between the United Nations and regional
organizations in maintaining international peace and security.
The United Nations can provide an umbrella of legitimacy
and security to all parties in conflict due to its universality and
availability of resources. The United Nations has the ability to levy
its members for resources and enforce mandates. Most often,
parties in conflict look for international recognition and security,
which regional organizations cannot provide.
Moreover, the United Nations also has the ability to see both
sides of complex issues, such as in the cases of Mozambique, El
Salvador, and Cambodia. Regional organizations cannot provide
that much needed security and legitimacy. For instance, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) inability to solve
the problem of East Timor, and failure to solve a small problem of
Papua New Guinea by the South Pacific Forum without the help of
the United Nations does indicate a need for strong cooperation
between the United Nations and regional organizations.
Depending on the nature of disputes, regional organizations
and the United Nations should act together. The cooperation
between the United Nations and the Commonwealth in the case of
South African Apartheid is a primary example of what can be
achieved with cooperation. Working together, the United Nations
can play a leadership role in maintaining both regional and
international peace and security.
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COMMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
Evan T. Bloom*
I understand that I am substituting for Cherif Bassiouni. Those are
big shoes to fill, and instead of providing the very detailed discussion of
the history of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and all its component
parts which he is uniquely qualified to deliver, I will instead provide my
own very brief overview of where we are on the proposal to establish an
ICC.
This is an exciting time in the history of the consideration of the
ICC. Over the past few years, we have moved from a rather academic
study of the prospects for having an ICC, to the verge of serious
negotiations. In the context of major treaty negotiations and diplomacy, it
is as if we have gone from crawling to sprinting in mere moments. We are
all trying to figure out whether we can, in fact, perceive the finish line
somewhere in the distance.
Let me begin by describing how we got to where we are, then
describe the outlines of the current ICC proposal now being considered,
and finally outline what we are now discussing at the United Nations about
next steps.
The recent movement in the United Nations toward an ICC began
several years ago with an initiative from the Caribbean states. They felt
that an international court could help them, as small states, deal with major
drug traffickers. They demanded that the issue be considered seriously.
Not long thereafter, events in the former Yugoslavia, resulting in the
creation of the United Nations' ad hoc tribunal, brought international
prosecution of war crimes to the fore in a way not seen since the
Nuremburg and Tokyo trials. The widespread support for the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda tribunals has been absolutely essential to making the ICC
proposal a viable one.
In addition, the world began to recognize, as never before, that
people were being subjected to horrendous crimes-we see this on CNN
* Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, United
States Department of State, and member of the United States delegation to the United Nations'
Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the United States
Government.
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every night-in places where there is no effective government to
investigate and prosecute manifestly criminal acts. It was natural,
especially in light of the ad hoc tribunal precedents, to refocus attention on
the proposal for an ICC.
In 1992, the General Assembly asked the International Law
Commission (ILC), an independent group of experts which works closely
with the United Nations, to prepare a draft statute for a court. In a single
year (actually a session of three months), it came up with not only a draft
but one that because of the extraordinary care and thought put into it,
moved the court proposal from the drawing boards and into the realm of
reality. All of a sudden, the world community had a tangible work
product before it---one that was (and continues to be) well-regarded as a
basis for further work by governments. In 1993, the United Nations
General Assembly asked the ILC to review its draft in light of comments
by states. The Commission did so, and in 1994 presented to the United
Nations an even more polished draft, along with a recommendation that
the United Nations General Assembly convene a conference of
plenipotentiaries to finalize the statute for adoption.
Despite the progress made, a number of states felt that there were
still many uncertainties with the draft, and the time was not ripe for a
conference. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly established
an ad hoc committee open to all states, which met for four weeks in two
sessions during 1995 to review the major issues presented in the ILC text.
The Committee's work was a success. It produced a fifty-odd
page report which outlines key issues. In some important areas, there was
a clear convergence of views among delegations as the discussions
continued. In others, while consensus has not been reached, at least the
contours of the issues have become clear.
What kind of a court are we talking about? First, there is
overwhelming support for establishing a court by means of a treaty, as
opposed to having the court established by the Security Council, or by
amendment of the United Nations Charter as a new organ of the United
Nations. This means that it would bind only the parties to it---the states
which join it voluntarily. As a result, it must appeal to the broadest range
of states, big and small, rich and poor, otherwise it will end up having
little practical impact.
The court will handle crimes of individuals, not states. There have
been a number of proposals for the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
The ILC suggested the following: crimes under international humanitarian
law, such as war crimes, both under customary law and under the 1949
Geneva Conventions, genocide, as defined in the Genocide Convention,
and crimes against humanity, plus crimes under a series of treaties dealing
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with terrorism--hijackings, hostage-taking, etc., and drug crimes. In
addition, the ILC proposed that the court include the crime of aggression
within its jurisdiction.
In the past year, we have seen broad support develop for the
proposition that the court's jurisdiction be limited to "core" crimes, in this
context meaning the international humanitarian law crimes-in general
terms, the same crimes which are part of the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda tribunals.
There has come to be much less depth of support for inclusion of
drug crimes and crimes under the terrorism conventions. States wanting to
include drug crimes were not able to win sufficient support for the idea,
given the concern that an international drug court would be flooded with
cases, and could not deal effectively with a type of crime which relies on
networks of criminal activity.
With respect to aggression, the Russians and some others support
its inclusion, arguing that to fail to do so would be a regression from what
was acknowledged at Nuremburg, basically that individual criminal
responsibility exists for the crime of aggression or waging aggressive war.
Most delegations, including that of the United States, would not include
aggression--even if there had to be a predicate finding by the Security
Council that the state in question had committed aggression, and only then
would the ICC bring a case against the leader or leaders of that state. The
reasons include the difficulties associated with defining aggression, and the
very difficult political issues attached to getting the court into the business
of handling this momentous crime. In sum, most states are willing to at
least begin with an ICC having jurisdiction over international humanitarian
law violations, and perhaps add more later, for example by means of a
periodic review mechanism.
What about the role of the Security Council, and its mandate under
the Charter to maintain and restore international peace and security? One
of the best reasons for establishing an ICC is to avoid the inconvenience of
the Council having to act each time to set up ad hoc tribunals. The ILC
envisioned a relationship between the ICC and the Council which calls for
the Council to be able to refer situations to it, for the Council to, in effect,
pre-empt prosecutions in relation to situations of which the Council is
seized, and for the Council to make a predicate finding with respect to
aggression by a state, before the ICC could hear a related case involving
the commission of the crime of aggression by an individual. The United
States supported this proposal with the exception of preferring that
aggression not be within the jurisdiction of the court in any circumstances,
and would also require, generally, that all humanitarian law situations be
referred by the Council. Other states want only a limited role for the
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Security Council, or none at all, in order to avoid what they consider
would be a politicization of the court.
One more point, and then I promise to get out of the procedural
weeds, is the repeated mention in the ad hoc committee of something
called "complementarity." I don't know who came up with the term, but I
can assure you that not everyone agrees on what it means. All delegations
strongly agree with the proposition that the ICC is intended to be
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where trial
procedures may not be available or may be ineffective. The ILC draft
statute says so in its preamble. So much so good-we agree that the ICC
is not supposed to replace national courts. But what does this mean in
practice? For one group, it means that the ICC comes into play only when
interested states agree that it should. For others, it means that if, in the
sole judgment of the court, the court is better able to handle a case than,
say, the courts of Mexico, Thailand or the United States, then the ICC
could decide that it will take the case-regardless of the fact that a state
stands ready and willing to prosecute.
Thus, on the one hand there are those who envision a court which,
from the beginning, would have jurisdiction over the broadest range of
crimes under international law, with the ability to reach into states which
are parties to the ICC and pluck out defendants for prosecution regardless
of the views of interested states. On the other hand are those who would
set up a court only as a stand-by, leaving cooperation with it in large
measure optional. Something in between would be acceptable to most
states.
There is more: Issues related to due process, extradition,
structure, funding, sentencing, etc. Rather than address those issues here,
I will simply recommend that you read the ILC's draft statute and the
report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
Today we finished a week of debate in the Sixth Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly on this subject. The General Assembly
will adopt a resolution near the end of the year on next steps, and we are
negotiating the text of that resolution now. The major issues under
discussion are:
1) Although it is clear that more work prior to the commencement
of the 51st General Assembly in September, 1996 will be
commissioned, the question is how long? Proposals range from
two to ten weeks, with most bets currently in the four to six
range.
2) What would the group be called? Would we continue the Ad
Hoc Committee, or convene something called a "preparatory
committee." The phrase "prepcom" implies strongly that we
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are preparing for something, in other words, a diplomatic
conference, and that such a conference should be expected at
some time in the near future.
3) What type of work will it do? Would it simply continue the
discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee, or would it combine
discussions with drafting of texts-in effect beginning serious
negotiation of a consolidated draft for submission to a
conference of plenipotentiaries?
4) Finally, when will a diplomatic conference be called? Should
we decide now, by superimposing a timeframe on the
preparatory work, or should we wait until next fall, and judge
then what progress we have made? Italy has offered to host a
diplomatic conference, and would like that conference to take
place in 1997. Other states, including the United States, feel
that the decision about when to convene a conference is
premature until we see how far our work progresses.
I cannot comment in any detail on the negotiations, but I will say
that most states seem favorable to having a series of meetings, called a
"prepcom." If that is what transpires, we will have a very ambitious
schedule of meetings to discuss all the key issues raised by the ILC statute,
and any other key issues we can think of.'
So I began by saying that this is an exciting time for consideration
of the issue of establishing an ICC. Even the President is interested. At
the dedication of the Dodd Center at the University of Connecticut on
October 15, 1995, he said that "nations all around the world who value
freedom and tolerance [should] establish a permanent international court to
prosecute, with the support of the United Nations Security Council, serious
violations of humanitarian law." Such a permanent international court, in
the President's words, "would be the ultimate tribute to the people who did
such important work at Nuremburg."
1. In fact, in its subsequent resolution 50/46 of December 11 1995, the United Nations
General Assembly decided to
establish a preparatory committee open to all States Members of the United Nations or
members of specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to
discuss further the major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft
statute prepared by the International Law Commission and, taking into account the
different views expressed during the meetings, to draft texts, with a view to preparing
a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal
court as a next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries,...
In that resolution, the General Assembly decided that the preparatory committee would meet
from March 25 to April 12 and from August 12 to 30, 1996.
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The challenges are great-even daunting. On some key issues
there are very significant differences among states. In addition, there is an
incredible amount of work still to be done. The United States and others
believe that it is essential to have developed the rules of procedure and
evidence for the court in conjunction with the statute. This is necessary to
protect the due process rights of defendants and should not be left to the
court's judges. There are many complex issues concerning the
relationship of the court to national judicial systems. One example close to
home is the role of national courts in transferring persons to the court. In
the United States, extradition requires a judicial finding of extraditability.
Wouldn't that be needed for surrender of persons from the United States to
an international criminal court, even if we don't use the word
"extradition?" But if our courts can undertake a review of whether
someone should be extradited, can't the courts of other states? Would the
ICC be able to overrule a U.S. court that found someone not properly
surrenderable to the ICC?
What about the role of the court's prosecutor? Should he or she be
able to bring cases on his or her own? Would he or she have powers
allowing him or her to demand production of documents? Witnesses? Or
would the prosecutor primarily rely on state authorities, and their good
faith?
An issue of a different dimension is that we have seen a lack of
involvement and participation by developing states in the work of the Ad
Hoc Committee. All delegations realize and are explicit in their speeches
about the need for broader participation. Otherwise, the court, if
established on the basis of a treaty, would be unlikely to attract broad
acceptance. You can imagine that a court which is primarily comprised of
western states would not be capable of fulfilling its promise. We must
guard against that result.
We are now in the process of shaping an institution that would
have an important impact on world society. More serious work by
governments was done on the subject of the ICC in 1995 than ever before.
In 1996 we will see an even greater level activity. Success is by no means
guaranteed, but the elements are in place for moving ahead. It will be an
exciting and interesting year for the ICC proposal.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE YUGOSLAVIA WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL
Michael P. Scharf*
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1993, in response to the "ethnic cleansing" of some 250,000
Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council adopted a resolution
establishing the Yugoslavia Tribunal; in September 1993, the General
Assembly elected the Tribunal's judges; and in July 1994, the Security
Council appointed its Prosecutor. As of the time of this writing, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has indicted over fifty suspects, including Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic and his military chief, General Ratko Mladic, yet
only a few trials have commenced.
The establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal marked the first time
since the Allies created the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military tribunals
following World War II that an international court was set up to prosecute
persons responsible for such international crimes. Justice Robert Jackson,
the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, concluded his report to the President on
the Nuremberg Trials by acknowledging that "many mistakes have been
made and many inadequacies must be confessed." But he went on to say
that he was "consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this novelty, errors
and missteps may also be instructive to the future." As the first international
criminal court, the Nuremberg Tribunal provides a benchmark for assessing
the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The question, then, is have we learned from the
mistakes of Nuremberg?
II. A COMPARISON WITH NUREMBERG
There were four main criticisms levied on Nuremberg. First, that it
was a victor's tribunal before which only the vanquished were called to
account for violations of international humanitarian law. Second, that the
defendants were prosecuted and punished for crimes expressly defined for
the first time in an instrument adopted by the victors at the conclusion of the
war. Third, that the Nuremberg Tribunal functioned on the basis of limited
* Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser,
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Departmentof State, 1989-1993; J.D. Duke University School of
Law. This is an expanded version of a speech delivered at International Law Weekend/95.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
procedural rules that inadequately protected the rights of the accused. And
finally, that it was a tribunal of first and last resort, since it had no appellate
chamber.
A. Victor's Justice
Elsewhere, I have written that in contrast to Nuremberg, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal was created neither by the victors nor by the parties
involved in the conflict, but rather by the United Nations, representing the
international community of States. Yet, this is perhaps somewhat of an
oversimplification. The decision to establish the Yugoslavia Tribunal was
made by the U.N. Security Council, which has not remained merely a
neutral third party; rather, it has itself become deeply involved in the
conflict.
The Security Council has imposed sanctions on the side perceived to
be responsible for the conflict, authorized the use of force, and sent in tens
of thousands of peacekeeping personnel. Its numerous resolutions have been
ignored and many of its peacekeeping troops have been injured or killed;
some have even been held hostage. Moreover, a compelling argument can
be made that the Security Council has (justifiably) favored the Bosnian-
Muslims over the Serbs throughout the conflict. Although it imposed
sweeping economic sanctions on the Serbs; such action was never even
considered when Croatian forces committed similar acts of ethnic cleansing.
During the conflict, the Council has been quite vocal in its condemnation of
Serb atrocities, but its criticisms of those committed by Muslims and Croats
has been muted.
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is supposed to be independent
from the Security Council, one cannot ignore that the Tribunal's Prosecutor
was selected by the Security Council and its Judges were selected by the
General Assembly from a short list proposed by the Security Council. While
the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute any one responsible for violations
of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia, it is perhaps no
surprise that the indictments so far have been overwhelmingly against Serbs.
As long as the jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals is triggered by a decision of
the Security Council, and the prosecutors and judges are selected by the
Council, such tribunals will be susceptible to the criticism that they are not
completely neutral. This is one of the reasons the international community is
so interested in establishing a permanent international criminal court.
B. Application of Ex Post Facto Laws
Perhaps the greatest criticism of Nuremberg was its perceived
application of ex post facto laws, by holding individuals responsible for
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waging a war of aggression. The first to voice this criticism was Senator
Robert Taft of Ohio in 1946, but it wasn't until John F. Kennedy reproduced
Taft's speech in his Pulitzer Prize winning 1956 book, Profiles of Courage,
that this criticism became part of the public legacy of Nuremberg.
The creators of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths to
ensure that the Tribunal would not be subject to a similar criticism. Thus, in
drafting the Tribunal's Statute, the Secretary-General required that the
Tribunal's jurisdiction be defined on the basis of "rules of law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary international law." In its proposal for
the Tribunal's Statute, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
world's leading authority on international humanitarian law, "underlined the
fact that according to International Humanitarian Law as it stands today, the
notion of war crimes is limited to situations of international armed conflict."
In the first case to be heard before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the
defendant, Dusko Tadic, challenged the lawfulness of his indictment under
Article 2 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and Article 3
(violations of the customs of war) of the Tribunal's Statute on the ground that
there was no international armed conflict in the region of Prijedor, where the
crimes he was charged with are said to have been committed. In a novel
interpretation, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Appeals Chamber decided by a
vote of four to five that, although Article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute applied
only in international armed conflicts, Article 3 applied to war crimes
"regardless of whether they are committed in internal or international armed
conflicts."
The Tribunal based its decision on its perception of the trend in
international law in which "the distinction between interstate wars and civil
wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned." While
Professor Meron has argued convincingly for acceptance of individual
responsibility for violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols
additional thereto in the context of internal armed conflict, such recognition
would constitute progressive development of international law, rather than
acknowledgment of a rule that is beyond doubt found in existing law. In
addition to raising the ex post facto criticism, there is a second important
reason for the Tribunal to exercise greater caution in construing its
jurisdiction: States will not have faith in the integrity of the Tribunal as a
precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and for a permanent international
criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived as prone to expansive
interpretations of its jurisdiction.
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C. Violations of Defendant's Due Process
The Nuremberg Tribunal has been severely criticized for allowing
the prosecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused over the
objections of their attorneys. As Telford Taylor, one of the Prosecutors at
Nuremberg, wrote in his book Anatomy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, "[tiotal
reliance on ... untested depositions by unseen witnesses is certainly not the
most reliable road to factual accuracy. ... Considering the number of
deponents and the play of emotional factors, not only faulty observation but
deliberate exaggeration must have warped many of the reports."' Such
affidavits seriously undermined the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him. In the case of Maryland v. Craig, the U.S. Supreme Court
expressed the importance of this right as follows: "Face-to-face confrontation
generally serves to enhance the accuracy of fact finding by reducing the risk
that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person."
On August 10, 1995, the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal
issued a two to one decision, holding that the identity of several witnesses
could be withheld indefinitely from the defendant, Dusko Tadic, and his
counsel, even throughout the trial, in order to protect the witnesses and their
families from retribution. This decision is troubling in that it elevates the
protection of victims above the accused's right of confrontation,
notwithstanding the fact that the Article 20 of the Tribunal's Statute requires
that proceedings be conducted "with full respect for the rights of the
accused," and with merely "due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses." In addition, the Yugoslavia Tribunal rationalized its decision on
the ground that the Tribunal is "comparable to a military Tribunal" which
has more "limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of evidence."
It then cited favorably the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal to admit
hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits with greater frequency than would
be appropriate in domestic trials. Although the rationale for this decision
was that the United Nations had not established or funded a sufficient witness
protection program, it would have been better for the Tribunal to refuse to
proceed with the trial until such a program was set up than to go forward on
the basis of unidentified and anonymous witnesses.
D. Right of Appeal
A final criticism of Nuremberg was that it did not provide for the
right of appeal. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been recognized
as constituting a major advancement over Nuremberg by guaranteeing the
1. TELFORDTAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERGTRIALS, at 174, 241, and 315
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right of appeal and providing for a separate court of appeal. However, the
procedure for the selection of judges did not differentiate between trial and
appellate judges, leaving the decision to be worked out by the judges
themselves. When they arrived at the Hague, this became the subject of an
acrimonious debate, since nearly all the judges wished to be appointed to the
appeals chamber, which was viewed to be the more prestigious assignment.
As a compromise, the judges agreed that assignments would be for an initial
period of one year and subject to "rotat[ion] on a regular basis" thereafter.
The rotation principle adopted by the judges is at odds with the
provisions of the Tribunal's Statute intended to maintain a clear distinction
between the two levels of jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that there shall be
three judges in each Trial Chamber and five judges in the Appeals Chamber,
and Article 14(3) expressly states that a judge shall serve only in the
chamber to which he or she is assigned. These provisions were intended to
ensure the right of an accused to have an adverse judgment and sentence in a
criminal case reviewed by "a higher tribunal according to law," as required
by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The purpose of the principle of the double degree of jurisdiction under which
judges of the same rank do not review each other's decision is to avoid
undermining the integrity of the appeals process as a result of the judges'
hesitancy to reverse decisions to avoid the future reversal of their own
decisions. The rotation principle, therefore, undermines the Yugoslavia
Tribunal's appellate process.
III. CONCLUSION
In the conclusion of Virginia Morris and my recent book on the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, we stated:
The Statute of the [Yugoslavia] Tribunal clearly meets the
international standards of due process established at
Nuremberg and reflects the significant developments in
international human rights standards in the last half
century. The detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted by the judges pursuant to the Statute represents a
marked improvement over the scant set of rules that were
fashioned for the Nuremberg Tribunal. The Statute and
the Rules provide the necessary framework for ensuring
that the [Yugoslavia] Tribunal will comply with
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international standards of fair trial and due process and
avoid the criticisms of its predecessor.2
In light of the subsequent developments described above, we may have been
too optimistic in our initial assessment. The Yugoslavia Tribunal's record so
far can only be described as a mixed one. It can, and must, do better. To
paraphrase Robert Jackson again, if we pass the defendants in an
international trial a poisoned chalice, it is we, the international community,
who is ultimately injured. For, the record upon which we judge Mr. Tadic
today, will be the record upon which history judges the effort to prosecute
crimes before an international Tribunal.
2. VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONALCRIMINALTRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 333-334 (1995).
[Vol. 2:655
COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY
Mark S. Zaid, Esq. *
I. INTRODUCTION
As a private attorney I have dedicated a significant part of my
practice to working with or representing victims of terrorism. In
particular, I represent several family members who lost relatives in the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in a civil action against the government of
Libya. Through the use of the judicial system, we are attempting to forge
a new weapon for use against terrorist states as a means by which to
achieve deterrence, punishment, and compensation for the victims.
Terrorism and the law are inexplicably interconnected, and the law
is one of our most important weapons available to fight terrorists. The
bottom line is terrorists are criminals who must be dealt with through the
rule of law. It is the preservation and adherence to laws, both domestic
and international, that separates us from the terrorists. In determining the
proper course of action to be utilized against a particular terrorist or
group, we must give serious consideration to the limits of the law. If we
stray too far from those limits then that line of separation may no longer
exist, and as a result, the terrorists in many ways will have secured a
victory.
How to best combat terrorism, particularly international terrorism,
remains a tantalizing and difficult subject. The United States
counterterrorism policy is based on three general rules: first, no deals will
be made with terrorists; second, terrorists will be treated as criminals; and
third, maximum pressure must be brought to bear on states that sponsor
and support terrorism.
Unfortunately, the United States' legal response to terrorism has
been, as has been of most nations, reactive rather than proactive.
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Following the rash of terrorist attacks in Europe against Americans in the
1980s, the United States enacted legislation to allow for prosecutions of
terrorists who commit acts against Americans abroad. Now, in the 1990s,
in the wake of terrorist attacks directed against Americans in the United
States, legislation is pending to ensure these perpetrators can be prosecuted
as the terrorists that they are. Hopefully, all the legal gaps have been
finally filled to cover all prosecutorial possibilities, but that is not enough.
It is time to stop responding and to start acting. Terrorists are
becoming more sophisticated in their techniques and skills. Their
conventional weapons are growing more powerful and their capability and
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction has arrived. Remember
the line given by the Irish Republican Army to Prime Minister Thatcher,
"you have to be lucky all the time, we only need to be lucky once." It
may be that the next terrorist attack will not provide us with an opportunity
to respond.
While 1994 witnessed a 25% decrease in the number of terrorist
attacks that occurred worldwide, the lowest number in twenty-three years,
and, for the most part, the state sponsors of terrorism have been relatively
quiet during the 1990s, this is no time to relax our guard. In fact,
according to the latest figures for 1995, attacks are on the rise again:
approximately 160 recorded attacks in the first quarter of 1995, although
the vast majority of these attacks were the result of PKK attacks in Europe.
Figures, however, are often unnecessarily distracting and certainly not
indicative of the imposing threat. Nor do they offer any solace to those
who later become unfortunate victims. In any event, regardless of the
statistics the trend is now toward a higher number of casualties, more
extensive property damage, and increasingly devastating effects on
economies.
Given the substantial devastation that might be caused by the next
attack, rather than focusing on how best to prosecute terrorists, which
remains, of course, an important and necessary objective, now is the
appropriate time to address the need to increase and strengthen the legal
resources needed to prevent future terrorist acts from occurring.
I would categorize the possible governmental responses to
terrorism into three major groups: (1) military strikes; (2) diplomacy; and
(3) legal measures, which would include, but is not limited to, law
enforcement efforts, intelligence gathering, infiltration tactics, sanctions,
civil suits, and reward programs. For the purposes of this panel, and due
to the constraints on time, I will only address the legal measures that can
be taken into the 21st century to combat international terrorism.
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II. LEGAL MEASURES
There have been many recent successes in the last few years in
capturing and prosecuting terrorists. Fawaz Yunis was convicted in
federal court in 1989 for the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am flight.
Mohammod Ali Hamadei was convicted in Germany for the June 1985
hijacking of TWA flight 847 and the murder of navy diver Robert
Stethem. Just last year, on May 24, 1994, four men were convicted of
bombing the World Trade Center in New York City and were each
sentenced to 240 years in prison. The New York conspiracy trial of Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman and ten of his followers for "seditious conspiracy"
resulted in a significant verdict of guilty. And Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the
alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, was apprehended
this past February in Pakistan and immediately deported to the United
States to stand trial.
But there have also been the failures. The two suspected Pan Am
Flight 103 bombers, Abdel Basset Ali A1-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa
Fhimah, still remain protected in Libya despite the passage of nearly four
years and the imposition of international sanctions against the state of
Libya. Mir Aimal Kansi, the alleged terrorist in the 1993 shooting at the
CIA, is at large in Pakistan. Two of the suspects arrested for the 1994
bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina were released for lack of
evidence on July 29, 1995. No convictions have been obtained for the
bombing of the Buenos Aries Jewish cultural center of last summer. And
the attacks still continue.
We will never be able to completely eliminate terrorism, at least
certainly not in our lifetimes. Although we have made a good start, there
are steps that can be taken by which we can improve the legal tools we
currently possess to combat terrorism. Let me suggest a few for
implementation at the international level.
III. ADOPT A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY ON TERRORISM
In light of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, now is the time to press States to draft and ratify a
comprehensive treaty on terrorism. During the last ten years there has
been great progress on the international level to condemn terrorism. In
1985, 1987, 1991, 1993, and most recently on November 17, 1994, the
General Assembly adopted resolutions on measures to eliminate
international terrorism. Each time the language of the resolution became
stronger and received greater support. In fact, on most occasions, it was
unanimous. But as significant as these resolutions are, they are merely
guidelines without teeth. A formal treaty should be adopted which covers
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such matters as the illegality of terrorist offenses, the principle of aut
dedere aut punire (extradite or prosecute), the sharing of intelligence
information, preventative measures, and punishment to be imposed on
States that support or consent to terrorism, and compensation for the
victims. Let me elaborate somewhat on some specifics.
The last reference, compensation, is a relatively new phenomena,
although there are some recent international precedents. For example, (1)
the Anglo-American Declaration of November 27, 1991 requires, as one
of three prongs, Libya to pay "appropriate compensation" in order to lift
the Security Council sanctions; (2) through the offices of the
Secretary-General, following the French bombing of the Greenpeace ship
"Rainbow Warrior," arbitration was conducted to determine the amount of
compensation France was to pay to New Zealand and Greenpeace; and (3)
the United Nations established the Iraqi Claims Commission to compensate
those harmed by Iraq's aggression.
More simple extradition procedures are necessary, including the
complete elimination of political offense exceptions (for example the
United Kingdom - Irish Republican Army problems) and, possibly, any
restrictions regarding extradition of a State's nationals. The only reason
the United States was able to secure custody over Ramzi Yousef so quickly
was that, since he was not a Pakistani national, Pakistan could expel him
immediately. The same will not occur when, or if, Amir Kansi is
captured. Since he is a Pakistani national he could hold up his extradition
through legal challenges for quite some time.
We need to adequately address issues of state sponsorship. What
is meant by sponsorship varies. It could be direct (Iran), financial (Syria),
or merely allowing the use of one's territory (Sudan). Regardless, any
aspect of sponsorship needs to be eliminated and severe penalties need to
be created that will be adhered to by all States. The current manner of use
of United Nations economic sanctions, I believe is a failure, particularly
with respect to Libya. Let me cite you just two examples of why the
Libyan sanctions are unsuccessful, although these would apply to any
sanction situation.
First, sanctions have to hurt, not just be inconvenient. In Libya's
case, all sales and purchases of oil would need to be prohibited. This will
never occur. Unfortunately, economic interests are apparently more
important to most countries than most anything else. Not only is such a
move opposed by two of our key allies, Germany and Italy, but even our
co-sponsors of the sanctions, the United Kingdom and France, will not
support the effort. In fact, France recently signed a one billion dollar oil
deal with Libya.
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Second, sanctions have to be rigorously and completely enforced.
If even one country fails to stand firm, there may be serious consequences.
There are various accounts of violations of the Libyan sanctions by
countries and companies. The most recent report was that Libya was
using its humanitarian flights to smuggle in embargoed goods through
Malta. Of course, several months ago, Saudi Arabia enraged the United
States by allowing a Libyan Arab Airlines aircraft to land and then depart
from Saudi territory. Support for Libya is increasingly growing in the
United Nation's General Assembly. Indeed, concerns existed earlier this
year that Libya may even be granted a seat on the Security Council.
Fortunately, this did not occur, but the mere fact that it was possible
helped strengthen Ghadaffi's position in the international community.
Globalization will also have a significant effect on facilitating
terrorism. It is becoming much easier for persons to travel from one
country to another without a visa. For the most part, this is an
immigration issue for an individual country to handle. However, at the
same time, States need to crack down on the availability of illegal
passports. It is very easy to purchase a valid, although improperly
obtained, passport, including those from western powers. Ramzi Yousef
entered and left the United States on two different valid passports. Law
enforcement needs to play a more active role in preventing government
officials from improperly selling or distributing passports.
Finally, in designing a comprehensive treaty, we should not waste
any time attempting to define international terrorism, although we do need
a domestic definition, as contained, for example, in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, for prosecutions under the common law
system. We all know the old adage that one person's freedom fighter is
another person's terrorist. The difficulties in formulating an agreed upon
definition has resulted in a significant loss of time. One 1983 study found
that from 1936 to 1981, at least 109 definitions were advanced. Terrorism
should be considered in this respect like obscenity. As Justice Stewart
once remarked, "I know it when I see it."
The solution is quite simple. Worry about the underlying crime
and not the definition. You do not need to be a lawyer to recognize the
difference between the killing of a soldier under rules of engagement and
the deliberate slaughter of innocent women and children. The types of
offenses that terrorism involves, such as murder, serious bodily harm, and
infliction of serious mental distress, are common crimes. There are many
acts which have been clearly identified as terrorist by international treaties
and constitute unacceptable conduct: aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage,
attacks on internationally protected persons, hostage-taking, torture,
extrajudicial killing, and the use of the mail for the delivery of explosives.
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Acts of terrorism also violate such international conventions as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, and various resolutions of both the General
Assembly and the Security Council. It is clear that international terrorism
violates the basic human rights principles developed over the course of this
century. Therefore, every form of terrorism that has been discussed at this
conference, the use of chemical and biological weapons, car bombings, the
assassination of dissidents, etc., is unlawful, no matter what definition is
adopted.
IV. NEED TO PRESSURE STATES TO PROSECUTE SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS AND ENSURE THEIR MAXIMUM SENTENCES ARE SERVED
There are occasions where States refuse to extradite a suspected
terrorist. For instance, some States will not extradite individuals to
countries, such as the United States, where the individual may be subject
to the death penalty. Many of the terrorist offenses under United States
law now include such a penalty.
Recent examples include the Hamadei and Rashid cases where
Germany and Greece respectively denied the United States extradition
request. Thereafter, United States prosecutors and investigators worked
with their German and Greek counterparts. Hamadei is now serving a life
sentence, and Rashid was sentenced to fifteen years. It must now be
ensured, however, that these and other convicted terrorists serve their
sentences. Italy, we recall, prematurely and secretly released two of the
Achille Lauro hijackers only about half-way through their sentences. I
already referenced the bombing of the "Rainbow Warrior." Let's not
forget that although the aggressor was a western democracy, France, in
this case, it was a terrorist act. And despite the promise of France, it, too,
released the two agents responsible for the bombing, which claimed the
life of one person prematurely. This is the wrong message to send.
A better ending story occurred in 1993 when after only seven
years had passed, Malta, because of internal political debate, released
Omar All Rezaq, who had been convicted for the 1985 Egypt Air
Hijacking. An American passenger was killed during the event.
Fortunately, the United States, with the assistance of two African nations,
attained custody over Rezaq. He is now pending trial in Washington,
D.C. Bilateral or multilateral agreements should be drafted between States
to ensure that those States whose nationals have been killed or harmed in a
terrorist attack have the option to prosecute the terrorist if the current State
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of incarceration is considering releasing the individual. The clear message
must be sent that terrorists will pay the full price for their actions.
V. CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
For most of this century, the international community has debated
the issue of establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC) to
prosecute, in particular, war criminals and terrorists. In 1994, the
International Law Commission issued a draft statute for the Court. I was
fortunate enough to recently serve as a member of a Commission of
Experts organized by the International Association of Penal Law and the
Max Planck Institute to further develop the statute, and was present as an
observer for the American Society of International Law at the Ad Hoc
meeting on an ICC which was held at the United Nations this past August.
An ICC can effectively remove some of the obstacles that have
confronted prosecution of terrorists. In particular, the uncomfortable
political and internal pressures faced by a State when it is called upon to
extradite a suspected terrorist to another State could be alleviated by the
existence of an ICC. Many States, including the United States, are, at
least in principle, dedicated to seeing a court established which would
include terrorist offenses, although the question of whether the ICC or a
national court would have primary jurisdiction remains unresolved.
Obviously, States such as the United States wish to be in the position of
prosecuting terrorists who harm their nationals.
The case of Pan Am Flight 103 comes to mind as a prime example
justifying the necessity for the creation of an ICC to handle a terrorist
case. One thing unique about the Lockerbie case has been the legal
arguments now before the International Court of Justice regarding Libya's
right to prosecute the two suspects under the Montreal Convention. The
Convention allows the State of custody to choose between prosecution or
extradition. Libya, therefore, argues it has the right to prosecute. But
Libya is itself accused of ordering the suspects to commit the bombing,
which brings about an unusual situation. Thus, I have suggested that in
cases where a State itself is accused of complicity, the ICC should possess
primary jurisdiction. If an ICC existed right now, the Lockerbie stalemate
might not exist. Unfortunately, the prospect for an ICC is still years, if
not decades, away.
VI. INCREASE THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF COUNTERTERRORISM
REWARDS PROGRAMS
Under the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the United
States Congress established a reward program for individuals who provide
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information to the United States about international terrorism. The
Diplomatic Security Service was assigned responsibility for implementing
the program under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1986. The program offers rewards of up to $2,000,000.00. The
Justice Department is also in a position to make available rewards for acts
of domestic terrorism.
Following the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on
December 21, 1988, my client, Bruce Smith, who lost his wife in the
attack, undertook efforts to lobby the Bush Administration and airline trade
organizations to strengthen the program. As a result of Smith's efforts, in
1990, the State Department forged a unique public-private partnership with
the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) and the Air Line Pilots
Association, International (ALPA). Each organization pledges up to
$1,000,000.00 to supplement rewards authorized by the United States
government.
Therefore, at present, the program offers rewards of up to
$4,000,000.00 to individuals who provide information leading to the
prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of an act of international
terrorism directed against United States air carriers, their passengers and
crew. Rewards will also be authorized for information that leads to the
arrest and conviction of any person who has committed such an act.
However, payment of supplemental rewards under the public-private
partnership are available only if the air carrier is a member of ATA and/or
the crew members are represented by ALPA. Information regarding all
other incidents only have a maximum available reward of $2,000,000.00.
The Secretary of State is authorized to pay for information
regarding any past, present, or planned future act of terrorism. Individuals
who provide information are afforded protection of their identity by the
United States government and may be eligible for relocation to the United
States or elsewhere.
The State Department has an ongoing public campaign to promote
awareness of the rewards program. Diplomatic posts are furnished with
printed materials on the program and Public Service Announcements are
broadcast featuring such movie stars as Charles Bronson, Charlton Heston
and Charlie Sheen. Posters are displayed overseas in areas of high
visibility acceptable to the local authorities and in the United States
wherever possible. Paid advertisements have been placed in an effort to
promote widespread awareness of the program, and to reach those with
information. Information about the rewards is also disseminated on the
Internet throughout the world.
Since the program was instituted in 1990, the United States
government has disbursed rewards totaling about $3,000,000.00 in over a
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dozen separate cases. ALPA and ATA have also paid out supplemental
rewards under the program. The highest single award was $750,000.00
and was paid out to an Iraqi Palestinian who provided information that
eventually led to the arrest of a leading terrorist figure. The program has
resulted in several terrorists being imprisoned and hundreds of American
lives have been saved. The most recent success of the program was the
apprehension of Ramzi Yousef who was apparently identified by a South
African who came across a matchbook cover with Yousef's picture.
Rewards can play a prominent role in preventing terrorist attacks
or capturing terrorists. In light of the success of the United States
program, other governments should be encouraged to institute a formal
rewards program. Other countries do, of course, utilize rewards on a
case-by-case basis. This past May, Canada offered a $740,000.00 reward
for information about the 1985 Air India bombing that claimed 329 lives.
A Canadian official has stated that the "reward has given the investigation
new life" after ten years of investigation. Following the Paris commuter
train bombing of last week, French officials announced the posting of a
$200,000.00 reward. This was an unusual step for the French, and it
resulted in over 200 calls within two days.
Recently, I helped found the Foundation to Combat International
Terrorism which sought to forge a new public/private partnership with the
Department of State. It was planned that the Foundation would seek to
provide supplemental rewards of up to $2,000,000.00 to the program to
ensure that any terrorist incident involving American lives will receive the
maximum possible reward. Where appropriate, the Foundation also hoped
to assist with other areas of the program such as advertising.
Unfortunately, political reasons resulted in the State Department declining
our proposal.
We are also in the process of forming the Center for the Studies of
Terrorism which will serve as a think-tank policy institute on terrorism
issues. It will maintain a terrorism database, a library, offer graduate
fellowships to promote the study of terrorism, publish policy papers, and
organize seminars on contemporary topics. We hope to hold our first
major conference early next year.
VII. CONCLUSION
In closing, terrorism is an old evil that is constantly creating new
threats to survive. With increased multilateral cooperation among States,
although we might not be able to eliminate terrorism altogether, the threat
can hopefully be sufficiently contained.
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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND
THE FUTURE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Gerhard Hafner
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently, the codification process as performed by the
International Law Commission (ILC) has become the target of severe
criticism. In this context, even the very existence of the ILC was disputed
as the Commission was said to be divested of any task as the main
codification work was considered already completed. But this criticism is
not new; as early as the 1970s, a UNITAR study was published which
pointed at several critical issues in this process. The more the current
process has already been made the subject of critical comments, the more
the question arises as to whether the existing codification process will
correspond to the needs of the 21st century. Hence, when addressing the
future of the codification process, it seems worthwhile to proceed from an
evaluation of the existing problems and of the contemporary needs for the
codification of international law.
II. THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
According to Article 13 of the Charter, the General Assembly is
considered the main organ for "the progressive development of
international law and its codification." The General Assembly disposed of
this task by creating the ILC as a subsidiary organ through Resolution 174
(II). The doctrine has frequently emphasized the big success of this organ,
by referring to Law of the Sea Conventions of 1958, the Convention on
the Diplomatic Relations of 1961, on Consular Relations of 1963, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, and the Convention
for the Protection of Diplomats of 1973. However, with regard to the
codification performed after that date, the commentaries start hesitating.
Could the Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations to
International Organizations, or the two Conventions on State Succession,
which have not yet entered into force despite the elapse of twenty or at
least fifteen years since their adoption, still be qualified as a success?
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III. THE RESTRICTED FIELD OF ACTIVITIES OF THE ILC
It must be borne in mind that already at the outset of the existence
of the ILC, the scope of its activities was reduced by matters that were
falling within the ambit of conflict of laws. Even a new organ was created
to take up these matters, the UNCITRAL, which admittedly has worked so
far rather successfully. However, this restriction of the competence of the
ILC was not justified since matters of international criminal law were dealt
with by the ILC without any problems. But even typical international law
matters were taken up by other organs, such as the outer space matters, or
issues relating to environmental law. Other issues were directly dealt with
by the General Assembly such as the Convention on the Safety of UN and
Associated Personnel of 1994. Again other matters were formulated by
special agencies of the UN, such as by the IMO. Whether or not these
instruments could be considered as codification stricto sensu, they
nevertheless would fall under the competence of the ILC to develop
progressively international law.
IV. THE REASONS FOR THE RESTRICTED SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES OF
THE ILC
The reasons of this reduced scope of activity are manifold and can
be located in and outside the ILC. To a certain extent they result from the
shift of paradigms international law and relations are subject to nowadays.
A. Internal Reasons
It is sometimes argued that the ILC is not furnished with the
necessary expertise in the field to be codified so that it could embark only
on very general issues. It is certainly true that under actual conditions the
regulations to be forged require increased knowledge in the techniques of
the matters subject to regulation. Due to the increased interaction between
states on all different levels, and the intensified communication between
them, more and more technical matters call for regulation for which an
international lawyer could consider himself not sufficiently qualified.
However, there is no reason why the ILC members should not become
capable of acquiring such technical knowledge either directly or by the use
of resource persons. There is only the need to establish appropriate
communication with the experts in the relevant fields so that instruments
also of technical nature could emerge from this body.
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B. External Reasons
It has been argued that the time of the typical codification is over.
In particular are those matters which are the most suitable for codification,
as they are governed by the principle of reciprocity and rely on well settled
practice. This is certainly true. A quick perusal of the matters originally
proposed for codification shows that only a few are left; mainly,
recognition, extraterritorial jurisdiction, rights of aliens, and territorial
asylum, whereby the latter two either are already regulated by other
instruments or are of an extremely political nature.
It can be deduced from the comparison of the different procedures
of elaboration and of the organs involved, that one of the reasons for the
difficulties the ILC faces stems from the reduced communication process
between the ILC and the states, and, therefore, the former incapacity to
reflect accurately the position of States. This is corroborated by a
comparison of the ILC with the other organs which, instead of the ILC,
were entrusted with the elaboration of rules of international law. Whereas
the ILC is composed of individual experts acting independently, the other
organs, including UNCITRAL, consist of representatives of States. Hence,
under existing conditions this contrast is of utmost importance as it seems
to be not without reason that the States hesitate to entrust a body consisting
of independent experts with the task of formulating new conventions. This
development is mainly caused by the following reasons, one procedural,
the others of substantial nature;
There is a major difference as to whether it is a question of a
codification stricto sensu or a progressive development. Although it has
been consistently argued that a clear distinction is not possible, it is
nevertheless possible to recognize the main task of an individual text,
either to codify law or to develop it progressively. In the first case, the
elaboration work can rely on a consistent practice of States which is
already well known. States, when conveying the information on their own
practice to the ILC, are neither formulating new positions nor disclosing
any state secrets nor are they making concessions which they have not yet
made in the past. Thus, the ILC would not encounter major difficulties in
obtaining the necessary information on the position of different States.
Under these circumstances a major divergence of positions which would
rule out any attempt to elaborate a commonly acceptable regime seems not
very likely.
In this regard, the work of the ILC mainly consists in
reformulating legal rules which already exist. In the second case,
however, that of the progressive development of international law, the
position of the States has not yet been established, no common patterns
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have emerged. The States, when asked to communicate their position to
the ILC, would have to formulate their position as a negotiating position
and would, perhaps, be asked to make concessions without knowing
whether they will be paid off or compensated by equivalent concessions of
the others. In this situation the ILC becomes entangled in a real
negotiation process among States. States would be required to entrust an
independent body over which they have only limited control with the
negotiating process in a matter where no established patterns exist.
It is doubtful whether in such a situation the existing process of
work of the ILC remains appropriate. Certainly, according to Article 8 of
the Statute of the ILC, its composition should be such that it represents the
main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world.
However, this rule does not guarantee that the different political positions
concerning one particular subject matter are also represented and, if they
are represented, are even maintained in the discussion within the
Commission. A State would also be less willing to ratify a convention if it
was not directly involved in its elaboration. Hence, it is therefore
comprehensible that if the States urgently wanted a treaty the latter's
elaboration was moved from the ILC to other bodies within the United
Nations system which consisted of State representatives or that if the need
was felt to establish political committees within the United Nations to
reconsider the work of the ILC, as it happened with the Draft Articles on
State Immunity or the Statute on an International Criminal Court.,
A second reason for the problems related to the current procedure
of codification stems from the fact that the time of the framing of
substantive rules on State behavior seems over. Greater emphasis is now
put on the elaboration of so called secondary rules or metarules, i.e., rules
concerning the creation, change, ascertainment of rules, and control of
their compliance. In this legal field new tendencies have emerged,
departing from the Westphalian system and pointing towards more
institutionalization and centralization, in particular as far as the compliance
procedures are concerned. These new tendencies call for new instruments
which again cannot rely on already existing patterns. In this time of
uncertainty about the further development, it is very difficult for a body
like the ILC to anticipate the final position of States in this respect.
These new parameters of the international law creating process are
echoed by the change of implementation structures of the rules of
international law. Traditionally, rules of international law have addressed
the mutual relations of States, mainly based on principles of reciprocity.
This is, however, no longer the case since more and more substantive rules
deal with the attitude of states towards their citizens as in the case of
Human Rights or towards the community of States. The ILC is already
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starting to deal with the former within the topic of reservation to
multilateral treaties since the most difficult item therein is undoubtedly that
of reservations to human rights treaties and their effects. A striking
example of the second type is the new topic on the agenda of the ILC on
the law of environment. Here, the ILC already stated its intention to
"focus more on the fields of the duties erga omnes where the real
complainant of deterioration of the environment is the international
community at large rather than individual States," so that the study will
include the topic of "global commons" as well. In both cases, the standard
setting type (human rights) and the erga omnes duties (law of
environment), the ILC will have to face structures of norms and of their
legal effect which totally differ from the traditional ones so that less and
less the prerequisites for a codification stricto sensu are existent.
V. THE POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS OF THE LAW CREATING PROCESS
TO THE NEW REQUIREMENTS
The possible adjustments could be of a procedural nature as well as
one relating to the nature of the outcome. As to the procedural nature, the
shift from the codification to the progressive development of international
law and the preponderance of the negotiation element require a changed
communication between the States and the ILC. The communication
channels between them must be improved so that the ILC can take the
different positions of the States abroad and serve as a honest broker of
these positions. Consequently, the States are called upon already at the
outset of the work of the ILC to clarify their position and convey it to the
ILC which is what they did not regularly in the past.
During the process of the formulation of rules their must be an
interactive exchange of views between States and the ILC which is what
requires a closer contact between the State representatives and the ILC
members responsible for that particular work. Thus, it could be imagined
that the special rapporteur addresses directly the States mostly concerned
by the relevant draft, and submits his work article by article for scrutiny
by the representatives in the sixth Committee. More than the existing
method would such procedure force the States to take a stance to the draft
articles.
It should also not be forgotten that certain valuable work in the
field of progressive development of international law originates from the
epistemic community such as IUCN, IDI or ILA. In particular in light of
the novelties in the structure of international law, a closer cooperation
between these bodies and the ILC would also be of a certain relevance.
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These institutions should therefore cooperate with the ILC and foster an
intensive exchange of views with the ILC.
As to the nature of the outcome of the work of the ILC it has to be
questioned whether the treaty form is still the most suitable one. So far,
the ILC has mostly envisaged the elaboration of treaties as being the only
instruments entailing legally binding effect. However, this effect addresses
only the parties to the relevant treaty, i.e., States which have undergone a
formal procedure for expressing their consent to be bound. Further, no
State can be forced to initiate such a procedure. Consequently, in a more
general perspective, a treaty is susceptible of a broader acceptance only if
it does not deviate too much from the existing patterns of behavior of
States since otherwise they would refrain from ratifying it.
In contrast thereto, use can be made of other instruments which
precede the creation of norms. Although they do not pertain to the law
creation process itself, customary law or treaty law, they nevertheless
influence this process considerably. These prenormative instruments or
"soft law" appear in form of declarations, resolutions or similar kind.
Their function on the law creation can be described as follows:
(1) they can educate the States to pursue a particular
attitude;
(2) they can prepare the grounds for the elaboration of new
rules, by treaty or customary law;
(3) they can make the States aware of a certain problem in
international relations being not yet sufficiently regulated;
and
(4) finally, they can furnish hitherto unclear customary
rules with a certain precise formulation.
In a situation which is marked by the progressive development
rather than by codification stricto sensu, such kinds of instruments could
increasingly influence the behavior of States so that a core of established
patterns could emerge which then could easily be converted into legal
rules. In the course of the solidification of the States' attitudes, an
intensive interaction will occur between the States' attitudes and the
relevant instrument. The latter will have to prove whether its content is so
convincing that the States will conform to it.
This type of instrument possesses certain advantages over treaties:
ratione temporis-they have an immediate, legally not binding, effect once
they are adopted and need not be made subject to a formal process of
ratification; ratione personae they address all States in the same way.
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Finally, they can more rapidly react to the quick change of the subject-
matters to be regulated. Their lack of legal effect is of less significance
than one might think: even if a State is bound by a treaty, the compliance
with the treaty can be controlled only if it is based on a reciprocal structure
or otherwise an appropriate mechanism exists to this end, be it a judicial
organ like the ICJ or a treaty organ. Particularly, in fields where the new
implementation structures become applicable, reciprocity no longer
provides a sanction mechanism so that in the absence of control
mechanisms the compliance even with treaty obligations can hardly be
ascertained.
As long as the regulation is not based on reciprocal structures
which in the absence of compliance mechanisms constitute the only
sanction mechanism. In light of these considerations, which are not totally
new, the ILC could start reconsidering the best possible way of the
creation of rules of international law, taking into account these
prenormative instruments. Nevertheless, the formulation of treaty law
should not be thrown overboard but should no longer be contemplated as
the only means of formulation of new rules of international law. By
resorting also to this different form of instruments the ILC could widen its
scope of activity and with its great authority assist the community of States
in finding the necessary regulatory response to the new challenges in
international relations.
1996l
THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE 2 1sT CENTURY
John de Saram*
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I take a somewhat different view of the
International Law Commission and its work.
The methods and procedures of the Commission, as in the case of
all human endeavors, need, of course, to be kept under regular review and
to be improved wherever advisable. The methods and procedures of the
Commission were referred to in the Sixth (the Legal) Committee of the
UN General Assembly over the two weeks just passed, in the course of
Sixth Committee consideration of the Report of the Commission.
The Resolution on the Commission to be adopted by the General
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, though still in
negotiation, will, I believe, request the Commission to review next year,
1996, the final year of its present quinquennium (1992 to 1996), its
methods and procedures of work in light of its experience over the
quinquennium.
The Commission will report next year to the Sixth Committee, and
I expect that in the fall of next year the Sixth Committee will consider
Commission methods and procedures as well as the methods and
procedures followed by the Sixth Committee itself when the Sixth
Committee debates the Reports of the Commission.
A number of the specific points made by Professor Mcaffrey as to
the methods and procedures of the Commission, as well as such other
points as may be raised in the Commission itself, will this and will be
considered next year both by the Commission and the Sixth Committee.
II
Yet it would be incorrect if the impression were to be left that the
Commission was without useful purpose and just drifting aimlessly along.
Whether or not a convention prepared by the Commission has been
* Member of International Law Commission, Representative of Sri Lanka to United
Nations General Assembly (50' session) Sixth Committee; and formerly Director, Office of the
Legal Counsel, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs.
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brought into force by governments within a short period of time is
certainly not appropriate criterion of the usefulness or worthiness of the
Commission. One need only refer to the many examples of conventions
that have taken several years to enter into force (the 1969 Convention on
the Law of Treaties and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea come
immediately to mind), yet which have not in the meanwhile been without
considerable influence on governments and governmental practice.
Though the membership of the Commission are nominated by
governments and elected by the General Assembly, members of the
Commission serve in their individual capacities. This is as it and was
intended to be and should be. The Commission is not, in other words, just
another committee of governmental representatives. It is required to have,
and does have, careful regard to both governmental and non-governmental
opinion: to the views of the practitioner of international law but to those
of the academic as well, to the former for guidance as to trends in state
practice and to the latter for opinion as to what, in light of principle, is the
proper "doctrinal" course.
The proposals of the Commission are in the nature of
recommendations to the General Assembly on what, in the view of the
Commission, the law presently is, codification, and on what, in the view
of the Commission, the law ought to be, progressive development. One
cannot, of course, assume that the views of the Commission, the General
Assembly, and governments will always be comfortable. Yet neither
should one assume that the recommendations of the Commission, even
though not brought by governments speedily into force, are without
persuasiveness.
III
A glance at the record of the past four years of the present
quinquennium of the Commission, moreover, is surely not unimpressive.
In 1993 and 1994, the Commission, as requested by the General
Assembly, did an extraordinary amount of work in the preparation of a
statute for the establishment of an international criminal court. It is true
that there still remain a number of difficulties to be resolved in the statute,
such as the provisions of the statute relating to the Security Council. Yet,
whatever the ultimate disposition of the Commission's statute for an
international criminal court, the fact should remain that the Commission
took the concept of an international criminal court much, much, further
than it had ever been taken, since the subject of an international criminal
court was first placed on the international legal agenda in the early 1950s.
Whatever each of us may feel as to the usefulness or likelihood of an
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international criminal court, we must recognize that there was, and is, a
very substantial body of world opinion in favor of very serious
consideration now being given to the question of the establishment of an
international criminal court.
Nor should the work of the Commission on the "Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind" be lightly dismissed.
It is true that, in the interests of arriving at a consensus within the
Commission, initial proposals made by its Special Reporter as to the
subject-matter scope of the Code have been very substantially reduced.
It is also true that there is a substantial body of opinion to the
effect that, given the incorporation into the proposed Statute for an
international criminal court of definitions of international crimes in treaties
presently in force for the purpose of demarcating the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Court, no useful purpose would be served by the
elaboration of a Code of Crimes against the peace and security of
mankind. Yet there is also a substantial body of opinion that holds that
there are a number of international crimes that would not be provided for
in the Statute for an international criminal court, and that the inclusion of
such international crimes in a code, be it only for deterrent effect, would
begin a process of consolidation into a single code of the substantive law of
international crimes. And it is difficult to conclude that the world does not
seem ready for such a code of international crimes.
The work of the Commission in the last four years on "State
responsibility" has also, I would think, been extraordinarily useful. There
was in the Commission, in 1994 and 1995, one of the most interesting
discussions ever, in any forum, of the controversial concept of state crimes
and of the controversial concept of counter-measures. In 1995, there were
also a number of provisions completed by the Commission for Part Three,
the concluding section, of its Articles on State Responsibility which would
provide for the settlement of disputes; and that would provide particularly
for settlement of disputes in situations where one state has taken a
counter-measure against another state.
The work of the Commission in the field of counter-measures has
been very much in the area of progressive development, given the
sparseness of authoritative international judicial or arbitral decision with
respect to this issue. Though still incomplete, the work of the
Commission, certainly in my view, is a most impressive example of
consensus procedure working as it should in legal deliberative bodies: a
reaching out for the highest level of agreement possible on sensitive and
controversial matters.
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IV
Of course, if the subjects placed on its agenda are too broad, or
contain too great a component of political sensitivity, or should a subject
contain at its core a fundamental but unresolved question of great legal
principle, great difficulties arise in the Commission.
This is particularly so as the Commission must have regard not
only to the nature of state practice but also to non-governmental opinion
and also because the Commission always proceeds in its work by way of
consensus, except in very ultimate recourse.
If the subject of "state responsibility" is a subject of great breadth
of scope and if the "Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind" is one of high political sensitivity, then the subject of "Liability
for injurious consequence of activities not prohibited by international law"
is one which contains at its core a fundamental but unresolved question of
great legal principle and great practical implication. The question is
whether the criterion of "due diligence" is the legally necessary, or the
practically sensible, standard for determinations as to the basis of the
obligation to compensate in cases of physical transboundary harm.
The fact that injurious consequences in one state of an activity in
another state, which are not prohibited by international law, may be
extremely substantial or even catastrophic exacerbates complexities. The
question of the basis of the obligation to compensate in physical
transboundary harm cases has not as yet been clarified in the Commission.
Whether or not the Commission reaches consensus conclusions, its debates
and working documents on the issue will undoubtedly be followed very
carefully outside the Commission and will be of substantial interest to
those concerned with the development of international law in such
transboundary cases.
Authoritative precedent in the form of international judicial or
arbitral decisions is sparse, and found by some to offer no guidance.
Further, treaty practice or custom are indeterminative largely because, it
would seem, governmental representatives are, quite understandably,
sensitive to the very great implications of the question of the obligation to
compensate for physical transboundary harm and have, therefore, hesitated
in treaty or in practice to resolve the basic legal question that needs to be
considered. The one exception to this observation is the 1972 Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Objects Launched into
Outer Space. Thus, recourse would seem to be necessary, in terms of
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." And there, of
course, one finds a substantial body of national precedent for a moving
[Vol. 2:679
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away on occasions, such as in cases of extra-hazardous activities, from the
"due diligence" criterion. Yet it is not at all an easy question to resolve
and understandably has occupied much time within the Commission.
V
Thus, I would think that the record of the Commission's present
quinquennium would show that the Commission, which proceeds, as it
should, in the light of governmental and non-governmental opinion and
through consensus-procedure, is useful and worthy. But, of course, it is
important that the subjects placed on the agenda of the Commission and its
methods and procedures, as in the case of all legal deliberative bodies, be
kept under continuous and careful review.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN CONTEXT AND ITS RELATIONS TO
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
Dr. Gerhard Loibl*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Europe--and I am taking Europe not just in the limited
geographical sense, but in a more political way--environmental
regulations have been created and further evolved by different means and
instruments: bilateral agreements, limited regional agreements, and
multilateral agreements adopted by nearly all European States. Moreover,
although, no European organization has been created to deal with
environmental issues as such, a number of international organizations have
actively taken up environmental issues in recent years. Let me just name a
few, perhaps those which have been most prominently involved in
environmental law making: United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, Council of Europe, European Communities/European Union and
the Nordic Council. Depending on their structure and powers they have
produced a variety of international instruments ranging from declarations
and resolutions to legally binding rules.
Although environmental issues have already been high on the
agenda in Europe in the last decades, due to the interest of the public after
a number of incidents which affected the environment, the Rio Summit has
put even more focus on the environment, and thus served as a catalyst for
environmental regulations in a number of areas. But one should not
overlook that also political changes in Central and Eastern Europe have
increased the awareness of environmental problems and accelerated these
developments.
* Institute of International Law
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II. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS EUROPE THAT HAVE BEEN
ACTIVE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MAKING: SOME EXAMPLES
A. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
The member states of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (ECE) encompass the European States and the former Soviet
Republics, as well as the USA and Canada. The ECE, when it was
established in 1947, was comprised of to comprise the industrialized States
of the North, now it has fifty-five member countries, twenty-six of which
are countries in transition. Thus, the structure of the ECE membership has
changed in the last years, and different ways of enhancing international
environmental law-making have to be experienced.
ECE has been active in the elaboration of rules and regulations
dealing with environmental issues in a transboundary context already in the
seventies. A number of international conventions were elaborated and
adopted under the auspices of the ECE: the Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution 1919, and its Protocols dealing with the
emission reduction and monitoring of certain pollutants; the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Tansboundary Content 1991
(Espoo-Convention); the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents 1992 and the Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992. These
conventions differ in the way they are to be implemented. Whereas the
1979 Convention was a framework convention envisioning the further
development of air pollution reduction by protocols adopted by all States
of the region, the latter conventions are to set minimum standards, thus
leaving it to the bilateral level or limited multilateral level to enhance more
stringent obligations. The use of such an approach - although already
taken up in some universal environment instruments - on the global level
should be further scrutinized.
Within the ECE, moreover the process "Environment for Europe"
has been set up. It aims at improving the environmental situation, thus
leading to sustainable development in the ECE member states, in particular
those in central and eastern Europe, as well as in the CIS-Republics. An
Environmental Action Program, for Central and Eastern Europe was
adopted at the Ministerial Meeting in Luzern in April 1993. It is built on
three main pillars: (1) the integration of environmental considerations into
the process of economic reconstruction to ensure sustainable development;
(2) institutional capacity building, including an efficient legal and
administrative framework as well as managing capacity, training and
education; and (3) immediate assistance programs comprising actions
which bring immediate or short term relief to regions where human health
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or natural ecosystems are severely jeopardized by environmental hazards,
taking into account also transboundary environmental problems.
Cooperation between the States is not limited to central governmental
level, but is extended to local authorities, local financial institutions,
private industry, and the indispensable participation of the informal
sectors. As a recent study has shows, financial assistance rendered to
central and eastern European States might be made more efficient by
mainly two means: to support the development of more efficient
bureaucratic structures within the States and to have international tenders.
The experience to be learned from this "Process for Europe" is that
environmental cooperation is not to be limited to central governments, but
a more widespread cooperation is necessary.
B. Council of Europe
Within the Council of Europe environmental issues have been
discussed in various fora and a number of international environmental
agreements have been elaborated under the auspices of the Council of
Europe, such as the "Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife and
Natural Habitats" (Bern Convention). the most recent agreement is the
"Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting front Activities
Dangerous to the Environment 1993" (Lugano Convention), which has not
entered into force so far. It is very unlikely that this Convention is to
enter into force in the near future as it contains rather extended rules on
liability. Critics have argued that such an extended scope - both including
damage resulting from accidental pollution and chronic pollution - is not
practicable. A further effort is currently undertaken in elaborating a
"Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal
Law." The draft defines types of offenses against the environment that
may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses under domestic law.
These include "international offenses," for example, the discharge,
emissions, or introduction of a quantity of substances and radiation into the
environment "which causes a serious damage to persons or which create a
danger of such damage." Furthermore, an infringement of a law,
administrative regulation, or decision by a competent authority that
"causes serious damage or deterioration to a component of the protected
environment, or which is likely to cause such damage to persons" may
also be considered a criminal offense. Moreover, provisions dealing with
the question of jurisdiction and international cooperation are contained in
the draft. Thus, a uniform criminal environmental law is to emerge in
Europe.
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An interesting point is also that environmental issues are dealt with
in the area of human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights
has proved to be a successful instrument to deal with environmental
questions, although a "right to a healthy environment" - as has been
discussed in international fora in the last years- is not included in the
European Convention. The European Commission of Human Rights
(ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights have both dealt with cases
concerning environmental protection. Environment related cases have
been decided by the ECHR on the basis of articles guaranteeing speedy
access to objective judicial hearings or the protection of private property.
In 1994, a case was brought before the Strasbourg authorities under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states
"everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home,
and his correspondence." The European Court of Human Rights held
unanimously that Spain had violated a family's right to privacy when local
authorities allowed operation of a waste treatment plant just a few meters
from the family's home. The ECHR ordered the Spanish government to
pay 5.5 million pesetas (US $ 42,000) in damages and legal fees. This
example shows that the traditional human rights approach can incorporate
new developments such as environmental issues effectively. For the UN,
the conclusion can be drawn that it might be a more useful way to give
consideration to already existing human rights instruments to be used for
the protection of the environment than to create a new "right to a healthy
environment."
C. European Community
The European Community did not have an environmental
dimension at the time of its creation. Only in the further development of
the Communities were environmental issues discussed and regulated within
the Communities. In the Single European Act 1986, the European
Community was given explicit competence for environmental issues.
Article. 130(r)(s), and (t) were inserted stating that the community will
ensure a high level of protection for the environment. Thus, the
integration efforts were extended to environmental issues. The
environmental competence of the Community was further enlarged by the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.
In contrast to other international organizations the community has
a so-called "supra-national" structure, enabling it to adopt legally binding
rules with majority decisions. According to Article of the 189 ECT, as
amended by the Treaty of Maastricht, "the European Parliament acting
jointly with the Council, and the Commission shall make regulations and
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issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations. In the area of
environmental policy the two main legal acts used are regulations and
directives." A regulation shall have general application and shall be
legally binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member States
without further acts of implementation. They are binding both for
authorities and individuals. In contrast, a directive is "binding, as to the
result to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."
Thus, member states are obliged to implement directives by national
legislation within the time limit frame. The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has been given the competence to hear cases where member States
have not implemented the adopted rules. Such a structure is unique in
international relations. No other international organization on the
international or regional level has been given that wide competence and
member states have transferred sovereign rights upon an international
organization. Thus, the frame for environmental regulations and rules
within the EC differs, to a large extent, from any other international
set-up.
In the development of environmental rules, the Community has
mainly made use of "directives." States have to implement these
directives within their, national legal system, but it is within their discretion
which kind of national legal instruments they use. In a number of cases,
States have failed to implement directives fully or on time. The
Commission which has been entrusted with the observance of the
implementation of the obligations set by Community law has taken up
these cases and brought them before the ECJ. It is interesting to see that
the majority of cases were based on information provided by individuals to
the Commission.
The competence of the EC to pursue an environmental policy is
based on the following provisions: Article 130(r) paragraph. 2 of the ECT
states: "Community Policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various
regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that
the polluter shall pay. Environmental protection requirements must be
integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community
policies." The decision-making procedure in the environmental policy
area is set out in Article. 130(s) of the ECT.
Article 130(t) of the ECT is a safeguard clause for more stringent
measures on the national level: "The protective measures adopted
pursuant to Article 130s shall not prevent any Member State from
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maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such
measures must be compatible with this Treaty. They shall be notified to
the Commission."
These provisions of the ECT recognize that different situations
exist in the various regions within the Community. Moreover, it is clearly
stated that member States are not prohibited from taking more stringent
steps in order to ensure the protection of the environment. The reference
to the compatibility with the Treaty refers to other Community activities,
in particular those dealing with the establishment of the internal market
(Art. 7a, Art. 100a).
This shows that the development of the European Community has
lead to the result that environmental issues are dealt with side by side with
economic mattes. Environmental rules and regulations have become an
integrated part in Community law. Such developments could take place on
the international level as well, as environmental issues have become the
concern of other fields of international law. The WTO is a good example
for this. But I would rather take the EC as an example for future
development on a global level. The unique institutional structure of the
EC is very unlikely to be copied on a global level in the near future.
Binding majority decisions and a universal judicial system will not be
completed on the global level.
III. WHAT ARE THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCE
The following principles for international environmental
law-making can be deduced from the European practice make the principle
of subsidiary or the search for the most suitable level for creating
environmental regulations: this principle which is now found in Article.
3(b) of the "Maestricht I Treaty" is of interest not only to such
supranational organizations as the European Union, but I would say that it
serves as guidance for other international organizations. Before indulging
in international efforts for the creation and development of international
regulations, thought should be given to the question of which level of
international cooperation is best suited for the envisioned international
regulation. Depending on the environmental problems discussed - whether
of global, regional, or bilateral concert - and the detailed rules of the
intended regulation the suitable level has to be found. But subsidiarity is
not an excuse for neglecting environmental issues. Subsidiarity only can
be understood in the sense that after an objective evaluation of all the
issues involved, the most suitable solution has to be adopted. Political
considerations might in practice lead to the conclusion that only the second
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best solution is achievable at a given moment, but an objective evaluation
is a useful instrument for further law-making.
Even within the well-defined regional scope of Europe, it is self-
evident that rules which might be adequate to the environmental issues in a
certain region, may not be suitable to the conditions prevailing within
another region. For example, climatic conditions in the north might
require different solutions for environmental problems, than conditions
found in southern Europe. International environmental regulations and
rules which are developed within certain regions also differ in regard to
their intensity and complexity of lawmaking. They are only as good as the
parties allow them to be. If the States parties to an agreement are a
relatively cohesive and homogeneous group with a strong political
commitment to environmental protection, the rules and regulations adopted
will be relatively elective, on the other hand if these criteria do not exist
within the group of States concerned environmental regulations are less
likely to be accepted.
Harmonization of environmental rules and regulations has been
achieved in the European context only within the member states of the
European Union. This shows, that such common standards of a high level
can only be achieved if similar geographical, climatic, social, and
economic conditions prevail. Otherwise, harmonization will only be of
limited value. But one should not forget, that a first step to achieve more
harmonized environmental rules and regulations, is to be seen in setting
limits for emissions for each State. This approach has been taken by
setting emission standards in the Protocols to the ECE Convention 1979.
It is left to the States to adopt regulations on the municipal level enabling
them: to reach the ceilings for national emissions set in international
agreements. Harmonization of environmental standards even on the
European level so far has not been very successful, except within the
supranational structure of the EC.
Further development of existing environmental conventions by
data collection is a prerequisite for the elaboration of adequate
environmental rules. The European Community as well as the
ECE-Convention 1979 and its Protocols established institutional
arrangements to ensure that the relevant environmental data are collected
on an objective basis.
An essential point of environmental law is to ensure that the agreed
rules and regulations are implemented and complied with. The EC has
created a very effective system concerning the monitoring and control of
the activities undertaken in the member States. As already pointed out, the
Commission has been entrusted with the task to observe the member
States' behavior. But this is a unique experience. The establishment of
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implementation or non-compliance mechanisms could be useful means in
this context. Although on the global level implementation or
non-compliance mechanisms have been set up or are under discussion, the
ECE has listed criteria on which such mechanisms should be based.
In the Declaration adopted at the Lucerne Meeting of the
Environmental Ministers the contracting parties to environmental
conventions were urged to work towards non compliance regimes which:
(1) aim to avoid complexity;
(2) are non-confrontational;
(3) are transparent;
(4) leave the competence for the taking of decisions to be
determined by the Contracting Parties;
(5) leave the Contracting Parties to each convention to consider
what technical and financial assistance may be required, within the context
of the specific agreement; and
(6) include a transparent and revealing reporting system and
procedures, as agreed to by the Parties.
Such mechanisms are to be seen as a supplement to traditional
means of dispute settlement. Nearly all environmental treaties which have
been adopted on regional and international levels in recent years include
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, such as negotiations,
consultations, arbitration, etc. But experience has shown that very rarely
these mechanisms are really used. Thus, other institutional arrangements
have to be found in order to deal with transboundary environmental issues.
As regards mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, in the
European context emphasis has been given to the concepts of equal access
to municipal courts and administrative authorities for persons resident
outside the fora State based on nondiscrimination. The idea behind these
issues is to avoid the confrontation between States on transboundary
environmental issues, leading to a depolitization of conflicts, but it raises a
number of questions, such as how information is distributed in other States
or what substantive law is applied. In my view "equal access and
nondiscrimination" are only accepted by States when they have trust in the
administrative and judicial system of the other States concerned. Only if
standards of administrative and judicial procedures are regarded as similar
or equal in the States concerned will such a system be accepted. The
Member States of the European Community and the Nordic Council are
examples for this. In order to transfer this experiment to a global level it
needs more elaborate examination of the different legal systems. I raise
my doubts that "equal access and nondiscrimination" will be used on a
global level in the near future taking into account the state of the world.
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As I tried to show, some of the experiences made on the European
level might be applied for global law-making, although adaptations may be
necessary.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, TAX TREATIES AND
THE UNITED NATIONS MODEL TAX CONVENTION
Peter D. Byrne*
Welcome everyone. My name is Peter Byrne. I am the Deputy
Director of the International Tax Program at Harvard Law School. We
have a great panel this morning, and I think you will be very interested in
what they have to say. I will introduce them before we start.
Here on my right is Denise Strain, who is Vice President and
Associate General Tax Counsel of Citibank. On a daily basis, she works
on international tax issues presented by Citibank's substantial overseas
operations. To my immediate right is Marlin Risinger, who is a friend of
mine from the Treasury Department, where we both worked in the late
1980's. Marlin is a native of Louisiana. Most people regard him as one
of the best tax lawyers around. He is now in the International Tax
Department of General Electric. He did that after becoming a partner at
Caplin and Drysdale, which is a prestigious tax law firm in Washington.
To my left, we have two Peruvians. We were only expecting one,
but we have two. To my immediate left is Adrian Revilla, who is the
National Director of Taxation of Peru. In a way, it is unfortunate that he
is going to talk today about tax treaties, because the most interesting story
for me from Peru is what they have done with the Tax Administration
there. In the last eight years or so, they have totally overhauled the tax
authority. In 1986 or 1987 Peru's tax administration was described as a
model of corruption. They have totally turned that around now. In fact, it
is considered to be the most efficient public institution in Peru now, and
certainly among the most efficient tax authorities in Latin America. He is
a lawyer from the Catholic University in Lima and he has a Masters in
Economics from Suffolk University, which certainly covers all the bases
for him for being a good tax policy-maker and administrator. Before
joining the Tax Administration in Lima, he was the head of the Legal
Department at Peru's Central Bank. Prior to that he was General Counsel
for the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, which is a think-tank in Lima.
Our unexpected visitor is Miguel de Pomar who is an advisor to
the Tax Administration in Lima and is reputed to be the international tax
expert for the Peruvian government. He is a graduate of the Law School
* Deputy Director, International Tax Program, Harvard Law School.
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of the University of Lima. Prior to joining the Government, he was Senior
Tax Specialist at Arthur Anderson.
We will proceed as follows: I am going to give you a broad
overview of what a tax treaty is, and then Marlin and Denise are going to
explain why tax treaties are important for multinational corporations.
They are going to describe some of the problems that they confront in the
international environment and how a tax treaty can help. And then, Mr.
Revilla will talk about a developing country's perspective on tax treaties. I
am told that he is going to give a very upbeat assessment of Peru's
prospects for tax treaties, which is encouraging, I have to say. On the
other hand, it is a bit surprising to me, because Latin American countries,
historically, have not had tax treaties. I hope that during the course of our
discussion, we can talk a little more about the reasons why they have not
had tax treaties, and the reasons for not having tax treaties. In any event,
let me begin by explaining what a tax treaty is.
Since this is the International Law Association, I do not have to
explain to you the legal aspects of a treaty. But I will say that most tax
treaties are bilateral. There are some multilateral tax treaties - there is one
for information exchange and there have been a few multilateral income
tax treaties. In fact, Peru is a member of one of the few multilateral
income tax treaties, but the income tax treaty is a bilateral concept by and
large. The United States, for example, has about seventy income tax
treaties. They are all bilateral. The United States also has a number of
shipping and air transport tax agreements, and a set of Tax Information
Exchange Agreements. These agreements covering transport and
information exchange are much more limited than comprehensive income
tax treaty, and it is this comprehensive type of tax treaty that we are going
to talk about today. So, the first thing is that tax treaties ordinarily are
bilateral in nature.
The principal goal of a tax treaty is to rationalize the tax systems
of the two contracting countries. Naturally, each country is going to have
its own tax policies and tax law. Sometimes, they conflict with each other,
with negative consequences for the investor. The idea is that once the tax
systems are rationalized, that will facilitate investment. There are a few
fundamental characteristics that I am going to touch on, but then I am
going to leave it to the other speakers to flesh them out.
The most important goal of a tax treaty is to eliminate double
taxation. Historically, they were designed primarily to eliminate double
taxation. More recently, elimination of excessive taxation has become
almost as important. To explain to you what double taxation is, I am
going to have to introduce you to a couple technical concepts. To
illustrate this problem, I have drawn a map of two countries that I will call
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Country R and Country S. And they are divided by a river. We are
calling this Country R because that is what we call the "Residence"
country. That is the country where the corporation, in non-technical
terms, is located -its country of residence. In the United States, that would
be the place of incorporation. In other countries, it might be the place of
management. We are just going to call it the Country of Residence. You
worry about problems of double taxation when a business is carrying on
activity in another country. The reason that we have called the other
country "Country S" is to call it the Country of Source - that is, the source
of its income.
Now, you can have double taxation under a number of
circumstances, but I am going to limit my comments to the principal ones.
For example, you might have a conflict in the two countries as to which is
the residence of the taxpayer. As I mentioned, the United States defines
the country of residence as the country of incorporation. There are other
countries that look at the place of management. Theoretically, you could
have a company that is incorporated in Country R, but its place of
management is in Country S. Under the laws of both countries, it could be
considered to be a resident, and therefore a basis exists for the same
income to be taxed by both countries. If that is the case, if both countries
want to tax the total income of the company, then you have the potential,
literally, for double taxation. If you have $100 of income from that
company for all of its activities on both sides of the border, then it is
subject to 35 % tax in the United States, 35 % tax in Mexico. If neither one
recognizes the other's tax, you could have a whopping 70 % tax.
You also could have a conflict of source. Say that you are a
lawyer and you are a resident in Country R and you are hired by a
company in Country S to do some legal work for them. It is not just
conceivable, it happens, that you could have a conflict of source. Country
R could say the money that you receive for carrying out these legal
services will be taxable, will be "sourced" there, because you did the work
while you were sitting at your desk in that country. You were within its
borders when the work was done. The activity that generated the income
took place here, and therefore we should get the tax. Country S could
have a different source rule that says that you are doing the work for
someone who is a resident of Country S, and the payment was made from
Country S, the income is "sourced" in Country S, giving it the right to tax
the income.
These are just general examples of where you could have double
taxation. A treaty provides a means to resolve these conflicts, and will
insure that you do not have a company or an individual that is deemed to
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be a resident of both countries, or income that is deemed to be sourced in
both countries.
I want to talk about two general types of activities which I have
designated by putting two blue arrows and two red arrows. This blue
arrow will be an activity that is carried on by a company in Country R, but
the business activity is taking place in Country S. If the company has been
sending sales people down to Country S and they are selling things in
Country S, the profit that they make for these activities (the proceeds of
the sales) will be the blue arrow going back to Country R.
One of the most fundamental terms that you have in a tax treaty is
the concept of a "permanent establishment" in the case of a business or a
company, and what we call "fixed base" in the case of an individual
performing personal services. The activity is carried on in Country S and
the money goes back to country R. The first question is: what level of
activity will cause our business to be subject to income tax in Country S in
the absence of a treaty? This often is not an easy question. Every country
has a different rule. The United States has a rule (engaged in a trade or
business) that I think no one understands totally. All we know is that
pretty much any level of activity above and beyond a bare minimum is
going to subject you to tax.
What does a tax treaty do? It establishes a clear threshold of
activity, and if you are below that threshold, you will not be subject to tax
in Country S. This is called either a permanent establishment rule or a
fixed base rule.
Another way that a tax treaty will try to address this potential
problem for double taxation (or excessive taxation) is if you have an
activity that is a passive investment. A person in Country R might hold an
investment, such as shares of stock, a debt instrument, or a patent,
entitling such person to payments from Country S. Holding this interest is
represented by the red arrow from Country R into Country S. Naturally,
there is a return that you get on this instrument, which could be dividends,
interest, or royalties (represented by the other red arrow). Normally a tax
treaty will reduce the withholding tax that is imposed by the source
country on these payments.
Just to give you an example, in the absence of a treaty, the United
States imposes a 30% withholding rate on these types of income. Now, if
you think about it, 30% imposed on a gross basis is a very heavy tax.
Through a treaty, the goal is to reduce this gross level of taxation to a
much lower level - to make it more or less reasonable when you compare
that gross basis tax to the tax on net income which a domestic taxpayer
would have to pay. The 30% withholding imposed in the absence of a
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Treaty could cause double taxation, but certainly will result in excessive
taxation. The treaty relieves the excessive tax.
So, the first significant advantage of a tax treaty is the elimination
of either double taxation or excessive taxation. This is achieved by first
solving source and residence problems; second, by creating an activity
threshold so that a business not having a fixed base or a permanent
establishment will not be subject to tax in the other country; and third, by
reducing the level of withholding so that you do not have an excessive
level of gross-basis taxation.
Another advantage to an investor is that the treaty will give access
to what is called "mutual agreement." Basically, if you have a problem
with the way you are being taxed by the other country, this gives you the
right to appeal to your tax authority (or in limited cases, to the other tax
authority). Assume a tax treaty between the United States and Peru. If
Peru taxed me because I had performed legal services in Peru, and I felt
that Peru was not permitted to tax me under the treaty, I would go to the
United States government and ask them to intervene on my behalf. If the
United States tax authorities agree that I have a legitimate gripe, then the
two tax authorities (the term we use is "competent authority") will get
together to try to work out the problem. In the absence of a treaty, the
United States does not care if Peru is taxing me in a way that I do not like.
A treaty also guarantees "non-discrimination," that is, the
guarantee of national treatment, which is even better than most
favored-nation treatment. National treatment guarantees you that you will
be taxed no more harshly than a national of the country where you are
doing business, as long as you are similarly situated. Let me illustrate
again the operation of "mutual agreement." Assume a United States-Peru
tax treaty. If your United States business is being taxed by Peru more
heavily than a similarly situated Peruvian you could go to the competent
United States authority, and say: will you intervene on my behalf? They
are not treating me in the manner specified in the treaty.
Next are two items that are mostly of interest to the tax authorities.
The first one is information exchange. That gives the tax authorities of the
two countries the ability to exchange information with each other - but
only information that is related to tax. The idea is to help the tax authority
of the other country control the taxes of its taxpayers who happen to have
activities in the other country. Information exchange is part of virtually all
comprehensive tax treaties, and sometimes is authorized by a separate Tax
Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA). In fact, we have a TIEA with
Peru. If a Peruvian taxpayer has a bank account in America, and Peru
wants to tax the interest (a nonresident alien's bank account in the United
States is exempt from tax) then if Peru is lucky enough to stumble across
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the location of the bank account, such as Citibank, then, Peru can ask for
the information. If the IRS can find the requested information, it will be
given to Peru.
The second major advantage for governments is Article 9, which is
normally called "Associated Enterprises". It is very much related to an
issue that I am sure you have all heard of, which is transfer pricing. This
gives the specific right to a government to adjust the prices charged on
transfers of goods or services between related companies. If a price is
adjusted and a taxpayer is in the unfortunate position of having inconsistent
prices on items, which results in excessive taxation in both countries that
will be an example of something that the company could take to the
competent authorities through mutual agreement procedure and say: look,
I am willing to pay the tax on this income to one of you, but I am not
going to pay it to both.
So, to summarize, there are aspects of a tax treaty that benefit both
investors and governments. In the absence of a treaty there are obstacles
to investment. Those obstacles may be true legal obstacles in th6 sense
that you could be subjected to double taxation or excessive taxation, or it
might just be the uncertainty that an investor has in the absence of a treaty.
That uncertainty can take two forms. The company from Country R may
choose not to do business in Country S, because it simply does not know
what its tax situation is going to be. When you have a treaty you have a
pretty clear idea of what level of activity will subject you to tax. But the
other kind of uncertainty is that when you have a treaty, you know that
there are certain limits to the level of taxation that the other country can
impose on you. General Electric, for example, would not be too
concerned about Peru's current levels of withholding. They are only 10%,
which is very low in the international environment. However, General
Electric, in the absence of a treaty, has no guarantee that next year Peru
will not raise that level of withholding to 40%. With a tax treaty, they
have a guarantee that, at least until the tax treaty is terminated, the level of
withholding that is called for in the treaty cannot be exceeded. As a
practical matter, there are very few cases in history where a tax treaty has
been terminated.
So, tax treaties give you a certain amount of predictability in your
taxation, and as Marlin and Denise will tell you, it is of ultimate
importance to an investor to be able to predict what its situation is going to
be - to have a stable environment. A tax treaty is certainly only one of the
many characteristics or aspects of a country that an investor will analyze in
terms of predictability and stability, but it is one of the few aspects that the
country actually has control over. It might be nice to have a stable labor
force, but a country has to view that as a long term problem. It cannot
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negotiate a stable labor force in six months. You might want to have a
good infrastructure. That is very important for any foreign investor, but
you cannot just build an infrastructure of railroads and highways in six
months. You can have a tax treaty in six months if you really work at it.
Just to summarize, with a tax treaty in force you have lower
withholding rates, you have the guarantee that you will not be subject to
discriminatory taxation compared to the nationals of the country of the
treaty partner country, and you have the right to recourse under the mutual
agreement procedure if you feel that you are being treated unfairly.
I am just going to finish up with a very short history of tax
treaties. Tax treaties have been around since the 1920's. They were
initiated by the League of Nations. In this year, the 50th anniversary year
of the United Nations, I suppose we should have a moment of silence for
the League of Nations, which was the predecessor of the United Nations.
But when the League of Nations went out of business, the tax treaty
football was picked up by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the OECD has had a series of model tax treaties
since the 1950's. The OECD's approach to international taxation has
basically been to facilitate international commerce by reducing the level of
taxation in the source country. In the OECD model tax treaty you find
what most countries consider to be a high level of activity threshold before
you are subject to tax in the source country, and also relatively low rates
of withholding on items such as dividends, interest, and royalties.
In 1977, the OECD came out with the new model and the United
Nations decided to get back into the tax treaty game. The reason is that
some countries wanted to have a treaty more sympathetic to the interests of
developing countries. The OECD model was not considered to be fair to
developing countries. In the real world, the residence country is generally
going to be a developed country, and source country is going to be a
developing country. When you have international economic activity
between a developed and a developing country, the direction of the flow of
investment is almost always from Country R (being the developed country)
into Country S (the developing country), whether you are talking about a
business activity or a passive investment such as shares of stock or a debt
instrument. So, the UN Model basically lowered the threshold of activity
that can trigger taxation in the source country, and left open the rates of
withholding on interest dividends and royalties. The understand'i g is that
they would be somewhat higher than the rates called for in the OECD
model.
A lot has changed in the last fifteen years. The first thing, from a
technical point of view, is that the OECD is a better financed organization
than the UN, and has continued to work on its treaty and continued to
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update it. So from a technical point of view, the current OECD model is a
more advanced model than the UN model.
I think it is perhaps more important that the attitude toward foreign
investment around the world has changed dramatically in the last fifteen
years. I am sure most of you, if you do not remember it personally, you
have heard that in the 1970's and early 1980's that multinational
companies were viewed as the enemy - they were out to exploit developing
countries and you really had to watch them closely. Maybe you were
better off not having foreign investment at all. It has been a long time
since I have heard anyone say this. To the extent that anyone says it, it is
normally not someone from a developing country.
Developing countries are competing for capital from developed
countries. So the UN model is now being revised and some of the people
here have been participating in the effort. The dilemma is whether the UN
model should move more toward the OECD model. The question then
becomes, if we are going to have a UN model that is very similar to the
OECD model, why have a UN model treaty at all? Or should we have a
UN model that is updated technically, but keeps the same kind of
developing country bias? The problem here is that many developing
countries, in their pursuit of foreign investment, are going with the OECD
model anyway. If the UN model does not become more like the OECD
model, it runs the risk of becoming totally obsolete.
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PERUVIAN INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES
Adrian Revilla*
I. INTRODUCTION
Peru agrees with the idea that double tax treaties are not only
useful, but invaluable tools in promoting understanding, stability and
confidence among the participants in international commerce. The tangible
benefits of the mechanisms provided by double-tax treaties include: the
lowering of costs to the investor, the attraction of capital, and a shared
understanding on the part of tax administrations of how the limited tax
revenues from productive enterprises will be apportioned.
Peru's network of double-tax treaties is as yet underdeveloped. At
the moment, Peru has treaties only with Sweden and the members of the
Andean Pact. No negotiations are pending although some interest exists on
the part of France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom and others.
Nevertheless, the Peruvian delegation can offer its experience to this
forum as a case study in the importance of double-tax treaties to a country
that is undergoing the transformation from a centrally-controlled to a
market economy. To further this objective, we will illustrate the role that
double-tax treaties will play in the development of Peruvian market
economy and in the process of Peru's reinsertion into the world economy.
We hope that you will agree that Peru's experience illustrates that the
making of double-tax treaties is an important ingredient in economic
development, improving relations with foreign investors, attracting more
of them, and improving understanding and cooperation in international
relations.
II. WHY DOESN'T PERU HAVE DOUBLE-TAX TREATIES WITH THE
MAJOR CAPITAL-EXPORTING NATIONS?
At a time when double tax treaties are becoming a key piece in the
structure of trading and economic relations between countries, it is a
curious fact indeed that Peru does not have double tax treaties with any of
the major capital-exporting countries. There are many reasons, most of
which are related in part to Peru's recent history as a heavily controlled
* National Superintendent of Taxation of Peru.
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economy, a terrorized society, and an unimaginative and paralyzed body
politic.
The late 1980's saw Peru experiencing the worst of times from an
economic, social, and political standpoint. Hyperinflation and economic
stagnation crippled the economy and repelled foreign investment.
Terrorism was rampant, and corruption blossomed. The national currency
was worthless. To be brief, very little was going right before the tide
turned in the 1990's.
The picture of the tax administration before 1990 illustrates the
lack of imaginative direction that characterized Peruvian public
institutions. Before 1990, the tax administration was incapable of dealing
with the external organizations and institutions. It was a bloated
bureaucracy under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy and
Finance and it lacked the financial resources and decision-making authority
to pursue its own agenda.
Likewise, the Peruvian tax system was complex, overwhelmed by
ineffective taxes and lacked a clear policy direction. Many taxes were
difficult to collect and some even yielded negative revenue. Compliance
costs were high and the rate of compliance was low.
III. WHAT DOES THE FACT THAT PERU DOES NOT HAVE
DOUBLE-TAX TREATIES IMPLY?
It means that Peru does not make full use of an important tool in
structuring its international economic relations. For example, no
mechanisms exist currently for the structured solution of important
differences of opinion between the competent authorities of Peru and those
of some of Peru's most important trading partners. It also means that Peru
does not use one of the now common methods to attract foreign
investment. Nevertheless, there are also important implications which are
related to the state of the internal development process of the people and
the economic structure of the country.
Peru was incapable of appreciating the value of and the need to
establish double tax treaties. The years of poor economic and political
management led to a lack of focus on the national interest and an attrition
in institutional capacity. Peru's public institutions were unable to analyze
Peru's position in relation to the rest of the world and to develop
mechanisms to adjust to changing times. This means that many changes
that should have been made were not and that Peru suffered for it. In
addition, there were serious questions about the capacity of the country to
monitor such instruments and to enforce them effectively, even if it were
willing to sign double-tax treaties.
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The relationship between Peruvians and their tax administration
has not been a harmonious one. For example, the tax administration never
saw the quality of service that it gave to the taxpaying public as an
important component in getting the tax system to work. Likewise, and
probably related, there has been a long-standing belief that the tax net
catches only those who are artless enough to avoid it. There are at least
two consequences. First, the tax administration has not been able to
develop a process by which it could concentrate on the things it needed to
do to get the tax system working well. Second, low rates of compliance
have contributed to poor tax yields which led to an adversarial relationship
between taxpayers and the tax administration. This adversarial relationship
stimulated efforts on the part of the government and the tax administration
to support additional and, in many cases, inconsistent taxes in the vain
effort to pursue a non-complying public. This was hardly an environment
conducive to the efficient use of the country's energies and resources. The
way public institutions and private companies behaved in Peru had to
change.
The restrictions that were imposed on the free market in Peru in
the past created a culture of doing business that eschewed free market
principles. Transparency is one of the key ingredients in the development
of a well-working free market and a sophisticated market culture. But
during the 1980's, the impetus for transparency was absent and the concept
did not become part of the national consciousness. Thus, the kind of
relationship between private companies and public institutions that would
bring important issues to light did not occur because of the distrust that
private companies and government institutions had for each other.
Peru's lack of integration with the world economy in the pre-1990
era not only prevented goods and services from entering the country, but it
also obstructed the free-flow of ideas that would have helped develop the
country's political, economic and social life. Peru now possesses the tools
necessary to pull itself out of the morass into which it has slipped. I am
happy to tell you that all this is now behind us.
IV. WHAT EVENTS HAVE TRIGGERED THE NEED TO HAVE
DOUBLE-TAX TREATIES?
President Fujimori's election in 1990 has been the catalyst for
fundamental change in Peru. The series of reforms promulgated by the
administration have been extensive and impressive in their results. Among
the many reforms are: (1) a new foreign investment law emphasizing tax
stability and the uncontrolled remittance of profits and capital gains; (2) a
new free-trade law that mandates the free-flow of goods, labor and capital;
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(3) a broad tax reform that has simplified the tax system, improved the
efficiency of the tax administration and reduced the compliance costs to
taxpayers. These reforms, and others, jump-started the economy,
increased the country's institutional capacity and competence, and have
revolutionized the way that Peruvians see themselves and the way they do
business.
It is important to understand just how far-reaching the 1991 tax
reform was. First and foremost, the tax reform created an autonomous tax
administration. The following statistics are enlightening. In just three
years, the tax administration has made a 180-degree turnaround, and is
now considered by the public to be the most efficient institution (public or
private) in the nation. Of course, relations between the tax administration
and the public have improved. Over sixty taxes were repealed. The present
tax structure has four major components: a value-added tax, an income
tax, customs duties and a selective sales tax. Naturally, rates of
compliance have increased dramatically; collections rose from 4% of GDP
(Gross Domestic Product) to 14% between 1990 and 1994.
In addition, the economic reforms have also led to other factors
that have triggered the need for and the appreciation of double tax treaties.
The opening of Peru's economy to world markets has led to better
economic performance, making the country an attractive venue for foreign
investment. Also, Peru is restructuring its public and private debt with a
Brady Plan. Therefore, Peru's reintegration into the world's economic and
capital markets required that we begin the process of refining our relations
with our external partners. The making of double-tax treaties is an integral
part of this new ordering of Peru's international and economic relations.
V. WHAT DOES IT MEAN THAT PERU is Now AWARE OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF HAVING DOUBLE-TAX TREATIES AND THAT FOREIGN
INSTITUTIONS ARE INTERESTED IN MAKING SUCH AGREEMENTS WITH
PERU?
The fact that Peru is aware of the need to have double-tax treaties
indicates that a transformation at the most fundamental level has taken
place in all parts of the society. What is even more stunning is that this
process took place in a matter of four years. To be sure, all of Peru has
not adjusted at once to these changes. However, the government is
determined to press ahead with the process of change. The government no
longer sustains the privileges that the business community became
accustomed to in the past. In addition, all members of Peruvian society
will be held to the letter of the law. This is an important message if the
reforms are to become self-sustaining.
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VI. WHAT ARE THE ISSUES THAT PERU WILL CONCENTRATE ON IN
THE NEGOTIATION OF DOUBLE TAX TREATIES?
In closing, I would like to list some of the issues that Peru feels are
very important in negotiating double-tax treaties: (1) Taxable income
should be shared with the country of the investor; (2) Taxes should not
discriminate against foreign investors; (3) Taxable income should take into
consideration the deduction of expenses related to the activity.
Thank You.
LINKAGE BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAIRO/BEIJING
AGENDA FOR WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT
Virginia Ofosu-Amaah*
I. INTRODUCTION
Making general statements on the correlation between the effects
of socio-economic development and the situation of women is difficult
because the political, economic, and structural conditions differ greatly
from one country to the other. However, nowhere in the world are
women treated as equal as men or enjoy the same opportunities as men.
All countries slip on the human development scale when inequality
between the sexes is measured. Differences between the life situations and
opportunities of men and women still arise from unequal access to
employment, income, economic resources, health care, food, education,
training, etc.
Social development, including fundamental changes in traditional
family and social structures, migration, urbanization, the contrast between
"traditional" and "modem" ways of life, and often unfavorable economic
development for the majority of the people, have a significant influence on
the role and status of women in most developing countries. Recent
reviews of the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies,
adopted at the Women's Conference in 1985, shows clearly that, in spite
of the progress achieved, particularly in the areas of education and health,
since the Women's Conference in Mexico twenty years ago, gender
disparities exist today in many fields, and there remains an unfinished
agenda for progress in gender equality and women's empowerment.
As we enter the 21st century, the situation of women in the
developing countries can be characterized as follows: (1) 500,000 women
still die each year from pregnancy and pregnancy-related causes, and (2)
120 million women in developing countries who want to delay birth or
childbearing have no access to contraception. Women earn one-tenth of the
world's income. Their wage rates are, on average, three-fourths those of
men because they are concentrated in the low-paying, non-formal
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sector and receive a lower wage for equal work. In spite of
progress in education, women still constitute 60% of the 1 billion adults
who have no access to basic education, and girls represent 90 million of
the 960 million (10.6%) with no access to primary education. Although
there has been economic progress in some developing countries,
particularly in Asia and Latin America, one-fifth of the world's
population still live in absolute poverty, with women accounting for 70%
of the world's 1.3 million absolute poor. This explains why poverty is
described as having a "woman's face." Two million girls undergo female
circumcision every year. Women still constitute less than one-seventh of
top administrators and managers in developing countries. Women are
exposed to all types of violence in all countries.
Taking into account the above situation of women, development
becomes the most important challenge facing the human race. The lack of
progress in the last twenty years in the eradication of poverty, the growing
proportion of women among the poor, and the violation of their rights are
among the most important threats to the progress of development and its
sustainability. As long as three-quarters of the world's population continue
to suffer from acute deprivation, as long as profound imbalances in global
consumption continue to persist, and, more important, as long as the
spread of poverty, particularly among women, continues unchecked, there
can be no development. The history of the development process shows
again and again that the improvement of the status of women is one of the
key variables in finding solutions to the poverty crisis.
There is a tendency that new inequalities may emerge with
globalization, the destabilization of national economies by war and
conflict, and the cut-back in budgetary allocations to social sector
programmes resulting from structural adjustment policies currently being
implemented in most Sub-Sahara African countries; all these have made it
difficult to sustain the limited gains made in many countries over the last
twenty years.
As Mahbub ul Haq wrote in the publication, Women: Looking
Beyond 2000, "[o]ne is presently faced with two contrasting trends-
increasing female capabilities on the one side, and restricted opportunities
on the other. Such a wide gap between capabilities and opportunities leads
to a considerable waste of women's potential and, naturally, to a rising
level of frustration." The struggle for equal opportunities for both men
and women will definitely change most of the developing countries'
premises for social, economic, and political development.
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II. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
In the past few years, a number of international conferences have
been organized under the aegis of the UN to find solutions to key global
problems and to establish policy directions at the national, regional, and
inter-regional levels. These conferences have also greatly contributed to
raising the awareness of countries to these issues and have provided the
fora for useful exchange and debate. This discussion will focus on two of
these conferences: the International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD), which took place in September 1994 in Cairo, and
the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW), which took place in
Beijing in September 1995.
A brief mention of other international conferences would
underscore the fact that the one recurring theme at these conferences
relates to gender equality, women's empowerment, and women's pivotal
role in development. The outcomes of these conferences have highlighted
the realization of the world community that women's empowerment issues
are development issues, and should be treated as such, in an integrated and
holistic manner.
At the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
de Janeiro in 1992, governments recognized that policies would fail if
women were not involved. At the World Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna in 1993, governments declared that the rights of girls and women
were an "inalienable, integral and indivisible" part of human rights, and
transcended nationality and culture; Governments agreed at the World
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen earlier this year that
development could not be achieved, nor poverty eradicated, without
investment in women.
At the ICPD, a "new development paradigm" was proclaimed. It
was agreed that development in the future was to concentrate on the
individual and less on growth rates. The ICPD Programme of Action
places human rights and well-being explicitly at the centre of all activities
to achieve sustainable development. Thus, it is squarely based on the
Convention to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). Rather than emphasizing human numbers and demographic
targets, it stresses the well-being of individual women and men, and the
need to invest in their health and education, in building equity and equality
between the sexes, in eradicating poverty, in the universal provision of
integrated health services, freedom of choice and absence of coercion in
family planning, and reproductive and sexual health programs. The ICPD
Programme of Action is remarkable for its clear recognition of the need to
empower women through, inter alia, investing in their education, and the
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need to promote equal sharing of responsibilities between men and women
in the home and in reproductive health matters. It thus calls for a new
action agenda that will make women full partners with men in all aspects
of the social, economic, and political lives of their countries and
communities.
The Beijing Conference had. a lot to build on and effectively
brought together the gender equality and women's empowerment strategies
of all the conferences into an inclusive and comprehensive Platform for
Action. It reaffirmed the following commitments made in Cairo:
(1) universal access to quality health services including reproductive and
sexual health services which are to be provided within the context of
primary health care;
(2) reproductive health information and services for adolescents, "taking
into account the rights of the child to access to information, privacy,
confidentiality, respect, and informed consent, as well as the
responsibilities, rights and duties of parents and legal guardians. In all
actions concerning children, the interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration." (para. 267 of Platform for Action);
(3) reduction of maternal and infant mortality;
(4) equal access of women to land, credit, rewarding employment;
(5) reduction in the gender gap in education;
(6) elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls;
(7) promoting and protecting the rights of women and girls;
(8) promoting partnership between men and women in household
responsibilities and reproductive health matters;
(9) promoting the participation of women in all decision-making and
power structures;
(10) putting people at the centre of the development equation by
understanding their needs;
(11) bringing women into the mainstream of development as an important
end in itself and as a key to improving the quality of life of everyone.
The Beijing Platform for Action advances some of the core and
contentious issues debated at length in Cairo - namely, issues relating to
the decriminalization of abortion and the consideration of reproductive and
sexual rights as part of human rights. It also made progress in the need to
monetise the non-market- work of women.
The Platform proposes specific actions to address the problems that
women face. Like the Cairo Programme of Action, it aims at changing the
status quo and ensuring that human development, which is an integral part
of sustainable development, can be engendered. Through these
conferences, governments acknowledged the validity of human-centred
sustainable development as an important factor for achieving peace and
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stability. They also recognized that it is imperative to address the
"gender" dimension if lasting solutions should be found to social and
economic development problems.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
How do we translate the new vision of a better future into reality?
This will be a difficult and long process, but one that is attainable
considering the success that has been made in many development policy
and programme initiatives. For example, a recent World Bank report
clearly showed that policies aimed at improving the welfare of women lead
to higher productivity, more rapid human capital formation, slower
population growth, and faster economic growth. The Demographic and
Health Surveys which have been carried out in most developing countries
have also shown that investing in girls' and women's education and health
is the most important means to break the cycle of low status, poverty, and
large families.
The implementation of the agenda outlined in the Cairo
Programme of Action and the Beijing Platform for Action for women's
empowerment and gender equality is a shared responsibility of all
governments (developing and developed countries) and other actors at the
national level, and regional and international institutions. The primary
responsibility, however, rests with countries. Commitment at the highest
level is essential for its implementation. There is need for new
development policies, strategies, new approaches to development planning,
new development thinking and practices that include the perspectives and
realities of women's lives, and that will empower both men and women to
participate in the design and implementation of key decisions that shape
their lives.
Societies and communities will have to stop valuing women only
for their reproductive role, start putting more value on women's social and
economic contributions to development, and capitalizing on women's
organizational abilities, strengths, and resourcefulness. The ability of
women to exercise choices in regard to their fertility will definitely allow
them to participate more effectively in social, political, and economic
activities.
Gender impact analysis will need to be undertaken to ensure that
development policies and programmes benefit women and men equally.
This means that governments from now on will need to undertake
systematic reviews of how women and men benefit from public sector
expenditures. Development priorities and the distribution of resources will
need to be re-examined to ensure that adequate resources are allocated to
1996]
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the women's empowerment agenda, particularly to health including
reproductive and sexual health, education, credit and capacity building.
Countries implementing structural adjustment programmes will have to
ensure that they include activities aimed at promoting gender equality and
women's empowerment.
Governments should tap the resources of the private sector for the
implementation of the ICPD and Beijing agenda. Partnerships should be
forged with NGOs which are the important voices of individual women
and girls. NGOs in developing countries are recognized for their
innovative, flexible, and responsive programme design and
implementation, including grass-roots participatory processes, and provide
effective means of better focusing local and national developmental
initiatives. Policy and legal reforms and affirmative action should be
undertaken to ensure equality of opportunities in the social, economic and
political spheres. Urgent action should be taken by governments, which
have not already done so, to ratify and also implement CEDAW.
UN agencies also have responsibilities within their mandates to
assist governments implement the commitments made at the Beijing and
Cairo Conferences. At the request of the UN Secretary-General, and to
ensure a coordinated response within the UN system, the Executive
Director of UNFPA, who was also the Secretary-General of the ICPD,
convenes and chairs an Inter-agency Task Force on the implementation of
the ICPD Programme of Action. The Task Force has five working
groups, one of which deals with women's empowerment. The guidelines
developed by the working groups to assist the UN Resident Coordinator
system in ICPD follow-up will facilitate follow-up to the Beijing
Conference as well.
At UNFPA, changes have been made in institutional structures,
policy guidelines, and operational procedures and partnerships with
non-governmental organizations are being expanded. UNFPA field offices
are supporting governments to develop plans of action for ICPD
implementation. These plans will include appropriate actions reflecting the
Beijing recommendations.
UNFPA will build on its achievements and further advance its
commitment to addressing concerns regarding the status of women by
focusing on gender, population, and development as a cross-cutting issue
in all its priority programme areas, namely, reproductive health, including
family planning and sexual health, population and development strategies,
and advocacy. In so doing, the Fund will support programmes promoting
women's health over their life span, women's reproductive and sexual
health and rights, elimination of all discrimination and violence against
[Vol. 2:709
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women and girls, education and male involvement in reproductive health
activities, and will emphasize gender awareness in all its programmes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Past strategies have not yet brought women to where they need to
be. All the UN conferences have attempted to make governments
accountable to women, and that demands the re-examination of priorities,
the re-allocation of resources, as well as commitment to urgent and
specific actions. It entails the enactment, review and enforcement of laws
so as to afford women equal opportunities and development.
Accountability requires policies for involving and advancing women in
social, political, and economic decision-making. Governments must take
the lead role in ensuring that institutional and financial arrangements are
made to enable and motivate national institutions to carry out all the
commitments they have made.
TOWARDS GLOBAL GOVERNMENT: REALITY OR
OXYMORON?
Valerie Epps*
The title of this panel asks us to examine where the world is going
and what is likely to be the governance structure for the foreseeable future.
This is a somewhat forbidding topic, but certainly worth tackling. We want
to ask ourselves whether the various forces in the world currently
operative will be reformulated, and if so, what the global arrangement will
look like. Several models spring to mind, and I thought I would outline a
few of them in order to get the debate going. I should add that I will not
offer a critique of these models, otherwise I will have far outrun my
prerogative as chair, but I hope that each model will arouse its critics and
possibly suggest other models.
The models I will suggest can be listed as follows:
(1) The "ethnic solidarity" model.
(2) The "clash of civilizations" model.
(3) The "urge to modernize, ruled by the multi-national
corporation" model.
(4) The "world civilization caused by economic
development" model, which is somewhat similar to
the "urge to modernize" model.
(5) The "substantive-issues-dictate-the-structure" model.
(6) A brief mention of a "world governmental" model
and the "rapid growth in regional international
structures" model.
One scenario is what we might call the Ethnic Solidarity Model.
Forget state sovereignty. States are gone - the future lies in much smaller
ethnic groups. The drive towards a comfortable, non-complex sense of
self, of family, clan, and tribe will drive us towards smaller units. This
movement partially reveals itself in all the groups that yearn for some sort
of autonomy and who seek to remove themselves from alien dominant
cultures - the Tamils, the Kurds, the Kashmiris, the Scots, and the
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Quebecoise. It also manifests itself in new configurations of nationalism,
often based on ethnic lines. The former Chezolovakia splits into two
republics. Yugoslavia is replaced by five republics, arranged largely along
ethnic lines, which are currently engaged in a battle to the death in
rearranging their borders through the means of ethnic cleansing. This
model sees a hunkering down towards one's ethnic or cultural center and
an insistent demand not to be dominated or ruled by an alien, ethnic group.
In a way it is a modem form of anti-colonialism now renamed self--
determinism.
Within states that are not facing issues of secession, the same
model is often manifested in a fervent nationalism and anti-immigrant
movement. Certain elements in the U.S. currently represent this theme.
There are bills in Congress to reduce substantially the number of legal
immigrants to the U.S., and also to increase substantially efforts to keep
out or deport illegal immigrants. Several countries in the European Union
have experienced similar trends, such as the burning of Turkish workers in
Germany and the frequent attacks on North Africans in France. The
Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights recently
issued a depressing report on racism and xenophobia which documents
these trends.,
This model, the ethnic solidarity model, almost always rejects any
form of outside governance and often sees such structures as sophisticated
attempts at dominating the group's culture. Structures like the U.N. are
viewed at best, as ineffective or irrelevant, and at worst, as a conspiracy to
keep certain powerful groups in control of not only the supranational
structure itself, but also their domination of the economic and resource
allocation systems.
Another model, explored extensively by Professor Samuel
Huntington, is the Clash of Civilizations model. Although Huntington
recognizes "the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism" 2 he is
convinced that we are entering the age of clashes of civilizations which he
defines as "Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. ... "I
The day of the nation state which was characterized by ideological
wars is over, and we are moving towards eruptions based on the "fault
lines between civilizations. "4 The micro-level clash will occur between
1. Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 103, U.N. Doc. A/50/476 (1995).
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993).
3. Id. at 25.
4. Id. at 29
718 [Vol. 2:717
Epps
different civilizations struggling over control of territory and the
macro-level clash will occur as these civilizations "compete for relative
military and economic power . . . control of international institutions...
and competitively promote their particular political and religious values."'
At the moment, Huntington concludes that "[tihe West in effect is
using international institutions, military power and economic resources to
run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect
Western interests and promote Western political and economic values," 6
He has outlined a strategy that will keep the West dominant but he finally
recognizes that the West will "have to accommodate . . . non-Western
civilizations" and will have to make an "effort to identify elements of
commonality between Western and other civilizations." The prediction is
that there will be "no universal civilization" but rather "a world of
different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the
others." 7 While this last remark might be seen as at least a step towards a
vision of a "multi-ethnic" global society, it is clear that the whole tenor of
this model is deeply pessimistic towards such a view. The vision of the
future is driven by notions of power scrambles based on clashes between
ingrained cultural divisions. I doubt that this model believes in any sort of
altruism operating at anything other than a personal level, and it clearly
perceives such movements as, for example, the human rights movement,
primarily an effort to foist Western values onto non-western societies.
Huntington is clearly a cultural relativist, but he understands what steps are
necessary to keep a particular culture in the ascendancy, and what factors
may lead to the unraveling of that ascendancy. It is the rise and future
dominance of non-western cultures that creates this vision and gives its
people nightmares. The model foresees the ascendancy of Islamic and
Hindu fundamentalism taking over the secular states of India, Pakistan,
Turkey, Iran, Algeria and so on. Japan is the enigma because it has
become a modern state without becoming a Western state. The model
clearly identifies modernity (whatever that may entail) with Westernism. I
suppose by modernity is meant things like banking systems, sophisticated
transportation and communications systems, heated or cooled and
adequately plumbed houses and offices, universal modern health care and
education. It is unclear whether the model thinks that non-western
civilizations will achieve these conveniences without becoming
westernized.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 40.
7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 49 (1993).
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This view might well leave the nation state nominally intact rather
like a modern constitutional monarch, but in reality the state becomes only
a cipher in a much greater force of what is called a civilization. The
current supra-national structure might well undergo further development
but only if one civilization gains dominance and then the development will
occur in order to enhance that particular civilization.
This view of the future has been elegantly challenged by Professor
Fouad Ajami who views the rise of fundamentalism as "less a sign of
resurgence [of civilization] than of panic and bewilderment . . . ." His
model of the world sees it as driven by the quest to "move out of
poverty," to seek "Sony, not soil" 9 and to "scramble for . . .market
shares" not to "set out on expeditions of principle." "Politics and
ideology" is mostly "sublimated into finance . . . "1' The whole idea of
civilizational hegemony is trounced by far too many cross cultural threads
and far too many divisions and conflicts within so-called civilizations.
Under this view "civilizations do not control states, states control
civilizations"." States will continue to be the main actors and they will act
out of self-interest in modernizational (consumerist) not civilizational
solidarity.
This view, even if based on a fairly cynical view of humans, finds
the urge to modernize so great that this alone will probably produce
supra-national structures. International business organizations will
probably predominate within the state and inter-state structures and the
current concerns of the United Nations in peacekeeping or humanitarian
work will only be supported if those activities contribute towards reducing
poverty, increasing modernization, and providing more goods to the main
actors. This model does not seem to concern itself with the configuration
of the distribution of wealth but remains in the thrall of those institutions
that deliver the goods - primarily great business enterprises.
Another model suggested by Robert Bartley of the Wall Street
Journal raises the prospect of a world civilization driven by world-wide
instant communications, "economic interdependence and the appeal of
individual freedom . . . . " 12 and "its political appendages of democracy..
." This model finds support for its view in such factors as the West
8. Fouad Ajami, The Summoning, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 3 (Sept./Oct. 1993).
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Robert Bartley, The Case for Optimism: The West Should Believe in Itself, 72 FOREIGN
AFF. 15, 16 (Sept./Oct. 1993).
13. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 2:717720
1996]
having won the cold war; reports that the number of "free" nations has
risen by thirty percent in the last decade; and information that as soon as
per capita income in a county rises above $5,500 nearly all states become
democratic with a few exceptions such as some oil sheikdoms and some of
the Asian Tigers. Under this view, economic development, which creates
a middle class, leads inexorably to enough people wanting a say in their
own future - which spells democracy. At the moment China remains the
enigma in this model - relentlessly improving its economy without trailing
clouds of participatory government-although Hong Kong should certainly
present a crucible for the theory once it joins China in 1997.
This model notes that democracies seldom go to war with each
other (although it sometimes forgets that civil wars, which can certainly be
as bloody as international wars, do not necessarily decline and that the two
World Wars defy this maxim). The optimistic view of this model sees the
whole world moving towards individual freedom (note the Western value)
and economic prosperity. Presumably supra-national structures will be
changed or fashioned to promote these values. It is again a model that
does not challenge the supremacy of the nation-state, but sees the
nation-state as necessarily moving towards the Western democratic model
and trailing supra-national structures in its wake, provided they also
support this trend.
The final model that certainly deserves at least brief mention, is
what I shall call the "substantive-issues-dictate-the-structure" model. This
model moves from somewhat different premises. It suggests that the
human condition constantly finds itself confronted with problems and that
it is these problems that dictate the structure of the form of governance.
For example, modern industrialization has led to pollution. The problem
of pollution has to be solved. The existing nation-state/domestic law
system could not solve some of the major aspects of the problem (such as
ozone depletion) because pollution does not respect state sovereignty. As a
result, a comprehensive international treaty system with, at the moment, an
embryonic, but growing supra-national enforcement system became
necessary. In other words the substance of the problem necessitated a
supra-national solution.
This type of model posits that the nature of the problem dictates
the level at which it can be solved. This may be the national, state or local
level depending on the problem, but the model often predicts that the vast
increase in the international movement of goods and people will likely
necessitate supra-national structures that will arise and develop out of the
particular issues that present themselves. This model is probably one of the
most optimistic with respect to predicting the development and growth of
supra-national organizations and it is probably the least concerned about
Epps
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domination of the supra-national structures by particular blocs. The
supra-national structure, however, may be much less governmental, in the
traditional sense, and rather more problem solving oriented.
None of the above models embraces a thorough abolition of the
nation state and the creation of a world government in which we would all
simply be world citizens, yet that too is a model some may wish to discuss.
None of these models pays particular attention to the rise of regional
international structures, which is certainly a model that some predict will
characterize the next century - the European Union, being in the vanguard
of this movement. None of these models start from a vision of a
supra-national structure and from that structure predicts the shape of
smaller units. Rather, all of these models look at the present nation-state
structure and from that, attempt to predict possible supra-national
structures. Let me end where I began by posing the question of what the
structure of the world is going to look like for the foreseeable future and
by hoping that some of the models outlined will spark a lively response.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The People's Republic of China has, during the latter part of this
century, consistently restricted one's right to religious freedom. Religious
rights, as well as other rights, within the People's Republic of China have
been the subject of much controversy around the world. Countries like the
United States have severely chastised China for not protecting the rights of
its citizens. Recent news reports, however, have shown that China's once
restrictive view of one's right to religion is expanding to the spirit in which
human rights standards were created. China, throughout its domestic
legislation, specifically enumerates the right to religious freedom and has
been a party to international declarations and covenants protecting an
individual's right to religion. During the formation of these domestic and
international documents, China was still criticized internationally for not
protecting the rights of its citizens. Particularly during the reign of Mao
Zedong, China sought to extinguish one's right to practice religion.
* B.S. University of Miami; Candidate for Juris Doctor 1997, Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor
Douglas L. Donoho for his help in preparing this article, and to her family for their support and
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This paper seeks to track China's view of religion through history
to determine the definition of religious rights and China's obligations to
ensure protection of those rights. Part One of this note seeks to define
religious rights and determine China's international legal obligations
through declarations and covenants in the protection of those rights. Part
Two examines Chinese history to analyze its view of religion, particularly,
the role of Confucianism. This also tracks China's early tolerant view of
religious rights, its later restriction and condemnation, and its present
growing tolerance of religious rights. That tolerance is not complete and
China's ambivalence to the protection of religious rights will be
considered. Part Three discusses and compares China's domestic
legislation with its international obligations to determine whether China
embraces the right of religious freedom and whether China complies with
international principles. Part Four analyzes the role of Chinese culture
and its relation to religious freedom to determine whether the reported
tolerance will continue or even expand.
II. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
A. Definition of Religious Rights
Internationally, China is a party to several international documents
which guarantee the right to religion. One of the early major international
documents specifically guaranteeing the right to religion was the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18 of the Declaration states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.,
The right specified in the Universal Declaration can be read
expansively or restrictively. Based on the plain meaning of the article, one
has the right to have religious beliefs, practice those beliefs, and to
observe and disseminate those beliefs to others. China, at the time the
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., pt.
1., art. 18, at 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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Universal Declaration was adopted, was not under Marxist rule, but still
adhered to a theory that religious beliefs were superstitious.,
Approximately four decades after the adoption of the Universal
Declaration, China accepted another declaration which further defines
religious rights. In 1981, China as well as other countries, adopted by
consensus the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Religious Declaration).,
Article 6 of the Religious Declaration states:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion
or belief, and to establish and maintain places for their
purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or
humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the
necessary articles and materials related to the rites or
customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in
these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these
purposes... ;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession
appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and
standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's
religion or belief; and,
(i) To establish and maintain communications with
individuals and communities in matters of religion and
belief at the national and international levels.4
The Religious Declaration is one of the most expansive
delineations of the elements of religious rights. Essentially, it declares that
2. Eric Kolodner, Religious Rights in China: A Comparison of International Human
Rights Law and Chinese Domestic Legislation, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 407, 416 (1994).
3. Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion of Belief. G.A Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
4. Id. at 172, art. 6.
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people have the right to have religious beliefs, exercise their beliefs in
public or private, fund their beliefs, and ensure the future of their beliefs
through religious training. Unlike the Universal Declaration, the Religious
Declaration is subject to less interpretation and therefore may have only
one expansive view of religious rights. A country's limitation of those
rights is all but eliminated in the Declaration. The fact that the Religious
Declaration was unanimously adopted is ironic because all countries,
including China, would have difficulty adhering to all the rights within the
Religious Declaration.5
The Universal Declaration and the Religious Declaration, while
major international steps in the explication of religious rights, are not
binding obligations. Rather, all countries that ascribe to the Declarations
essentially aspire to uphold the tenets within them. Even though China
adopted the Universal and Religious Declarations, the doctrines they
embody are merely a proclamation of the country's aspiration. One could
argue that China only grudgingly embraced the Declarations' guarantees to
be a part of the international mainstream and therefore has no intention of
upholding the doctrine. However, agreements to which China is a party
obligate China to assure religious freedom in China. These international
obligations also assist in defining the elements of religious freedom.
B. International Treaty Obligations
After supporting the Universal Declaration, which is merely a
proclamation that countries have a goal to allow religious freedom, China
entered into a binding obligation with the international community granting
religious freedom to all its citizens. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights6 (ICCPR), adopted in 1966, further delineates the
religious rights of the signatory countries. Article 2 of the ICCPR states
that each state shall respect and ensure to all individuals the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without any distinction to religion.,
Further, Article 18 of the ICCPR expands those rights proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration:
5. It would be interesting to see how the Supreme Court would have decided Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), in light of the Religious Declaration. In this case, the
dissent stated that an employer's responsibility to accommodate one's religious rights should not
be unreasonably costly to the employer. The Court defined unreasonably costly as de minimis.
Id.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
7. ICCPR art. 2.
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2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair
his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice;
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others;
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
have respect for the liberty of parents ... to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions
While some of the religious rights expanded upon in the ICCPR may be
seen in other articles within the Universal Declaration, the consolidation
demonstrates there are rights fundamental to one's existence and a denial
of those rights may have later detrimental effects to the international
community. 9 The ICCPR is an example of international documents which
acknowledge a respect for individual human rights.
The rights within the ICCPR have no explicit limitations. Instead,
the rights guaranteed in the ICCPR are generally limited country to
country by their own domestic laws. '0 In China, as well as other countries,
one's right to religion is limited by other domestic laws. The "bottom-
line" nevertheless, seems clear that religious belief, even if superstitious,
should be respected and protected domestically.
B. Domestic Legislation
China, through domestic and international legislation, has acceded
to the concept of religion as a fundamental right. The concept's presence
is evident in China's earlier Pre-Mao legislation and constitutions. An
8. ICCPR art. 18.
9. As stated in the United Nations Charter, the purpose for the organization is to protect
international stability. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. Denial of fundamental rights may incite another
world war and one of the United Nations' purpose is to protect fundamental rights thereby
protecting international stability. It will be interesting to see whether the more expansive
definition of religious rights as explicated in the Religious Declaration had an effect on China's
recent tolerance of religious freedom.
10. For example, in the United States, freedom of speech is a fundamental right, but is
limited. The Supreme Court stated in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), that in
some cases freedom of speech is not unlimited but may be, in certain situations, subordinate to
societal values. Religious freedom in America has clashed with other rights. An employer may
limit employee's religious observance that imposes more that a de minimis cost to the employer.
Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 63.
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analysis of those constitutions, even if not implemented, gives perspective
to what the Chinese people and government consider rights in general."
Early constitutions embraced ideas analogous and fundamental to religious
freedom. China's first "constitutional" draft, called the Principles, and
published by the imperial government in 1908, developed a reform
program analogous to essential principles of religion, namely Christianity.
The principles that were established were grants or gifts from the Chinese
emperor to his people. It is important to note the Chinese constitutions
unlike the United States Constitution is not a delineation of rights but a
description of the Chinese aspirations of what may be considered rights.,2
As the edict that instigated Chinese constitutional lawmaking states: "The
wealth and strength of other countries are due to their practice of
constitutional government, in which public questions are determined by
consultation with the people. The ruler and his people are as one body
animated by one spirit."" This concept is analogous to Western religious
ideology. In the Old and New Testament, Jews and Christians strive for a
oneness with their ruler, God. Further, the Principles grant certain
freedoms to people of China, one of which, grants freedom of speech,
writing, publication, assembly, and association.'
The Principles, however, are merely an interesting insight into the
history of Chinese domestic legislation because before their
implementation the dynasty fell and the Principles were replaced by the
Provisional Constitution in 1913. That constitution was replaced with the
Constitution of 1923.'1 In both the Provisional Constitution and the
Constitution of 1923, a freedom of religion was established as a political
right. 6 The authors of both constitutions recognized the laws established
within the constitutions as either rights or freedoms (quan and ziyou
respectively). The Provisional Constitution stated that the people's rights
may be limited for the public welfare." Such a distinction is a departure
11. Andrew J. Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 77 (R. Randle Edwards ed., 1986).
12. David E. Christensen, Breaking the Deadlock: Toward a Socialist-Confucianist
Concept of Human Rights for China, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 469 (1992).
13. Nathan, supra note 11, at 84.' The Principles were never implemented because the
dynasty fell. Id.
14 . Nathan, supra note 11, at 85.
15. Nathan, supra note 11, at 86.
16 . Nathan, supra note 11, at 87; Article 5 and 6 of the 1923 Constitution states: "The
people of the Chinese Republic are all equal, without differences of race, class, or religion ....
The people have the freedoms of speech, writing, publication, and of assembly and association."
Id.
17. Nathan, supra note 11, at 86.
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from the Emperor's grants that was published by the imperial government.
The rights within the Provisional Constitution are no longer grants given
by the emperor but are rights enjoyed by all Chinese people.,8
The distinctions between grants and freedoms or rights is
significant because it illustrates a fundamental difference between China
and other democratic countries and what some may consider a profound
difference between the imperial government and China today. The
distinction between rights, freedoms, and grants may only be a difference
in semantics, but it seems clear that China, throughout its domestic
legislation, chose its words carefully to avoid individual interpretation.
This distinction seems to show China's present and past ambivalence about
what the Chinese people can expect in the realm of rights and freedoms.
Even earlier constitutions, as previously discussed, seem to term
rights not as fundamental or a high priority, but essentially grants which
the government may modify or rescind at any time for the public welfare."
That terminology is contradictory, but nevertheless perpetuated in other
domestic legislation throughout Chinese history.
After the Constitution of 1923, the Nationalist Party (a period also
known as Guomindang) rose to power. The Nationalist Party, led by Sun
Yat-sen, introduced the Tutelage Constitution in 1931 which would be
replaced by a permanent constitution when the Chinese people reached a
certain level of economic, educational, and political status ° The Tutelage
Constitution accepted the principle of popular sovereignty, but that
principle was only during the Tutelage period.2' The Constitution
recognized many freedoms, including equality under the law without
regard to race, religion, class, or gender.2
While granting freedoms, the Tutelage Constitution, like previous
constitutions limited those freedoms with duties. Within the Constitution,
citizens were obligated "to obey public officials in the legal discharge of
their public duties."13 Challengers to the duties and advocates of human
rights could not find solace within the constitutions because the rights were
subordinate to the duties.
18. Id. at 87.
19. Id. at 89.
20. Id. at 90.
21. Nathan, supra note 11, at 91.
22. Andrew J. Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 77 (R. Randle Edwards ed., 1986).
23. Id. at 91.
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On December 25, 1946, China adopted a permanent constitution.14
The rights and freedoms delineated within the Constitution of 1946 are the
most generous grant in any constitution. But even with all the freedoms,
the road to the preservation of those freedoms has yet to be totally
realized. The rights within the 1946 Constitution are limited by Article 23
which states that the freedoms and rights listed may be legally restricted to
protect others' rights and freedoms, maintain social order, and promote the
common good.- It seems that the common good is defined as what the
government terms it to be. Presently, the common good is Communism.
During the period of "democratic" rule in China, i.e., the
Nationalist period, Communism was becoming an integral part of China's
political framework."7 In 1954, the first Communist constitution was
introduced." In that Constitution, the right to speech, publication,
assembly, and association was explicit in the constitution. 29 The 1954
Constitution was heavily influenced by one of China's most revered and
religiously repressive leaders, Chairman Mao Zedong.10 Chairman Mao,
in writing the 1954 Constitution and considering what was good for the
Chinese citizens, stated, "We write into our constitution what is feasible
now and exclude what is not."' Chairman Mao did not grant liberal
rights, but aspired to expand rights at some later date.32
Subsequent constitutions granted similar freedoms as those granted
ifi the 1954 Constitution. However, in 1975, prior to his death, Chairman
Mao, in an attempt to leave his philosophical legacy to the Chinese
citizens, created another constitution. 33 After his death, his successor Deng
Xiaoping, extricated the Mao loyalists from power and created a new
constitution in 1978. 3
While all versions of the constitution, from the earliest period to
the present, place limits on citizen's rights, they all implicitly grant
religious freedom. As an example the earliest constitutional draft, the
24. Id. at 93.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 84.
27. Andrew J. Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 77 (R. Randle Edwards ed., 1986) at 96.
28. Id. at 102.
29. Id. at 103.
30. Nathan, supra note 11.
31. Id. at 103.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 111.
34. Id. at 112.
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Principles, grant freedom of speech, writing and association. Such
implicitly grants freedom of religion because religious freedom
encompasses all of those rights. Later constitutions explicitly grant
religious freedom. An example is the Constitution of 1923. Such a grant
is analogous to rights granted in the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution." While the Principles are not explicit in establishing
religious rights, its implicit grant displays Chinese officials' ambivalence to
delineate religious rights on the one hand, and restrict the expression of
those rights on the other.
The right to religion is expressly granted in the most recent
constitution, written in 1982. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution states:
"No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to
believe in, or not believe in any religion, nor may they discriminate
against citizens who believe in or do not believe in any religion. 36  The
constitutional guarantee is ironic in the sense that the Chinese government
authors considered religious belief superstitious and were therefore
limited.1 The limitations restricted religious beliefs from derogating the
Four Cardinal Principles .3  The Four Cardinal Principles are the
adherence to Confucianism, Marxism, Maoism, and Communism. 39  The
Chinese government's limitation of the guaranteed rights include the
prohibitions against disrupting public order, impairing public health, and
interfering with the educational system.40 In addition, the Government
expressly requires in the Constitution that "it is the duty of citizens . . to
safeguard the unity of the country and refrain from acts detrimental to the
security, honor, and interests of the motherland."41 While Confucianism
35. The First Amendment to the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
36. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 421.
37. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 419. Chinese government officials also considered religion
as the opiate of the people. Id.
38. Id.
39. Marxist thought was developed by Karl Marx and adopted by China. Karl Marx, like
Chairman Mao rejected individual universal rights and, instead, believed rights were a bourgeois
invention to impede socialism. Christensen, supra note 12. Maoism, created by Chairman Mao
Zedong, adopting his form of Marxism with his own philosophical interpretation, emphasizes
incremental subordination until the ultimate subordination, to the Central Committee government
that is the Communist government. Id. Both Marxism and Maoism believed that communism
was the ultimate path to achieve morality, but Maoism highlights those beliefs embraced by
Chairman Mao. Id.
40. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 421.
41. Id.
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was the first established principle, and a belief Chinese citizens hold dear,
belief in the tenets of Confucius is limited by the other three principles.
The supremacy of the three other principles over that of Confucianism,
seems not to have subordinated the adherence and sacred belief in
Confucian thought.4 2
Presently, Chinese regional legislation expressly grants and
enumerates religious rights. Article 4 of the Xinjiang Religious Regulation
provides:
The masses of religious believers are permitted to conduct
all normal religious activities, such as reciting scriptures,
giving a sermon on scriptures, conducting religious
sermons, practicing abstinence from meat as a religious
exercise, saying prayers, burning incense, worshipping
Buddha, celebrating mass, and celebrating religious
festivals in their own houses, and in places for religious
activities .41
Religious adherents therefore are granted the right to observe, and
manifest their religious beliefs in variety of ways.
Based on international documents and domestic legislation, the
right to religion includes the right to have, adhere to, and disseminate
religious beliefs. China may limit such rights, but the limitations
expressed in domestic legislation are seemingly similar to Western
restrictions to fundamental rights. It is primarily practiced in countries
like China and the United States where they differ in the protection of
those rights. The history of religion in China, via Confucianism, and
China's view of rights in general, may offer assistance in determining why
China delineates the right to religion yet refuses to aggressively protect
that right.
III. THE HISTORY OF RELIGION AND CHINESE CULTURE:
CONFUCIANISM
China has embraced a view that religion is analogous to
superstition and, as Chairman Mao termed, an opiate of the people."
Confucianism, a belief and adherence to Confucian teachings, was
developed in China over a period of thousands of years, beginning in 551
42. Id.
43. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 427.
44. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 419-20.
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BCE . 4  Confucius, the man, believed and preached about morals, and
created a belief system that is deeply ingrained in Chinese thought.
Confucianism is no more or less superstitious than Christianity, Buddhism,
or Islam. Each religion bases its belief in a central person who espouses
morality, forms of social order,4 and a way of life.
It has been argued that Confucianism and the culture it espouses
may be the central problem for China's violation of religious and human
rights.41 Such an argument is fallacious because rather than espousing a
denial of human rights, Confucius embraces social rights. For example, in
China, Confucius teaches that no man is an island, but an element within
the community." The family is central to Chinese society. Confucius
advocates five cardinal relationships: (1) parent and child, (2) ruler and
subject, (3) husband and wife, (4) old and young, and (5) friend and
friend.49 These relationships create the Chinese social system. Confucius
believed societal harmony was the highest aspiration,5 and that people
should strive through moral growth and education to obtain "ren," and
higher moral excellence or humanity."
The five cardinal relationships advocated by Confucius are similar
to fundamental relationships in other religions, in particular Christianity.
For instance, the Ten Commandments advocate honoring parents, spouses,
friends, and God.,' Confucius' relationships, while not a religion, espouse
45. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 415; Franz Michael & Yuan-li Wu, Introduction: An
Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1-6 (Yuan-li Wu et al.
eds., 1988); Ta-ling Lee, Red Guards and Political Dissidents (11): Victims Beyond a
Generation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 211-32 (Yuan-li Wu et al.
eds., 1988).
46. An example of social order would be the theory of communal accountability in
Christianity and other religions.
47. Christensen, supra note 12. According to commentators, the Confucian view of the
collective over the individual reflect China's continual denial of individual religious rights on the
one hand while embracing Confucian ideologies, which are similar to other religious ideologies,
on the other. Id. See also Kolodner, supra note 2.
48. Christensen, supra note 12, at 487.
49. Christensen, supra note 12, at 489.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Exodus 20 (New International Version). Specifically, when God gave Moses the Ten
Commandments He said:
You shall have no other gods before me . . . .Honor your father and your mother, so
that you may live long in the land . . . .You shall not commit adultery . . . . You
shall not give false testimony against your neighbor. You shall not covet your
neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbors' wife .... or anything that
belongs to your neighbor ....
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the same principles embraced in religions. The similarity between
Confucius' principles and "Western" religions exemplifies an
inconsistency of Chinese thought that religion is analogous to superstition.
Confucian thought is present in China today, although China has
undergone tremendous changes from a monarchy, to nationalist, to
communist. Confucianism was even present during the reign of Mao
Zedong, one of China's most revered leaders. Chairman Mao has even
advocated respect for the five cardinal relationships. He has said that all
people must "belong to some party, some class, or some nation, and man
participates as a social being in every sphere of the actual life of society." 3
During Chairman Mao's religiously repressive period, Mao, like his
predecessors, seemed ambivalent in their view of religious freedom and
their desire to extricate China from religious thought, and the view of the
people who revered Confucius. On the one hand, Mao desired to rid the
country of the superstitious thought and on the other hand, seemed
powerless to manifest his desire.
It seems that Mao's ambivalence recognizes a fundamental
principle in relation to religion that denial of other forms of religious
beliefs is effectively denying Chinese belief in Confucius. All major forms
of religion require that which Confucius and Chairman Mao embrace, a
sense of societal harmony and moral growth through healthy relationships.
Such an acknowledgment may be the reason why Chairman Mao during
his reign only condemned instead of repudiated religious practices and
thereby religious freedom.
During the period of Mao's reign, the explicit grants of freedom
were severely limited by the Four Principles. The limitations, while
severe and inhumane, at their most brutal form did not extinguish the
"superstitious" religious thought. The Communist Party permitted religion
as a necessary evil for the time until, they hoped, religious thought would
die a natural death.4 Under Chairman Mao, who attempted to destroy
religion, belief in higher powers grew." When Chairman Mao attempted
to eradicate religious exercises and beliefs, Chinese citizens privately
turned to religion for relief during the repressive time.16 According to
These Commandments are analogous to Confucius' five cardinal principles because the
Commandments implicitly embrace certain relationships, husband and wife, friend and friends,
children and parents, and ruler and subject (i.e., God and humans). Id.
53. Christensen, supra note 12, at 491.
54. Franz Michael, Non-Chinese Nationalities and Religious Communities, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 268, 281 (Yuan-li Wu et al. eds., 1988).
55. Id.
56. Michael, supra note 53, at 283.
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reports during Chairman Mao's repressive period, religion in China grew
to an unofficial number of ten to twenty million adherents. 7 Such religious
growth exemplifies that while one may hope to diminish, denigrate, or
destroy one's right to religion, some rights are so fundamental not even the
Four Cardinal Principles can destroy them.
Within China's borders, the Chinese government embraced the
view of religion as a superstition. While this view was applicable and
manifested during its most restrictive times, it has not been maintained by
the Chinese citizens. The citizen's view of and reverence to Confucius
may be the guarantees to the right to religion for other religious adherents.
Confucianism and its analogy to other forms of religion, in addition to the
death of Chairman Mao, may be factors for China's tolerance and
acceptance of other religious views. 8 The three other Cardinal Principles
do not have the history or the reverence Confucianism has sustained
through the thousands of years and therefore, the possibility that the other
Principles, while presently supreme, may eventually die the death
Chairman Mao predicted and hoped for religion.
IV. CHINESE INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE
Domestically and internationally China has obligated itself to the
protection of religious freedom. Presently, China seems to be striving for
compliance on the one hand while attempting to eradicate religious view
on the other. The Chinese government's current doctrines show that the
historical view of religion is still accepted. Government documents
indicate that religion is still only tolerated subject to China's socialist
order.19  Freedom of religion is still illegal for those who subscribe to
Communist ideology. As one Chinese government document states: "the
fact that our Party proclaims and implements a policy of freedom of
religious belief does not, of course, mean that the Communist Party
members can freely believe in religion .... There can be no doubt at all
that they must be atheists. "6 Juxtaposed against China's mandate for its
citizens to adhere to Communist ideology is China's mandate that all
citizens have the right to believe or not to believe in religion, as is
manifested in its domestic documents. The Chinese government continues
57. Id. Officially, the Chinese government states the numbers are estimated at 6 million.
Id. While the numbers in comparison to the billion of Chinese citizens is small, the growth is an
obvious frustration to Mao's desire to eliminate religious thought.
58. The discussed tolerance in China in light of repressive intolerance is not a drastic
change but still constitutes tolerance.
59. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 417-18.
60. Id. at 419-20.
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to discourage religious beliefs while they tolerate religious beliefs. These
seemingly contradictory policies are inexplicable unless one considers that
their discouragement may be an act in futility. China, through its domestic
legislation, seems to acknowledge that religious freedom, whether it is a
grant or an inalienable right, must be given to its citizens. The Chinese
government has always discouraged religious thought terming it as an
opiate or superstition. Yet Chinese citizens still adhere to religion and
such may be proof of futility. Despite the government's desire to eradicate
religious beliefs and their attempt at that goal, religious beliefs seem to be
inextricably linked to China's history and culture. The government's
prohibition and restriction of religious rights does not seem to be a battle
the government will win.
China's concession of the battle can be seen in news reports
indicating that China is on the road to the protection of religious rights.
Tibetan officials are reporting that China's laws guaranteeing religious
freedom are being implemented in the spirit in which the laws were
enacted. 6' Most encouragingly, are reports in Tibet that Tibetans have
enjoyed freedom of religious rights over the past ten years.62 A Tibetan
regional government official has asserted that the Chinese government has
complied with international agreements, namely the Universal and
Religious Declarations.3 According to Zhou Dunyou of the Regional
Nationalities Affairs Commission, a government organization, the right to
religious freedom is being implemented in the spirit in which the laws
were created.M4 Such an assertion does not seem to be accurate based on
other recent news reports. In Tibet, the Dalai Lama's choice for
Buddhism's spiritual leader has been rejected by Chinese government
officials .65 The conflicting news reports seem to indicate that while
Chinese officials want the world to believe religious rights are protected in
China, in practice they are not. The Chinese government on the one hand
explicitly states that religious rights shall be protected, and even generates
news reports to reflect this fact, while on the other hand it interjects its
control whenever those religious rights are manifested.
61. China: Official Claims Tibet Enjoys "Full Freedom in Religious Belief", Oct. 1, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC Monitoring Service: Far East [hereinafter Tibetan
Religious Freedom].
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text.
64. Tibetan Religious Freedom, supra note 61.
65. Human Rights in Tibet Never Better, Says China, Nov. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Agence France Presse.
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Other reports indicate that the Chinese government is increasingly
tolerant of Western religious ideology, such as Catholicism. The
Chairman of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, Bishop Zong
Huaide, while acknowledging the need for continued progress, commends
the government for its recent tolerance of religious beliefs. According to
the reports, Catholic seminaries have been established in China's capital
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, Chengdu, Xian, and Shijiazhuang.17
Local experts attribute the recent tolerance to reform and new open door
policies. However, not all parts of China are embracing religious
tolerance.6 Provinces in northern Heibi, Shaanxi, and Gansu are still
practicing Catholicism underground in fear of the government's hostile
repression.6 In contrast, the organization the Institute of Islam Theology
has established several religious schools.70 Despite repression in some
parts of the country, China has seemingly accepted and expressly
acknowledged the right to religious freedom.
Chinese toleration of religious rights has only been recently
accepted. After the death of Chairman Mao, his successor Deng
Xiaoping, has allowed the reconstruction of religions shrines and allowed
the Chinese press to celebrate religious diversity," but Xiaoping's
permissiveness cannot, according to Communist doctrine, change the basic
communist goal. Deng Xiaoping was an integral part of constructing the
1982 Constitution which explicitly grants the right to religious freedom.7
Present compliance or tolerance of religious freedom may be related to
economic development in China. Currently, China is encouraging Western
business within its borders.7 3  Westerners with their differing religious
beliefs are aware of China's past persecution of those who exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion .7 China has seemingly
acknowledged that guaranteeing religious rights has its practical
66. China: Senior Bishop Hails Progress, Sept. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, South China Morning Post.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 420.
71. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 420; Michael, supra note 54, at 284.
72. Nathan, supra note 11, at 115.
73. Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Doing Business in China Public Law,
Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 66, 68 (1993).
74. Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 73, at 68.
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advantages." Additionally, China, in a effort to continue trade relations
with the United States, may have awakened to the fact that a guarantee of
fundamental rights is a guarantee to Most Favored Nations' trading status
with the United States."6 Many private business' that trade with China
have included a human rights guarantee in their contracts." While the
guarantee may be the least effective means, and probably has the least
effect in the changing tide in China, it is interesting to note that Westerners
who seek to do business with China have included religious rights within
their business contracts.
China's desire to have an economically productive government
may have the ultimate effect on the government's benevolence to its people
in the area of religious freedom. However, China has always had
religious rights included either implicitly or explicitly in their domestic
legislation. Such inclusion may ultimately relate to its view of humanity
through the eyes of Confucius and the long developing respect and
reverence for Chinese culture.
V. CHINESE CULTURE AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Confucian tenets and their similarity to other religious tenets
indicate that, barring another leader like Chairman Mao, religious
tolerance in China may continue. The Chinese government has seemingly
acknowledged, through the Four Cardinal Principles, that Confucianism is
inextricable to Chinese culture and no amount of repression can separate
one from the other. Proof of this acknowledgment is exemplified in
Chinese constitutions and reports indicating that most Chinese citizens
adhere to Confucianism. As an example, in the 1980s the Chinese
government in concession to the presence of Confucianism and other
religious beliefs, expended 140 million yuan (equivalent to 20 million
dollars) to the restoration of religious shrines.", The 1990s indicate that
religious tolerance may continue. Chinese officials released a Chinese
75. For example, China wants to host the 2000 Olympics. The United States, in an effort
to protect human rights has opposed China's bid without human rights guarantees. Id. at 73.
76. Id. at 77. Under United States legislation, if China fails to promote fundamental
human rights including freedom of expression and religion, the United States can deny China
Most Favored Nation status. Id.
77. For private businesses to trade with China, they must adhere to a code-of-conduct bill
which inter alia states that United States Economic Projects in China should ensure that decisions
concerning employment in such projects do not entail discrimination based on religion.
Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 73, at 85.
78. Kolodner, supra note 2, at 420; Michael, supra note 54, at 284.
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Protestant, Li Jiayao, from jail six months early for good behavior.,,
Although the release of Li Jiayao was delayed because of pending
investigation, his early release is encouraging and shows signs of a
potential death to China's early repressive past.1
Aspects of China's repressive past sometimes creep into the
country's future. While Westerners can be encouraged that China seems
to be changing its act, repression still exists in some respects. The same
news source that reported the early release of the Chinese prisoner, reports
that Chinese Premier Li Peng has signed decrees that ban unauthorized
religious ceremonies.8' Westerners, however, can be encouraged with
recent reports that the government has authorized national publication of a
quarterly magazine sponsored by the governmental agency, Religious
Affairs Bureau [RAB] .82 According to Religious Quarterly, Chinese
officials hope that the national publication will dispel the claims that China
persecutes its believers.8 3 However, Chinese believers are not satisfied
with the governmental publication." However, Ling Haicheng, a Beijing
based researcher at the Buddhist Association in China, remarked of the
national publication: "The magazine is supposed to have something on
government policies and opinion but I can't see anything remarkable or
new at all. "83 In fear of religious persecution after the union of China and
Hong Kong, officials in Hong Kong indicated that after 1997, Chinese
officials will cooperate in the spirit of goodwill and protect the right of
religious freedom. 86 Additionally, other reports indicate that relations with
the Vatican and Buddhists in Tibet are easing.8 According to reports, the
basis for the new ties between China and the Vatican concern the
impending union of Hong Kong and China.u
79. China: Early Freedom for Bible Man, Mar. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, South China Morning Post.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. China: "Last Resort" Religious Quarterly Dispels Few Doubts Over Freedom of
Worship, Sept. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, South China Morning Post.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. By Libby-Jane Charleston, May 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, South
China Morning Post.
87. China: Links with Vatican Strengthen, Sept. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, South China Morning Post; China: Tibet .Passes Rules on Religious Freedom, Apr. 29,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter News Service-Far East.
88. China: Links with Vatican Strengthen, supra note 87.
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The future of religious rights in China are encouraging. The
reasons for China's new tolerance and the hope for continued, expanding,
and legitimate tolerance are many and center primarily around China's
economic needs. The death of Chairman Mao and the rise to power of his
successor Deng Xiaoping, a less repressive leader than Chairman Mao and
one who accepts the role of religion within the Chinese community, are
other reasons for the recent tolerance. China's continued and expanding
links with other cultures, will also assist with their tolerance which may
even grow to accept religious rights within its borders. All present signs
point to that assertion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the latter part of the twentieth century indicates
otherwise, the People's Republic of China has always recognized one's
right to religious freedom. That right includes the right to believe,
worship, and teach others of one's religious inclination. Religious rights,
as defined through international and domestic documents, seem to be
fundamental rights because they incorporate aspects fundamental to one's
existence. While religious rights were repressed during the Mao period,
nearly twenty years after his death, China seems to manifest the view of
religious tolerance overtly to the world while repressing the view
domestically. The reasons for such tolerance may be arguable but they
relate to China's growing economic needs as well as the expanding
communication and business links with other cultures. China's own
culture, based on the tenets of Confucianism, also embrace one's right to
religious freedom. Belief in Confucius, however, is also contrary to
China's adherence to Communism. Confucianism has survived thousands
of years and its death is not soon forthcoming. It seems Confucianism
will outlive Communism. China's recent practices are encouraging and
support the theory that religious rights as well as other human rights may
expand if China continues on its current track.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of a single market among countries, which just
over fifty years ago were engaged in one of the bloodiest wars in
history, is one of the greatest experiments ever. The movement
toward a single market in Europe has undergone countless changes
since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) in 1951.1 Today, with the exception of some proposals
which did not enter into force as scheduled on January 1, 1993,2 a
single financial services market in Europe appears near completion.
3
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of
the movement toward a single market in Europe and the creation of
a unified competitive banking system among the European Union
member states.4 This Comment will trace the evolution of the
European Union and will examine its progress towards
harmonization. Next, this Comment will discuss the mechanisms
for achieving a unified banking system in Europe, and the regulation
of that system. Finally, this Comment will evaluate the impact
which these measures are having and will likely have on non-
European Union banks.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. History
Following the devastation of World War II European
political leaders began envisioning an integrated Europe for two
1. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, as amended, Treaties Establishing the European Communities (EC Official Pub.
Office, 1987) [hereinafter ECSC].
2. PAOLO CLAROTTI, E.C. HARMONIZATION IN THE BANKING SECTOR 1 (1992).
3. Id.
4. Id. Currently there are fifteen members of the European Union: Belgium, Denmark,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands.
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reasons.5 First, World War II left Europe in economic disarray.6
Second, with the growing political power of both the United States
and the Soviet Union, Europe was left in a political vacuum, leaving
the smaller countries of Europe in an uncertain and potentially
vulnerable position.7
With the passing of World War II, Europe began the
evolution toward a single market. In the fifty-one years following
World War II, Europe has achieved remarkable results in both
economic and legal integration.8 From the ECSC in 1951, 9 which
united Germany and France with regard to the regulation of coal and
steel, to the Treaty of Rome,' ° which worked to bring about
common external trade policies and a single internal market, Europe
appears to be close to attaining a unified market.
B. European Community Law and a Unified Market Today
Although the objective of the EEC Treaty to bring about a
common market in which goods, services, and capital could move
freely among members states failed, the desire to create a common
market continued among leaders in Europe.' In 1985, the European
Commission issued the White Paper containing approximately
twenty pieces of proposed legislation which needed to be passed to
ensure the goals of financial unification would be met. 12 The White
Paper encouraged greater liberalization of capital movements 3 for
three reasons: to enable access to efficient financial services; to
5. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL; CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 3 (1993).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ECSC, supra note 1, at 140.
10. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
11. Farzaneh Marvasti, The Single European Act: A Profitable Perspective Not Only for
the European Community, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 175, 175 (1991).
12. CLAROTIri, supra note 2, at 1.
13. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM (85)310 (1985) [hereinafter White Paper].
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achieve monetary stability; and to promote an optimal allocation of
European savings.
14
As a result of the White Paper, the Single European Act
(SEA) was signed in 1986 by all twelve member states. 5 The
significance of the SEA is its focus on creating a single internal
market to eliminate all legal, economic, and technical barriers to
trade between member states.1 6  The SEA combines 320 million
people in twelve countries, making it the largest market of all, and
enables the member states to compete with the United States and
Japan.' 7 Although the deadline of January 1, 1993, has passed, it
appears that the ambitious program set forth in the SEA will soon be
met. 18
Following the passage of the SEA, a committee of central
bank directors and monetary experts produced a report which
outlined the essential features of the European Monetary Union
(EMU).' 9 In December 1991, the European Council reached a final
agreement on the EMU at Maastricht. 20 The resulting agreement
imposed a commitment on member states to bring about a
convergence of monetary policies while at the same time reducing
deficit spending and inflation.2'
The criteria set forth for the EMU included: the creation of
the European Monetary Institute in 1994 to coordinate the activities
of central banks and to make recommendations on general monetary
policies; the requirement that member states without central banks
create them; the elimination of excessive deficits among member
states; and plans for total monetary unification.2 2 Moreover, the
plan for the EMU provided that in 1996 the European Council
would decide whether to begin the third stage of creating a European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) in 1997. The ESCB system is
14. Id. § 124-27.
15. Single European Act, 30 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 169) (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
16. Id. art. 8.
17. SEA, supra note 15, at 183.
18. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 1.
19. BERMANN, supra note 5, at 17.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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analogous to the United States Federal Reserve System, with a
European Central Bank (ECB) at its core.23 In the final EMU stage,
national currencies would be replaced by a single currency.2 4 With
the emergence of the EMU much legislation has been passed
through directives. 25 These directives have had a profound effect on
the regulation of banking in Europe, as well as other financial
service areas of the economy. These directives have resulted in the
creation of an integrated European banking system.26
III. DIRECTIVES AND BANKING
A. The Foundation for a Unified Competitive System
Harmonization in the banking sector has come about in
Europe through a series of directives which are the foundation for
the single market in financial services.27 The most significant
directives which have been passed by the Council are the Freedom
of Capital Movements Directive, 28 the First Banking Directive, 29 and
the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive.3" While other
important directives have been passed,3' these three directives have
been the most important because they establish the foundation for
the single market in the financial services sector.32
23. BERMANN, supra note 5, at 17.
24. Due to concerns expressed by the UK, the Maastricht European Council decided that
the UK could opt out of the monetary control exercised by the European Central Bank and out of
the single currency system for as long as it wished, but without prejudice to its joining at a later
date. Id.
25. See EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 189. Directives are one of the three types of
legally binding acts which may be passed by Council. Directives shall bind any Member State to
which they are addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a
competence as to form and means. Id.
26. See Banking Integration in the European Economic Community: Impact on the
Eurodollar Market, 3 TRANSNATL LAW 185 (1990) [hereinafter Banking Integration].
27. See CLAROTIr, supra note 2.
28. Council Directive 88/361/EEC, 1988 O.J. (386) 1 (establishing the free movement of
capital within the European Community).
29. Council Directive 77/780/EEC, 1977 O.J. (332) 30.
30. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, 1989 O.J. (386) 1.
31. See infra p. 16.
32. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 1.
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1. The Freedom of Capital Movements Directive
The Freedom of Capital Movements Directive was passed in
1988, and mandates the abolition of all restrictions on capital
movements between member states before July 1, 1990. 33 It allows
the free transfer of capital for any purpose, thus permitting cross-
border banking.34 The Freedom of Capital Movements Directive
serves two other key purposes. First, its implementation date has
been used as a mark to begin the first stage of the EMU. Moreover,
the directive helps to create a sense of community because
individuals and enterprises can transfer their funds freely throughout
the member states.3
2. The First Banking Directive
Although the First Banking Directive was passed before the
SEA established minimum harmonization and mutual recognition as
36its objectives, it is key to understanding later developments.
The First Banking Directive accomplished three
objectives.
a. It cleared away most of the obstacles to the freedom of
establishment of banks and other credit institutions.
b. It laid down common standards for the granting of
banking licenses.
c. It introduced the basic principle of the cooperation
between the supervisory authorities of different
member states (by setting up the banking Advisory
Committee). 3
Despite accomplishing these goals, several obstacles had to
be eliminated before a truly unified European Community Banking
Market could be established. First, a bank or other credit institution
33. Council Directive 88/361, supra note 28. This mandate provides an exemption for
Ireland and Spain which may keep certain restrictions until 1992, and Greece and Portugal which
may maintain their restrictions until 1995.
34. Id. art. 4. Member states may verify the nature of capital movements for statistical
and tax administration purposes, as well as for the supervision of financial institutions. Id.
35. BERMANN, supra note 5, at 616.
36. David H. Lui, A Bankers Guide to the European Community's 1992 Program, 107
BANKING L.J. 148, 156 (1990).
37. See CLAROTT1, supra note 2, at 2.
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required authorizations from eleven different supervisors to establish
branches in all member states.38 Second, banking services could not
be provided in all member states because permissible banking
activities were not defined." Thus, banks were required to conform
with activities approved by host' member states." The final
obstacle was that a branch in a host country was required to keep its
funds separate from its parent's funds. 42  The result was that a
foreign branch was required to have its own dedicated capital, thus
imposing a greater barrier to operating in foreign countries. 4"
The First Banking Directive failed because it sought to
centralize the supervision of banking activities.' Member states
realized that this directive would prevent uniformity within a
reasonable period of time45 because regulatory policies of different
member states reflect different factors such as "geographic location,
expertise of banking professionals, and the relationships between the
central banks and their respective banking systems.946
3. Second Banking Co-ordination Directive
In light of the obstacles under the First Banking Directive, a
Second Banking Co-ordination Directive was passed by the Council
in 1989. This directive creates a single banking license which is
38. Council Directive 77/780/EEC, supra note 29, art. 3.
39. Lui, supra note 36, at 157.
40. Under the First Banking Directive, banking regulation was to be carried out by the host
country. Host country is defined by the Second Banking Directive as the Member State in which
a credit institution has a branch or where it provides services. Council Directive 89/646/EEC,
supra note 30, art. 1. Thus, a foreign bank was to be regulated by the country in which it was
in. This contrasts with the Second Banking Directive which established that a foreign bank
would be regulated by its Home Country. The Second Banking Directive defines home Member
State as the country in which a credit institution has been authorized. Id. Thus a foreign bank
would be regulated by its country of origin, no matter where it was located in the Common
Market. Lui, supra note 36, at 156.
41. Lui, supra note 36, at 157.
42. Council Directive 77/780/EEC, supra note 29, art. 3.
43. Lui, supra note 36, at 157.
44. Banking Integration, supra note 26, at 188.
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id. at 187-88.
47. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30; see Banking Integration, supra note 26,
at 187.
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valid throughout all of the member states. 8  This approach allows
EEC based banks to provide financial services throughout the
Comnunity, and promotes growth and efficiency in the banking
industry. Thus, EEC banks should be stronger competitors within
the EEC and throughout the world. 49 The Second Banking Directive
sets forth the general rule that each Member State must honor the
banking laws and supervisory practices of all other member states."
Therefore, member states will be required to accept branches from
other member states without the need for applications."
Beyond establishing the principal of mutual recognition,52 the
Second Banking Directive defines the activities which are subject to
mutual recognition.53 These activities include:
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from
the public.5 4
2. Lending. 55
3. Financial leasing.
4. Money transmission services.
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g.
credit cards, travelers' cheques and bankers' drafts).
6. Guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers
in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs,
etc.);
(b) financial futures and options;
48. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 3.
49. Banking Integration, supra note 26, at 187.
50. Id. at 188-89.
51. CLAROTI-i, supra note 2, at 1.
52. E. Waide Warner, A Mutual Recognition and Cross Border Financial Services in the
European Community, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1992).
53. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, at Annex.
54. Id. This activity may only be performed by banks, not non banks. All of the other
activities listed may also be performed by non banks. See CLAROTI, supra note 2, at 3.
55. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, at Annex (including consumer credit,
mortgage credit, and financing of commercial transactions).
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(d) exchange and interest rate instruments; and
(e) transferable securities;
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of
services related to such issues.
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial
strategy and related questions, plus advice and services
relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings.
10. Money brokering.
11. Portfolio management and advice.
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities.
13. Credit reference services.
14. Safe custody services.56
If a bank is authorized to engage in these activities under the
terms of its home member state license, it is permitted to engage in
them in all of the other member states. Although this directive does
not impose the universal bank as a model,5 for banks to be
competitive, member states will adopt the most favorable banking
measures. 9 To eliminate the initial competitive advantage enjoyed by
banks from member states which currently permit all of the activities in
the annex, member states will eventually allow all of these activities. 60
This movement to deregulate banking activities is commonly referred
to as "the race for the bottom."6M This competitive system creates a
unified banking system which is competitive both within the European
Union and the world. 62
56. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, at Annex.
57. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 3.
58. A universal bank is a bank which offers a variety of financial services including those
listed in the Council Directive, supra note 28, at Annex. While the Directive allows the
universal bank, it does not impose it, and allows it to compete with other models such as
specialized banks and multifunctional banks. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 3.
59. Banking Integration, supra note 26, at 192.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Warner, supra note 52, at 26.
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B. Regulating a Unified European Banking System
As discussed previously, the Second Banking Directive
establishes a single license approach,63 which authorizes a bank or
credit institution to supply services throughout the European
Community through either branches or cross-border services.' In
order to obtain a unified banking system, the Second Banking Directive
and other related directives have established standards which regulate
the adequacy of a branch's administrative structure and its financial
situation.65 Thus, a minimum harmonized supervisory standard for
credit institutions has been created.'
1. Second Banking Directive and Minimum Harmonization
The Second Banking Directive establishes several provisions for
minimum harmonization which must be established by banks for mutual
recognition and the issuance of the Single Banking License.67 First, a
minimum capital base is required before a bank is permitted to receive
authorization to conduct business in another Member State. 68 The
minimum capital base requirement provides that authorities shall not
grant authorization in cases where initial capital is less than five million
European Currency Units (ECU).69 Although this provision does not
preclude member states from applying higher minimum capital levels
for its own institutions, it is unlikely that member states will do so
because of competition against foreign institutions. 7' This is an
example of the "race to the bottom," 71 and how the unified banking
system will enjoy stability while maintaining intra-community
competition.
Second, the Second Banking Directive requires the supervision
of major shareholders as a prerequisite to receipt of authorization to do
63. BERMANN, supra note 5, at 621.
64. CLAROTrl, supra note 2, at 3.
65. BERMANN, supra note 5, at 621.
66. Warner, supra note 52, at 12.
67. Lui, supra note 36, at 157.
68. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, art. 4.
69. Id. art. 4.
70. Id. art. 4; see Lui, supra note 36, at 158.
71. Lui, supra note 36, at 158.
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business in another Member State.72 This provision requires disclosing
the identity and the amount of holdings of any major shareholders who
own or control greater than ten percent of the bank, before
authorization is granted.73  If the authorities deem that these
shareholders or members are not suitable, they may refuse
authorization.74 Competition prevents member states from enforcing
more stringent levels of control on local banks because foreign credit
institutions are not required to comply with local rules that are more
rigid than their own. 7
Third, the size of participation in non-credit institutions by
credit institutions is limited for purposes of stability.76 This limitation
provides that credit institutions are limited to qualified holdings of no
more than 15% of that institution's own funds in a single non-financial
undertaking.77 Moreover, financial institution's total participation in
non-financial undertakings may not exceed 60% of that firm's own
funds.
78
Fourth, the Second Banking Directive requires Home States to
have sound administrative and accounting procedures, as well as
adequate internal control mechanisms .9
Fifth, under the Second Banking Directive, a minimum level of
capital is required for new banks.' This provision differs from the
First Banking Directive 8 because it eliminates the requirement that
branches operating in a separate Member State meet separate minimum
fund requirements.'
72. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, art. 5.
73. Id. art. 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 4; see Lui, supra note 36, at 158.
76. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, art. 12.
77. Id. art. 12.
78. Id.
79. Id. art. 13.
80. Council Directive, supra note 30, art. 4; see Lui, supra note 36, at 160.
81. See Council Directive 77/780/EEC, supra note 29.
82. See Council Directive 77/780/EEC, supra note 29; Council Directive 89/646/EEC,
supra note 30.
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IV. SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE AND HOST COUNTRY CONTROL
While the Second Banking Directive establishes the regulations
for minimal harmonization among member states,83 Host member states
will retain primary responsibility for other regulations. 4  The areas
which host member states will likely retain regulatory power include
supervision of liquidity and monetary policy. 85  Moreover, Host
Countries may also apply additional restrictions based on general public
interest."
V. OTHER RELATED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEGISLATION
Although the Second Banking Directive provides a wide range
of provisions to ensure the protection of depositors,87 other legislation
was required before mutual recognition and Home Country control
would take effect.88 Although the required date for the implementation
of these measures, January 1, 1993 has passed, the major legislation
required for setting up the single European market in financial services
is in place. 9 The purpose of this additional legislation is to ensure the
solvency of European banks, and protection for depositors. 9°
A. Own Funds
A directive on own funds was approved in April, 1989.91 The
purpose of this legislation is to harmonize the meaning of capital. 92
The definition of "own funds" is a credit institution's own capital,93
83. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, art. 4, 5, 12 and 13.
84. Lui, supra note 36, at 161.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 161-62.
87. Id. at 162.
88. Id. at 162. See Council Directive 88/361/EEC, supra note 28, art. 22.
89. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 1, 6. The major legislation which is currently in place
includes, the Freedom of Capital Movements Council Directive, supra note 28; the Second
Banking Directive, Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30; the directive defining funds,
Council Directive 89/299/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 124/16); the Solvency Ration Directive, Council
Directive 89/647/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386/14); the Large Exposure Directive, Council Directive
92/121/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 29/1).
90. Lui, supra note 36, at 162.
91. Council Directive 89/299/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 124/16).
92. Id.; see Lui, supra note 36, at 162.
93. Council Directive 89/299/EEC, supra note 89; see Lui, supra note 36, at 162.
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which is divided for assessment by distinguishing between internal and
external elements. 9' The internal element is primary capital and is
comprised of paid up equity, share capital, share/premium accounts,
and reserves. 9' External elements are funds which are not exclusively
controlled by the bank. 96 External funds include subordinated debt and
redeemable shares. 97 Under this directive, external elements must not
exceed 50% of the internal elements.9" Thus, the minimum level of
capital which a bank must have is maintained beyond capital which the
bank does not have sole control over.
B. Solvency Ratios
A directive on solvency rations was also adopted in December,
198999 to limit the amount of exposure to a banks own funds. l°
Limiting exposure is accomplished by establishing a minimum level,
whereby a bank's own funds must be at least eight percent of all its risk
based assets, including off balance sheet items."10 This percentage is
adjusted to reflect varying degrees of risk with the level of a bank's
own funds which are available to meet such risks.'02 The level of a
bank's own funds thus reflects the amount of risk which the banks'
assets are exposed to.' 03
C. Large Exposures
A directive regulating the level of large exposure a credit
institution may have was adopted on December 21, 1992.' 4 This
94. Council Directive 89/299/EEC, supra note 89; see Lui, supra note 36, at 162.
95. Council Directive 89/647/EEC, supra note 89; see Lui, supra note 36, at 163.
96. id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Council Directive 89/647, 1989 O.J. (L 386/14); see Lui, supra note 36, at 163.
100. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 4.
101. Lui, supra note 36, at 162.
102. CLAROrII, supra note 2, at 4. For example, governments of OECD countries are
considered as having zero percent risk; banks represent for other banks (always within OECD) a
risk of 20 percent; and residential mortgages represent a risk of fifty percent. All the other risks,
namely all the loans to commercial and industrial companies, have a weighting of 100 percent.
Id. at 4-5.
103. See Lui, supra note 36, at 162.
104. Council Directive 92/121, 1993 O.. (L 29/1).
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directive limits a credit institution's exposure to a particular client or
group of connected clients.0 5 Exposure is considered large, and thus
prohibited, when its value exceeds ten percent of the institutions own
funds. " Moreover, a credit institution's total level of large exposure
is limited to 25 percent of the institution's own funds."17 The result of
this directive, like the others, is to ensure competition among credit
institutions while protecting depositors.
D. Deposit Insurance
A system for establishing a minimum level of deposit insurance
for credit institutions has been recommended by the Commission, but
no final directive has been passed.10 8 The recommendation provides
that deposit insurance should be mandatory among Member State credit
institutions, but leaves each Member State free to determine whether
these systems should be publicly or privately organized."°  While a
minimum level of deposit insurance has not yet been established, the
member states are discussing a base level of 15,000 ECUs." 0
E. Consolidated Supervision
The issue of regulating credit institutions on a consolidated basis
was dealt with in the 1992 directive on the rules on the annual and
consolidated accounts of banks.' This directive broadens the scope of
the 1986 directive" 2 on the rules for regulating banks on a consolidated
basis." 3 The 1992 directive expands which institutions are regulated
on a consolidated basis from institutions where the parent company is a
credit institution," 4 to groups where the parent company is a financial
105. Id.
106. Council Directive 92/121, supra note 104; see CLAROTI, supra note 3, at 5.
107. Council Directive 92/121, supra note 104. see CLAROTrI, supra note 2, at 5.
108. CLAROTT1, supra note 2, at 6.
109. Id. at 6. Currently only four member states have followed this recommendation and
six others already have a deposit insurance scheme.
110. Id. at 6 (stating that coverage should focus on the depositors and not the deposits).
111. Council Directive, 92/30/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 110/52); see CLAROTri, supra note 2,
at 6.
112. Council Directive, 86/635/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 372/1).
113. See CLAROTII, supra note 2, at 6.
114. Council Directive 92/30, supra note 111.
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holding company with financial companies and primary credit
institutions as subsidiaries." 5 Therefore, supervisors are better able to
control the overall solvency and risk exposures of a related group of
companies. This is accomplished by preventing these related
companies from working around the minimum requirements. Hence,
related companies will no longer be permitted to work together to
bolster figures.
F. Capital Adequacy
The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) was proposed by the
Commission in 1990, and relates to the field of securities market
regulation." 6 Although it did not take effect until January 1, 1996, this
directive applies to firms which participate in the trading of
securities."17 Moreover, it provides for a minimum capital requirement
against a particular securities position." 8 The CAD provides for the
same requirements among banks and non-banks in the securities field,
thus creating a level playing field which enables banks and non-banks
to compete equally. n 9  This measure also establishes minimum
standards to protect institutions from instability created by market risk.
G. Investment Services Directive
The Investment Services Directive 120 (ISD) provides the
framework for establishing a European Passport in the securities field
and took effect on January 1, 1996.121 The ISD allows banks to
participate in trading securities under the Second Banking Directive. 122
However; because banks will gain a European banking license under
the Second Banking Directive, only three provisions of the ISD may
apply to credit institutions.123
115. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 6; see Council Directive, supra note 111.
116. Council Directive, C152/6, 1990 O.J. (revised C50/5, 1992 O.J.).
117. Council Directive C152/6, supra note 116; see CLAROTrI, supra note 2, at 7.
118. Council Directive C 152/6, supra note 116; see CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 7.
119. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 7.
120. Council Directive, 93/22/EEC, 1993 O.J.
121. Council Directive C152/6, supra note 116; see CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 8.
122. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 30, at Annex; see Clarotti, supra note 2,
at 10.
123. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 10.
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1. Investment firms must comply with the proposed
Capital Adequacy Directive;
124
2. Member states shall draw up prudential rules to be
observed by investment firms; 125 and
3. Investment firms may have access to stock
exchanges and organized securities markets. 1
26
The CAD affects banks which participate in the trading of
securities in three ways. 127 First, it establishes minimum capital levels
for investment firms, including banks which participate in various
investment activities. 128  These levels range from 50,000 ECUs to
73,000 ECUs, depending on the activity. 129 This standard differs from
the requirement of five million ECUs under the Second Banking Co-
ordination Directive because investment firms participate in a narrower
range of activities, thus requiring less capital.1 30 Second, the CAD
defines the calculation of capital requirements for investment firms and
banks with regard to their trading businesses.131  Third, the CAD
establishes definitions for banks and investment firms. 132 Because the
definitions of capital for banks and investment firms were originally
different, a common definition of capital for banks and non-banks was
established. 133 Again, the directive puts banks on a level playing field
with non-banks. 13
4
The ISD is also important because it requires Home States to
draw up mandatory prudential rules for firms authorized within those
124. Council Directive C152/6, supra note 116. CLAROTII, supra note 2, at 10. The
CAD provides minimum capital requirements for both investment firms and for credit
institutions. These minimum capital requirements are measured against a particular securities
position and are basically the same for both banks and non banks. Id. at 7.
125. Council Directive C152/6, supra note 116; see CLAROTIrI, supra note 2, at 10.
126. CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 10.
127. Id. at 12.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. CLAROTrI, supra note 2, at 12.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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states. 35 Prudential rules are basic rules of conduct and require as a
prerequisite to obtaining authorization that firms:
1. have sound administrative and accounting
procedures and adequate internal control
mechanisms;
2. make adequate arrangements for securities or
money belonging to investors so that their
ownership rights or claims are protected, and to
prevent the firm from using the securities or
money for its own account (banks can use money
for their own account);
3. are either members of a compensation scheme
effective on bankruptcy or default of the firm, or
make individual arrangements giving equivalent
protection to investors.
4. provide their regulators with such information on
request and at such intervals as requested (but not
less than quarterly) so that the firm's financial
soundness and adequacy or provisions for market
risk can be assessed;
5. arrange for adequate records to be kept and
retained for a prescribed period, where such
records relate to executed transaction (and are of a
type sufficient to allow Home States to monitor
prudential rules, including rules about market
risk); and
6. are structured and organized in such a way as to
minimize the risk of clients' interests being
prejudiced by conflicts of interests between the
firm, its clients, and another. 36
Moreover, the ISD will allow banks which participate in
investment activities to become members of stock exchanges in other
135. Id. at 10.
136. CLAROT-I, supra note 2, at 10.
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member states without setting up subsidiaries in those countries.13 7
Banks will be on a level playing field with investment firms, thus
creating more competition in the field of investment services.
H. Prevention of Money Laundering
Another important piece of legislation is the Directive on the
Prevention of Money Laundering which was approved by the
Council on June 10, 1991.138 It prevents abuses in the freedom of
the movement of capitals between member states because of drug
and other criminally related activities.1 39 This directive requires:
1. financial institutions must require identification of
their customers (and beneficial owners) when
entering into business relations or when
conducting one-off transactions over specified
thresholds (15,000 ECUs);
2. financial institutions must exercise due diligence
in examining unusual transactions;
3. financial institutions must report suspicious
transactions to the competent authorities for
combating money laundering, and to that extent,
bank secrecy has to be lifted;
4. financial institutions are required to establish
internal procedures against money laundering,
including suitable staff training programs.14
These measures have resulted in the standardization of
Member State banking laws. 14' The minimum harmonization of
supervision and the regulatory standards serve several purposes.
First, they provide the basic framework under which mutual
recognition can operate.14 2  Second, these measures operate as a
137. Id. at 11.
138. Council Directive, 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 164) 77.
139. CLAROTIn, supra note 2, at 15.
140. Id.
141. Warner, supra note 52, at 13.
142. Id.
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safeguard to ensure that in the pursuit of a competitive advantage,
banks will not race to the bottom in an unrestricted manner.
Moreover, these regulations ensure that banks will enjoy cost
savings'43 because banks are only required to meet one set of
regulations rather than multiple Member State regulations.'"
Through these measures, credit institutions within the European
Community will enjoy equality of competition and the stability of a
stable banking system that protects investors. 45 While not all of
these directives have been approved, those already in place provide
a single European market for financial services."
VI. THE EUROPEAN MARKET AND NON-EEC BANKS
A. From Reciprocity to National Treatment
As discussed previously, the Second Banking Directive
establishes a European Passport which allows banks of the different
member states to operate freely throughout the European
Community. 147  The Second Banking Directive will also create
benefits for non-EEC banks.'"4
The benefits which non-EEC banks will enjoy vary, and have
been a source of controversy in the area of which non-EEC banks
will enjoy the benefits of a European Passport. 149  First, under the
Second Banking Directive, subsidiaries of nonEEC banks which are
already established in a Member State will be able to operate the
143. Banking Integration, supra note 26, at 195.
144. Id.
145. See CLAROTrI, supra note 2; Lui, supra note 36.
146. See CLAROTTI, supra note 2, at 17.
147. See Council Directive, supra note 30.
148. See Creation of a European Financial Area, 36 EUR. ECON. 35 (1988); Banking
Integration, supra note 26, at 195. The Communities financial market will be characterized:
1. by the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services within
the Community;
2. by coordinated rules relating to the access to or exercise of the profession of
financial intermediaries, which are intended to ensure that all users of financial
services enjoy the same protection;
3. by coordinated systems of surveillance and control, designed to ensure the stability
of the financial system.
Id.
149. Lui, supra note 36, at 160-61.
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same as any other EEC bank. 50 However, branches of non-EEC
banks will not have the benefit of operating under a European
passport,' 5' and will thus be regulated and authorized separately by
each of the EEC member states. This is because branches do not
have to meet all of the regulatory requirements of subsidiaries.'12
Second, the guidelines for the regulation of non-EEC banks
which are not currently operating in Europe are also contained in the
Second Banking Directive. 153 In the initial version of the Directive,
the Commission required that without reciprocity of banking laws
between the non-EEC banks and the European Community, the
Commission could deny non-EEC banks access to the European
Community. 1 4 This requirement was abandoned in 1989.155 Today,
there is a revised standard for reviewing whether a non-EEC bank
may enjoy the benefits of a European Passport.1 56  Rather than
allowing a bank to be denied a European Passport because its Home
Country does not have reciprocity of banking laws with the
European Community, a non-EEC bank may only be denied a
European passport if the bank's Home Country discriminates against
European banks.'57 In other words, non-EEC credit institutions can
only be denied access to the European market if that bank's Home
Country does not provide the same competitive opportunities for
European credit institutions.1 58  "Although the revised standard is
vague and [may be] vulnerable to political undercurrents within the
Community, [it] provides an anti-discrimination mechanism under
which Common Market banks must be treated in the foreign nation
the same way the foreign nation would treat a domestic bank." 159
Prior to the revision of the standard from reciprocity to
national treatment, the United States might have been prevented
150. Banking Integration, supra note 26, at 196.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Council Directive, supra note 30, Title III.
154. Lui, supra note 36, at 160.
155. Id. at 160-61.
156. Id. at 161.
157. Council Directive, supra note 30, art. 9.
158. Id.
159. Lui, supra note 36, at 161.
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from enjoying entry into the European market because of barriers
between commercial and investment banking."6°  Under the
requirement of reciprocity, because European banks would be
prohibited from participating in securities activities in the United
States, the United States could have been denied access to the
European Market. 16' However, under the revised standard, it is
likely that United States banks and other non-EEC countries will
benefit from the European market as long as they do not participate
in discriminatory banking practices. Thus, foreign banks incur
fewer costs while operating in Europe because they may establish
themselves in any Member State, and set up branches wherever
market conditions are favorable.' 62 In the end this will create more
competition in the banking sector while providing tremendous
opportunities for non-EEC banks. 163
B. Establishing a Bank within the European Economic Community
Non-EEC countries may also establish companies as well as
banks within the EEC. 64 The ability of non-EEC countries to do
this is provided for in the Treaty of Rome.
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of
a Member State and having their registered office,
central management or main establishment within the
Community shall, for the purpose of applying the
provisions of this chapter, be assimilated to natural
persons being nationals of member states. The term
Companies shall mean companies under civil or
commercial law, including cooperative companies and
other legal person under public or private law, with
the exception of non-profit companies.165
160. Id.; see Glass-Steagall Act. This act prohibits banks from participating in securities
transactions.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 165.
163. Lui, supra note 36, at 165.
164. Single European Act, supra note 11, at 190.
165. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 58.
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Under the EEC Treaty a foreign company must satisfy two
conditions to benefit from the European market and from the rule of
non-discrimination."6 First, the foreign company must form a firm
or company under the laws of one of the EEC member states. 1
67
"The second requirement is that the company [including a foreign
bank] must have its registered office, central administration, or
principal place of business in the Community.' 68 Thus, a foreign
bank may be established in the EEC if it is established under the
laws of one of the EEC member states, and has its registered office,
central administration, or principal place of business is in the
Community.
These requirements are subject to two different
interpretations. The broad interpretation is that these place no
impediments on a foreign firm seeking to establish its business in
that country. 69 The narrow view is that there are restrictions on
third-country companies. 70 Because of these differing views and
because the EEC has not acted on this issue, it may be advantageous
for a foreign bank to establish itself in a Member State with the
broader interpretation of the EEC Treaty as soon as possible. 71
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has undergone
countless changes which have resulted in the creation of a unified market.
While all of the mechanisms for creating a single European market in
financial services are not in place, a unified market in Europe has been
created,1 72 resulting in a unified banking system which is designed to be
166. Single European Act, supra note 11, at 191.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Examples of countries which follow this view include the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg. These countries do not require companies to actually
conduct business in that member state. Id. at 191.
170. Single European Act, supra note 11, at 191. Examples of countries which place
restrictions are Germany and France. Restrictions include the requirement that a foreign
company formally register in that country, that it maintain a place of business in that country,
and that it conduct genuine business activity in that or another specific Member State before it
granted rights under article 58. Id.
171. Id. at 191-92.
172. CLAROTrI, supra note 2, at 1.
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both competitive and stable. 173 Moreover, the single European market
could provide tremendous opportunities for non-EEC firms.174 While the
end result is still unknown, as the world becomes more global, a unified
European investment services market may become a world leader in what
is now a competitive global marketplace.
173. Lui, supra note 36, at 165.
174. Id.
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